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STANDING To SUE IN COLORADO: A
STATE OF DISORDER
GLENN WARREN MERRICK*

An increasing number of Colorado litigators are discovering that they
are confronted with the threshold issue of standing to sue in state court in a
significant number of cases, especially when public law questions are involved.' Unfortunately, one need invest only a modest amount of time in
the law library to discover that the law of standing is a labyrinth of compounding confusion. A tempting inference is that the left judicial hand is
ignorant of what the right has done, and that standing is frequently a device
of expedience-a mechanism for sidestepping issues that the court finds
unattractive. This article does not pretend to provide a compass to guide
lawyers and jurists successfully through the maze; rather, its purpose is to
analyze the current state of the law of standing in Colorado, to offer some
comparisons to federal Supreme Court jurisprudence, 2 and to spotlight some
of the more vexing problems which remain unresolved.
I.

THE SOURCE AND TEST FOR STANDING

The bedrock case upon which most of the recent Colorado decisions rely
3
In
for the expression of state standing principles is Wl'mbery v. Ettenberg.
Wimberly, a number of bail bondsmen filed suit seeking to enjoin the operation of a program that permitted certain defendants to deposit a sum of cash
equal to ten percent of the total amount of their bail to obtain pre-trial
release. The Wmbery plaintiffs claimed that this program had driven them
to the brink of bankruptcy. On appeal, after the district court had entered
an order enjoining operation of the program, the Colorado Supreme Court
took the opportunity to address the law of standing.
*
B.A., University of Colorado, 1976; J.D., University of Texas, 1979. Currently an associate with Davis, Graham & Stubbs in Denver, Colorado.
1. As a practical matter, standing issues arise less frequently when the suit seeks to challenge private action having limited consequence beyond the parties. See generally C. WRIGHT,
LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 43 (3d ed. 1976).
2. The law of standing in the federal courts is equally enigmatic; it has baffled some of the
best legal scholars and has troubled the Supreme Court on several occasions. Writing for the
Court in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970), Justice
Douglas stated: "Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such." Chief
Justice Warren's majority opinion in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), quoted Professor
Freund for the proposition that standing is one of" 'the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire
domain of public law.' " Id. at 99 (quoting Hearings on S 2097before the Subcomm. on Constitutwtnal
Rights ofthe Senate ]udciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 498 (1966) (statement of Prof. Paul A.
Freund). Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953) describes standing as a "complicated speciality of
federal jurisdiction." More recently, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982), the majority recognized that
"the concept of 'Art. III standing' has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the
various cases decided by this Court which have discussed it.
3. 194 Colo. 163, 570 P.2d 535 (1977).
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First, the justices made it clear that standing in the state courts has its
wellspring in article III of the Colorado Constitution, 4 which mandates separation of powers between the three branches of government. The court exbasis for
pressed the importance of this constitutional separation of powers
5
the standing doctrine, quoting Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Cito of Chicago:
[T]his power of judicial determination is delicate in character
. . .for it may result in disapproval of acts of. . .both co-ordinate
branches of government. This care . . .has been proverbially observed by the courts, lest . . .they exceed their judicial authority
and invade the fields of policy preserved to the legislative arm or to
the realm of administrative discretion lodged in the executive
branch .... 6
In addition to the constitutional substructure undergirding the standing doctrine, the Wimberly court remarked that: "[J]udicial self-restraint, based upon
considerations of judicial efficiency and economy, also supports the
7
doctrine."
The court then turned its attention to formulating the proper test for
standing. Justice Erickson, writing for the court, recognized that the United
States Supreme Court has formulated a two-prong test for standing in Association of Data Processing Service Organizationsv. Camp.8 The test articulated in
Data Processing requires that the plaintiff allege that the challenged provision
or conduct caused him injury in fact, and that the injury sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 9 The Wimberly court
agreed that standing involves a two-prong inquiry and conformed the first
prong of the state standing test to that set forth in Data Processing-the plaintiff must have suffered injury in fact.' 0 However, the justices rejected the
second part of the Data Processing test. In place of the "zone of interest"
inquiry, the Wimberly court substituted the more stringent "legal interest"
test. That is, to determine whether the plaintiff has standing to sue, the
4. COLO. CONsT. art. III, provides:
Distribution of Powers
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments,-the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments
shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution expressly directed or permitted.
5. 115 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1940).
6. 194 Colo.at 167, 570 P.2d at 538 (quoting Ex-,Ce//-O, 115 F.2d at 629). Accord McCroskey v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51, 54 & n.3 (Colo. 1981). But cf. Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662,
668 n.5 (Colo. 1982) (suggesting that separation of.powers concern may be separate and distinct
from the test for standing to sue).
7. 194 Colo. at 167, 570 P.2d at 539. Accord McCroskey v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo.
1981).
8. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
9. 1d. at 153. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), a companion case decided the same
day as Data Processbng, repeated this two-prong standard. Id at 164.
10. 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. Strictly speaking, Data Processing requires only an
allegation of injury in fact. 397 U.S. at 162. Subsequent cases, however, have frequently restated this aspect of the federal test for standing in terms of plaintiff "showing" that he has been
injured in fact. See in/a notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
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court must decide whether the interest advanced is legally protected.

1

This dissimilarity between the second prongs of the Data Processing and
Wimberly standing tests is significant. The Data Processing Court expressly
rejected the "legal interest" inquiry because it goes to the merits; the justices
2
viewed standing issues as quite distinct and preliminary to the merits.' The
Wimberly tribunal disagreed:
In our view, a decision on the merits is always inextricably tied to
every case which involves the issue of standing ....
The typical lawsuit raises three questions: (1) whether the
plaintiff was injured in fact, (2) whether the injury was to a legally
protected right, and (3) whether the injury resulted from the alleged action of the defendant. Courts in different jurisdictions may
choose to address any or all of these questions as part of the inquiry
on standing. But we deem the more reasonable approach to be to
address only the first two questions in the context of standing.
Those two questions can be decided by the court as a matter of law
in the preliminary inquiry on standing. The third question is propof fact and is the primary question to be
erly reserved for the trier
13
resolved on the merits.
With the standing test thus formulated, the Wimberly court went on to
hold that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy either aspect of the test. First, the
damage sustained by the bail bondsmen was characterized as "indirect and
incidental pecuniary injury," and such an injury was deemed insufficient to
constitute injury in fact. 14 Second, the plaintiffs could not point to a statutory or constitutional provision protecting them against competition from
5
bail alternatives. i
It is important to distinguish between the theoretical underpinnings of
the federal standing doctrine and the separation of powers basis for standing
articulated in Wimber'y. In the federal courts, standing is but one of several
doctrines, comprising the concept of justiciability under which may preclude
a federal court from deciding a case because the issue is not yet ripe, involves
11.By appending this second criterion as a part of the Colorado test for standing, the
Wimberly court removed Colorado from the majority of states in which one need only suffer
injury in fact to possess standing unless a statute or "public policy" requires otherwise. One
leading commentator has described this majority view as "both simple and satisfactory" in comparison to the complicated federal law of standing. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 22.00-4, at 722 (Supp. 1970).
12. 397 U.S. at 153.
13. 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. It is interesting that the Wimberly court did not
mention a case that had been decided only five years earlier and which had articulated the twoprong standing test in the dtjunctwe. In Colorado Chiropractic Ass'n v. Heuser, 177 Colo. 434,
438, 494 P.2d 833, 834 (1972), the court had said that standing required a plaintiff to "show
that it is an aggrieved party or that it is a party whose interest the statute was designed to
protect." (emphasis added).
14. 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. But see Board of County Comm'rs v. Thornton, 629
P.2d 605, 609 (Colo. 1981) (holding that owner of property adjacent to rezoned land has standing to challenge allegedly illegal zoning where value of property has diminished as a result of
rezoning).
15. 194 Colo. at 168-69, 570 P.2d at 539. But cf. People v. District Court, 196 Colo. 116,
117 n.2, 581 P.2d 300, 301 n.2 (1978) (holding, without explanation, that a district attorney, as
contrasted with the Wimbery bail bondsmen, has standing to challenge the bail bonding
program).
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a political question, is moot, or would require the rendering of an advisory
opinion. 16 "Justiciability," in turn, is a shifting term of art' 7 used to express
the dual limitations placed on the federal courts by article III of the Consti18
tution which limits federal jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies."
These dual limitations confine the federal courts to questions "presented in
an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process," and they define "the role assigned to the
judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts
will not intrude into areas committed to other branches of government.""
This explanation of justiciability demonstrates that a separation of powers maxim can give rise to nonjusticiability in the federal courts; however,
the basis for nonjusticiability is the political question doctrine rather than
standing. Both standing and the political question doctrine are embodied in
the "case" or "controversy" restriction found in article III, but each imposes
20
a distinct and separate limitation on the federal judiciary.
Perhaps the best expression of the difference between the principle of
standing and the political question doctrine is found in Baker v. Carr.2 1 Concerning political questions, the Baker Court said: "[I]t is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government
. . .which gives rise to the political question. . . . The nonjusticiablity of
22
a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers."
Standing, on the other hand, involves a different issue in the federal courts:
standing requires that the litigants have "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."' 23 Similarly, in Flasi v. Co16. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). See also United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302,
305 (1943) (collusive suit). However, "standing" has sometimes been used by the Court as a
shorthand expression for these various other elements of justiciability. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99;
Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Miuse of "Standing," 14 STAN. L. REV. 433, 453 (1962).
17. Justiciability is a difficult concept to understand, in part because, as the Court observed in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1961), it is "not a legal concept with a fixed
content or susceptible of scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle
pressures, including the appropriateness of the issues for decisions. . . and the actual hardship
to the litigants of denying them the relief sought."
18. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968).
19. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980) (quoting Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)).
20. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974); see Simon
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-38 (1976). But see Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-74
(1982) (the article III standing requirement confines the federal judicial power to a role "consistent with a system of separated powers").
21. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
22. Id. at 210. Accord Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-19 (1969).
23. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. The converse of the quote from Baker is generally not true.
Absent injury in fact, concrete adverseness and a sharp presentation of issues do not establish
standing in the federal courts. E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486 & n.21 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39-40 (1976); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40
(1972). But cf.United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) (discussed more
fully in/ia note 96).
A leading treatise makes the distinction between standing and political questions suc-
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hen ,24 the Court observed that "[t]he fundamental aspect of standing is that
it focuses on theparty seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and
25
not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.
Based on established federal principles, therefore, one would not have
expected the Colorado Supreme Court to rely on article III of the state constitution as the foundation for standing. A more logical source of the standing doctrine is section 1 of article VI of the Colorado Constitution. 26 That
section limits the state courts to the exercise of "judicial power," and it can
be persuasively argued that judicial power extends only to suits evidencing a
"case or controversy" as those terms are understood in federal case law. 2 7
Notwithstanding the peculiar source of the standing doctrine announced in Wimberly, almost without exception 28 the Colorado Supreme
Court has employed the Wimberly standing test. 29 But the nature of standing
in Colorado remains unclear. One decision from the state supreme court
contains an unequivocal statement that standing goes to the court's constitutional jurisdiction. 3 0 Another more recent decision, however, agrees that the
first part of the Wimberly test, the requirement of injury in fact, has constitutional origins but states that the latter part of the test, the requirement that
the asserted interest be legally protected, is founded only in judicial
3
prudence. '
cinctly: "Unlike the rules of standing... [the] political question doctrine purports to establish
" 13 C.
that a particular question is beyond judicial competence, no matter who raises it ..
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3534, at 297 (1975).

24. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
25. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
26. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § I provides in pertinent part:
Section 1. Vestment ofjudicial power. The judicial power of the state shall be
vested in a supreme court, district courts, a probate court in the city and county of
Denver, a juvenile court in the city and county of Denver, county courts, and such
other courts or judicial officers with jurisdiction inferior to the supreme court, as the
general assembly may, from time to time establish ....
27. Indeed in Theobald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 644 P.2d 942, 950 (Colo. 1982), the
court indicated that absent "an actual controversy for adjudication," plaintiffs lack standing.
Accord Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982).
28. Aside from the special standing test for taxpayers suing on behalf of a municipality
announced in McCroskey v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1981), the only aberration in the
supreme court's decisions appears in a footnote in R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980),
wherein the majority stated that standing problems may be analyzed using the test announced
in Data frocessing: "(a) whether the party alleges... injury in fact; and (b) whether the interest
sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of interests encompassed by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at 668 n.3. Data Processing and Wmberly were both
cited for this proposition, despite the fact that Wimberly had expressly rejected the Data Processing
formulation of the standing test.
29. Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 668, 667-68 (Colo. 1982); Board of County Comm'rs v.
Thornton, 629 P.2d 605, 608 (Colo. 1981); Colorado Springs v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Pension Fund, 626 P.2d 1122, 1126 (Colo. 1980); Marco Lounge, Inc. v. Federal Heights,
625 P.2d 982, 984 (Colo. 1981); Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Comm'n, 620
P.2d 1051, 1055-59 (Colo. 1980); Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1380
(Colo. 1980); Dodge v. Department of Social Serv., 198 Colo. 379, 380, 600 P.2d 70, 71-72
(1979)..
30. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Colo. 1980). Accord McCroskey v. Gustafson, 611 P.2d 984, 986 (Colo. App. 1980), afd, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1981).
31. Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982); accord McCroskey v. Gustafson, 611
P.2d 984, 986 (Colo. App. 1980), af'd, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1981). This statement from Conrad is
analogous to the rule in federal courts that although article III of the federal Constitution undergirds the injury-in-fact requirement of standing. Eg., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
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INJURY IN FACT

The purposes served by the injury in fact requirement are said to be
threefold. First, it insures a complainant will zealously present a complete
perspective of the adverse consequences flowing from the specific set of facts
underlying the grievance. Second, it guarantees that judicial review is necessary to protect the complaining party's interests. Third, it assures that any
relief granted will be no broader than is required by the facts giving rise to
32
the dispute.
Plaintiffs in the Colorado courts can establish the injury in fact requirement in a variety of circumstances. 33 The Colorado Supreme Court has said
that the injury need not be direct, economic harm;3 4 intangible loss can be
U.S. 363, 372 (1982); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973),
the second prong of Data Processing, the "zone of interest" requirement, is a nonconstitutional
limitation to be applied only in appropriate circumstances. E.g., Valley Forge Chr ttn College,
454 U.S. at 474-75; Gladstone,Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100 n.6; Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976). See also Wiznberly, 194 Colo. at 166, 570 P.2d at 538.

The drawing of these distinctions is often difficult as the Valley Forge ChristianCollege majority recently remarked:
[I]t has not always been clear in the opinions of this Court whether particular features
of the "standing" requirement have been required by Art. III ex proprio vigore, or
whether they are requirements that the Court itself has erected and which were not
compelled by the language of the Constitution.
454 U.S. at 471.
32. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974). Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) also identifies three implicit policies of
article III served by the requirement of "actual injury redressable by the court." First, it assures
that legal questions are resolved in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences ofjudicial action. Second, it insures that one decision will not pave the
way for other lawsuits which have some but not all of the same facts. Finally, it guarantees that
the federal courts do not simply become vehicles for the value interests of concerned bystanders.
Id. at 472-74.
33. By comparison, the United States Supreme Court has allowed important rights to be
vindicated when plaintiffs had no mcre stake in the outcome of the suit than a fraction of a
vote, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); a five dollar fine and costs, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 4240 (1961); and $1.50 poll tax, see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966). In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), the Court stated: "The basic idea
that comes out in numerous cases is that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out
a question of principle: the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the motivation." Id. at 689 n.14 (quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 601, 613
(1968)).
The principal exception to this "trifle" theorem involves suits challenging the legality of
federal expenditures wherein standing is predicated solely upon taxpayer status. In these cases
the Court has ruled that "the interests of a taxpayer in the moneys of the federal treasury are
too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect to furnish a basis for [standing]." Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and States, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 478, 761 (1982) (quoting Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952)). See
also Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464,478-79 (1938); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 487 (1923). Despite the potentially significant stake of major corporate taxpayers in the
federal treasury, see Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 497 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
this genre of taxpayer litigation founders on standing shoals unless the taxpayer can meet both
of the special criteria for maintaining these suits announced in Fast. See infra notes 107-09 and
accompanying text.
34. Dodge v. Department of Social Serv., 198 Colo. 379, 382, 600 P.2d 70, 71-72 (1979)
(citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973)); accord Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662,
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sufficient injury to meet the initial Wmberly criterion. 35 It is also clear that
the injury may be prospective under Colorado law. In CF&I Steel Corp. v.
Colorado Air Pollution Control Commission,36 the court remarked that "the
proper inquiry to be made as to the injury in fact requirement is 'whether
the action complained of has caused or threatens to cause injury in fact' to the
plaintiff."' 37 In this respect the law of standing in state court is consistent
with the rule that has developed in federal court 38 notwithstanding the significant doctrinal difficulties evident in federal law. 3 9 On the other hand,
when the Colorado Supreme Court has deemed the threatened injury to be
too remote and abstract to prevent "an actual controversy for adjudication,"
it has ruled that the plaintiffs lack standing. 4° What remains unclear is how
immediate the injury must be to confer standing.
The most notable recent Colorado case addressing the requirement of
668 (Colo. 1982); Olson v. State Bd. for Community College and Occupational Educ., 652 P.2d
1087 (Colo. App. 1982), cert. granted, VI BRIEF TIMES RrTR. 975 (Colo. Oct. 18, 1982) (No.
82SC27 1). See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env'tl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 73-74
(1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261-63 (1977); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206
(1962). Cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (posting of the Ten Commandments on the walls of public classrooms); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (systematic exclusion of blacks from juries).
35. Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051, 1058 (Colo.
1980) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)). See also supra note 34.
36. 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).
37. Id. at 279, 610 P.2d at 92 (emphasis in original) (quoting Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194
Colo. 163, 570 P.2d 535 (1977)). CF&ISteel Corp. deals principally with the related doctrine of
ripeness. For a brief analysis of the interplay between standing and ripeness in this case, see
Note, PAe-Enforcement Judicial Review: CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colorado Air Pollution Control
Comm'n, 58 DEN. L.J. 693 (1981).
38. Threatened injury is sufficient in the federal courts as well. See, e.g., Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 499 (1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972); Doremus v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. 429, 434 (1951); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923). However, in Laird
the United States Supreme Court held that subjective injury is insufficient; the federal complaint must allege a claim of present, objective harm or a threat of future objective injury. 408
U.S. at 13-14. In Frothingham, a unanimous Court stated that prospective damage will not suffice to support standing unless it is threat of "immediate" injury. 262 U.S. at 488.
39. Complicated justiciability problems can arise in federal court when threatened harm is
the basis for injury in fact. Article III does not empower federal judges to adjudicate "abstract"
or "hypothetical" claims. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 332-33 & n.9 (1977); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1969); United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947); but cf. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 6 n.7
(1977) (challenge to limitation on student loans permitted on assertion that litigant "may require" such a loan). But " '[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury
to obtain preventative relief. If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough.' " Babbitt v.
United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (quoting Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923)); accord Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143
(1974). Nevertheless, "[a] plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger
of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement." Babbitt, 442
U.S. at 298; cf O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 494 (plaintiff need only allege such danger of injury). The
Babbitt Court summarized the difficulty of balancing the competing justiciability constituents
when the plaintiff complains of threatened harm as follows: "The difference between an abstract question and a 'case or controversy' is one of degree, of course, and is not discernible by
any precise test." 442 U.S. at 297.
40. Theobald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 644 P.2d 942, 950-51-(Colo. 1982).
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41
injury in fact is Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Commission,
where the court reexamined the distinction it had drawn in Wi'mberl between "direct" and "indirect" economic injury. The plaintiff kennel clubs
were seeking review of a decision by the Colorado Racing Commission to
grant additional racing days to a competing kennel club; the plaintiffs
claimed that the grant was in excess of the power vested in the Commission
under the Colorado Racing Act. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for want of standing, and the Colorado Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Writing for a unanimous court on review of the court of appeals decision, Justice Dubofsky returned to the Wimberly distinction between direct
42
According to
economic loss and indirect and incidental pecuniary injury.
the CloverleafKennel Club court, direct economic loss, in contradistinction to
indirect loss, comprehends "out of pocket" losses, "direct, palpable economic
43
Of greater significance, howinjury" or an adverse impact on revenues.
ever, is the fact that in a footnote the court implicitly overruled part of the
Wmbery holding while ostensibly following that decision. That footnote deif the plaintiff can point
clares that even indirect economic loss is actionable
44
to statutory protection against such harm.

The court then turned its attention to the court of appeals' holding that
economic injury from lawful competition can never confer standing to challenge the legality of agency action. The justices disapproved the lower
court's interpretation of earlier precedent, and stated that there is no per se
rule that economic impact from lawful competition is never sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Wimberly test. Rather, such an injury can suffice to
45
The court
confer standing if the economic interest is legally protected.
held, however, that the Cloverleaf Kennel Club plaintiffs lacked standing because, inter ah'a, they had failed to allege sufficiently the adverse conse41. 620 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1980).
42. It will be recalled that W'nberly held that indirect and incidental pecuniary damage is
insufficient to constitute "injury in fact." 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539.
43. 620 P.2d at 1057. See also Augustin v. Barnes, 626 P.2d 625, 629 (Colo. 1981).
44. 620 P.2d at 1057 n.8; see also Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982). The
broadening scope of fiscal loss sufficient to constitute injury in fact is even more evident when
this language from CloverleafKennel Club is compared with older standing decisions. For example, in Rinn v. Bedford, 102 Colo. 475, 84 P.2d 827 (1938), an attorney brought suit challenging
a state tax levied on professional services. The attorney sought to attack the statute both as a
provider and as a consumer of these services. Despite the apparent direct economic impact on
the plaintiff as a consumer of professional services, the court held that he could not attack the
statute in that role. In so ruling, the court remarked: "That the price charged him for such
services of others is fixed by the addition of the amount of the tax or any other factor does not
entitle the plaintiff to complain. He may take the service as offered or he may leave it." 102
Colo. at 479, 84 P.2d at 829.
45. Relying on federal precedent, Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968); FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258
(1924), Justice Dubofsky formulated the rule this way:
[Economic impact from lawful competition is not sufficient to confer standing] unless
a legislative intent to protect economic interests from competitive harm is explicit or
fairly inferable from the statutory provisions under which an agency acts or if the
legislature expressly confers standing on competitors to seek review of agency action.
620 P.2d at 1057.
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quences resulting from the award of additional racing days to their
competitor.
"Injury in fact" has additional facets, one of which was mentioned in
Wnimberly. The Winberly court perceived that Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wefare
Rights Organization46 had bifurcated the injury in fact prong and had held
that this initial aspect of the standing test is not satisfied unless: 1) the plaintiff suffers injury in fact, and 2) the relief sought will redress the damage
sustained. 47 Although Wi'mberl merely described this second phase of injury
in fact without expressly adopting it, other Colorado cases such as DtLeo v.
Board of Regents of the University of Colorado48 and Lee v.People49 have denied
50
standing where the relief sought would not repair the alleged wrong.
There are also dissimilarities between federal and state law, however. For
example, despite the fact that federal decisions have often insisted upon "a
fairly traceable causal connection between the alleged injury and the challenged conduct,"' 5 1 the Colorado Supreme Court has indicated that causality
52
is not required to establish the threshold of standing in state court.
46. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
47. 194 Colo. at 167, 570 P.2d at 538. Other recent federal Supreme Court cases expressly
articulating the "redressability" requirement are Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) and Watt v. Energy
Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 161 (1981). This requirement has lately been refined in
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). In that case, the majority held that when the loss
threatened or suffered may derive from more than one source, the federal litigant need not
demonstrate that the loss will not be sustained; a showing that a favorable decision will likely
remove the particular source that occasioned the suit is all that is required. 456 U.S. at 243.
48. 196 Colo. 216, 590 P.2d 486 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 927 (1979). DiLeo has been
severely criticized by one commentator. See Note, Standing to Challenge SpecialAdmi sion Programs,
50 U. COLO. L. REV. 361 (1979).
49. 170 Colo. 268, 460 P.2d 796 (1969).
50. There seems to be a significant difference between federal and state decisions with
respect to equal protection challenges. In DiLeo, the court denied standing to one seeking to
challenge a special admissions program for law school. The justices noted that if the program
were struck down, DiLeo would not benefit because he would not have qualified for admission
under the conventional admission standards. Of interest is the fact that the court was not dissuaded from its ruling by the possibility that if the program were declared unconstitutional, the
university might have chosen to redraft the special admissions program along non-racial lines
rather than simply eliminating it. 196 Colo. at 221, 590 P.2d at 489.
In contradistinction, the United States Supreme Court has confronted the problem of underinclusive statutes, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.24 (1976) and Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975), without denying standing merely because the legislature could choose to
cure the illegal discrimination in a manner that would not affect the plaintiff. See also Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1979). Accord Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526
(1959); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932). This result is simply a more
particularized application of the general rule of redressability discussed in Larson. See supra note
47.
51. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env'tl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (quoting
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977)). Accord Larson
v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 241 (1982); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 375
(1982); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 161
(1981); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 44-46 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,505 (1975). But see United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687-89 (1973).
In Valley Forge Christian College, however, the Court described "redressability" and
"causalty" as independent parts of the article III phase of standing, separate and distinct from
the injury in fact requirement rather than merely aspects of it. 454 U.S. at 472.
52. Cloverleaf Kennel Club v. Colorado Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051, 1056 (Colo.
1981); Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977). But see Board of
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Yet another feature of injury in fact is the ill-defined concept of "particularity." The Colorado courts have on some occasions indicated that the
damage must be particularized; that is, it must be more personal than one
which is shared by a large group of potential litigants. 53 In other Colorado
cases, however, this characteristic of injury in fact has been completely ighas also chosen to apply the
nored. 54 The United States Supreme Court
"rule" of particularity on a few occasions. 55
III.

LEGALLY PROTECTED INTEREST

The second prong of the Wimberly test, whether the complaining party's
interest is legally protected, is even more perplexing. For instance, the Colorado Court of Appeals has opined that mere "incidental" advantage derived
from statutes primarily designed to protect third parties is insufficient to establish the legally protected interest prong.56 Confusion also results from the
fact that in going beyond the injury in fact requirement, Wimberly and Cloverleaf Kennel Club employ language which seems to equate standing with
whether a claim for relief has been stated. Indeed, the Wimberly court said:
"When standing is in issue, the broad question is whether the plaintiff has
stated a claim for relief which should be entertained in the context of a trial
on the merits." 57 And the Cloverleaf Kennel Club court reinforced the
equation:
Abandonment of Data Processing's rigid threshold view of
standing does not necessitate a full-scale trial on the merits before
standing disputes may be resolved. The question of whether a
County Comm'rs v. Thornton, 629 P.2d 605, 612 n.1 (Colo. 1981) (Hodges, C.J., dissenting)
(reading Wimberly and Dodge as supporting the proposition that injury in fact to private property occurs only when there is "an injury directly resulting from the action complained of').
53. Smith v. City of Aurora, 153 Colo. 204, 385 P.2d 129 (1963); Denver v. Miller, 151
Colo. 444, 450, 379 P.2d 169, 172-73 (1963); Kolwicz v. City of Boulder, 36 Colo. App. 142, 145,
538 P.2d 482, 483 (1975). Smith and Miller involved the rule that a citizen of an unincorporated
area that is not part of a tract to be annexed by a city is not a "person aggrieved" by annexation
proceedings. Thus, such a person has no standing to bring suit under a statute authorizing suits
by persons aggrieved by the annexation proceedings. According to the Miller court, the reason
for the rule is that "[s]uch a person does not suffer, by reason of the annexation, a detriment
peculiar to himself as distinguished from the general detriment theoretically shared by all property owners in the governmental unit." 151 Colo. at 450, 379 P.2d at 173.
54. Eg., McCroskey v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1981); Dodge v. Department of Social Serv., 198 Colo. 379, 600 P.2d 70 (1979); Howard v. City of Boulder, 132 Colo. 401, 290
P.2d 237 (1955); Ferch v. Hansen, 115 Colo. 366, 174 P.2d 719 (1946).
55. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 482-90 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservist Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 219-21 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-79 (1974); Ex Parte
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). However, in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S.
91, 99-100 (1979), the Court described this aspect of the injury in fact requirement as being a
"prudential principle by which the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social
import where no individual rights would be vindicated and [which] limit[s] access to the federal
courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." Accord Valley Forge Chrstian
College, 454 U.S. at 475. In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973), the Court
remarked that "we have already made it clear that standing is not to be denied simply because
many people suffer the same injury." Accord Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
56. Intermountain Sys., Inc. v. Gore Valley/Big Horn Water Dists., 654 P.2d 872, 873
(Colo. App. 1982).
57. 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. Accord Intermountain Sys., Inc v. Gore Valley/Big
Horn Water Dists., 654 P.2d 872, 873 (Colo. App. 1982).
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plaintiff has stated a claim for relief-i.e., pled facts which, if
proven, would constitute actionable injury under the relevant substantive law-may be decided, as a matter of law, antecedently to
an adjudication of the remaining merits questions (these include
any disputed issues of fact as well as such58mixed questions as causation and justification of official action).
This equation is troublesome for at least two reasons. First, it is not
difficult to hypothesize a situation where one who apparently should have
standing fails to state a claim for relief. For example, one who has been
undeniably defrauded, but who fails to allege each of the elements of fraud is
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief, but
should not be dismissed for lack of standing. Second, the Colorado Supreme
59
Court has categorically stated that standing is a jurisdictional question.
Failure to state a claim for relief, however, is not a defect that goes to the
60
court's jurisdiction.
CloverleafKennel Club does shed some light, however, on the "legally protected interest" aspect of the Wmberly formula for standing. In ascertaining
whether the second prong of the Wimberly standard had been satisfied, that
is, whether the statute protected the interests asserted, the CloverleafKennel
Club court borrowed part of the test announced in Cort v. Ash 6 1 for determining whether an implied cause of action exists under a federal statute. 6 2 The
Colorado court looked to: 1) whether the statute confers a right in favor of
the plaintiff; 2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create a remedy or to deny one; and 3) whether it is
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
63
such a remedy for the plaintiff.
The utilization of the Cori factors to determine one of the integral stand58. 620 P.2d at 1056. Later in the opinion the court seemed to reiterate the congruency:
The standing doctrines formulated in Wtmberly guide us here: we must ascertain
whether the petitioners' complaint that the Commission favored Mile High over them
by allotting to Mile High more racing days than were allotted to the petitioners states
a claim for relief under the provisions of section 12-60-100.2, et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (now
in 1978 Repl. Vol. 5) (Racing Act).
Id. at 1057.
59. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Colo. 1980). Accord McCroskey v. Gustafson, 611 P.2d 984, 986 (Colo. App. 1980), a 'd, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1981). But
cf. Clark v. Colorado Springs, 162 Colo. 593, 596, 428 P.2d 359, 361 (1967) (suggesting that
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief is a proper method for disposing of suits
with standing defects).
60. The equation may harbor another anomaly as well. The Colorado courts may not go
beyond the confines of the complaint in ruling on whether plaintiff has stated a claim for relief.
McDonald v. Lakewood Country Club, 170 Colo. 355, 360, 461 P.2d 437, 440 (1969); Gayton v.
Department of Highways, 149 Colo. 72, 73-74, 367 P.2d 899, 901 (1962). But if the state
supreme court adopts the federal practice, the judiciary may look to affidavits and other discovery material to determine whether standing has been established. See Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109 n.22 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1975).
61. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
62. The only Cort factor not used by the CloverleafKennel Club court focuses upon whether
the cause of action has been traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern
of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law. 422 U.S. at 78. This factor was obviously not applicable to the issue of standing in state
court.

63. 620 P.2d at 1058-59.
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ing criteria in Cloverleaf Kennel Club is certainly not a concept that follows
ineluctably from federal law. For as the United States Supreme Court observed in Davi's v. Passman,64 there are fundamental, conceptual differences
between the traditional standing doctrine and the existence of an implied
cause of action. The prevailing federal view is that standing entails whether
the complaining party is so personally involved in the outcome as to assure a
sharp presentation of the issues. 65 The existence of an implied cause of action, on the other hand, focuses upon the nature of the right asserted rather
66
than the quality or extent of the injury.
In any event, CloverleafKennel Club is almost certainly not the last word.
As the court recognized, the continued viability of the Cori test for determining whether a cause of action should be implied under federal statutes is in
doubt. 67 Moreover, CloverleafKennel Club is silent on whether the litmus for
determining whether an asserted interest is legally protected will evolve
64. 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979).
65. E.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 273 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env'tl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
66. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979). Cf.National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 465 n.13 (1974) (stating that "[slince we hold
that no right of action exists, questions of standing and jurisdiction became immaterial.").
This distinction may not be as sharp under Colorado law. Unlike the constitutional underpinnings of standing in the federal courts that restrict federal court jurisdiction to "cases" and
"controversies," e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 474-75 (1982); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493
(1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968), the constitutional basis for standing in Colorado
is separation of powers. Wimber/y, 194 Colo.at 168, 570 P.2d at 538. When standing is founded
upon separation of powers, it is more logical to base a determination of standing on the resolution of whether the court ought to enforce an asserted right for a given class of litigants, at least
when that determination will arguably encroach on the domain of a co-equal branch of state
government.
67. 620 P.2d at 1058. For example, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979), the Court said:
The question of whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by
implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction (citations omitted). While
some opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of
implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies thought to effectuate the
purposes of a given statute (citation omitted), what must ultimately be determined is
whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear.
Accord Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1839 (1982);
Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771 (1981).
The Court, however, does not seem to have settled on the precise formula for discerning
congressional intent. In Coutu, the majority stated that it should be ascertained from "the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its'purpose." 450 U.S. at 770. See
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979). But the factors subtly shifted in
recent cases. In California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981), the justices urged that "the four
factors specified in Cori remain the 'criteria through which [congressional intent can] be discerned.' " Id. at 293 (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979)). The Court went on
to hold, however, that the final two Cort factors are only relevant where the first two factors
indicate an intent to create a private remedy. 451 U.S. at 297-98. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981), on the other hand, recites that "[c]ongressional intent
may be discerned by looking to the legislative history and other factors: e.g. the identity of the
class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, the overall legislative scheme and the traditional
role of the states in providing relief." In Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981), the Court remarked: "We look first ...
to the statutory
language, particularly to the provisions made therein for enforcement and relief. Then we review legislative history and other aids of statutory interpretation .... "
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with the developing federal standard for deciding whether a cause of action
should be implied under federal statutes.
Of perhaps greater significance, however, is the fact that CloverleafKennel
Club indicates that the Colorado courts look to the Cori factors to determine
whether an asserted interest is protected under legislation. But the Colorado
appellate courts have not yet clearly indicated how the lower courts are to
determine whether an asserted interest is legally protected when a would-be
suitor claims that the interest is protected under the federal or state constitutions. It is noteworthy, therefore, that the United States Supreme Court has
ruled in Davis that the Cort test should not be used to determine whether a
cause of action should be implied under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 68 The Davis Court pointed out that "the question of who may
enforce a statutoy right is fundamentally different from the question of who
may enforce a right that is protected by the [federal] Constitution." 69 The
Court went on to suggest that an implied cause of action should be presumed
from federal constitutional restrictions:
At least in the absence of "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department,"
Baker v. Cart, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), we presume that justiciable
constitutional rights are to be enforced through the courts. And,
unless such rights are to become merely precatory, the class of those
litigants who allege that their own constitutional rights have been
violated, and who at the same time have no effective means other
than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke
the existing jurisdiction of the70 courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights.
Therefore, if the existence of an implied cause of action is the touchstone for whether an asserted interest is legally protected, Davrs suggests that
the second prong of the Wimberly standing formula is more easily satisfied
when litigants assert federal constitutional protection rather than a statutory
basis. Several Colorado cases imply a similar result when the state constitution is the alleged source of a litigant's legally protected right. 7 '
It should be noted that the Cloverleaf Kennel Club opinion is also intriguing for another reason; it alludes to the legislative power to confer standing
on those who would not otherwise possess it under conventional canons. The
Colorado court relied on a classic decision from the United States Supreme
72
Court
in stating: "[Sitanding . . . 'may exist solely by virtue of statutes
68. 442 U.S. at 241.
69. Id. (emphasis in original).
70. Id. at 242.
71. Eg., Dodge v. Department of Social Serv., 198 Colo. 379, 600 P.2d 70 (1979). In Dodge
the court found that the second prong of Wt~nberly was satisfied by the simple averment that the
challenged expenditures violated a specific constitutional provision and that the defendants had
no statutory authority to expend public funds for abortions. Id. at 381, 600 P.2d at 71. See also
Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982); Olsen v. State Bd. for Community Colleges
and Occupational Educ., 652 P.2d 1087, 1089 (Colo. App. 1982), cert. granted, VI BRIEF TiMES
RPTR. 975 (Colo. Oct. 18, 1982) (No. 82SC271).
72. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). In Traffante the Court
held that a white tenant of an apartment complex had standing to sue the owner of the complex
for discrimination against nonwhites under § 810(d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 42 U.S.C.
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creating legal rights the invasion of which creates standing.' ,,73 Similarly,
the power of Congress to broaden the class of those with standing to sue in
federal court is well-documented, 74 provided the article III requirement of
injury in fact has been satisfied. 75 Indeed, where congressional intent to
broaden standing to the full extent permitted by article III can be detected,
the Supreme Court has said that the judiciary is powerless to frustrate that
76
intent by creating prudential barriers to standing.
Another aspect of the legally protected interest prong concerns whose
interest must be secured. Several Colorado cases hold that a litigant does
not have standing to seek redress for damage suffered by third parties; 7 7 only
those persons who have suffered the injury may litigate. 78 This principle is
not absolute, however, and the Colorado Supreme Court has recently stated
in Augusltin v. Barnes 79 that there are at least three exceptions to the general
rule:
A litigant's injury, coupled with the presence of one or more of the
following factors, may justify third party standing. First, the pres§ 3602(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). That statute permits any aggrieved person to implement the
statutory mechanism for informal resolution and to institute suit should that informal mechanism fail. The Court noted that the statutory definition of "person aggrieved" is "broad"-it
includes " 'any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice.' "
Id. at 208 (quoting § 810(a) of the Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
Thus, the white tenant surmounted the standing hurdle by alleging that: 1) he had been denied
the social benefits of living in an integrated community; 2) he had been denied mixed business
and professional opportunities that would have accrued if he lived with members of minority
groups; and 3) he had suffered embarassment and economic loss in social and business activities
because he had been stigmatized as a resident of a "white ghetto." 409 U.S. at 208.
73. 620 P.2d at 1058 (emphasis in original) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500
(1975)). Two years before Cloverleaf Kennel Club was decided, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled
that the Colorado Declaratory Judgment Act, CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-51-101 to -115 (1973 &
Supp. 1982), was not a statutory grant of standing to political subdivisions and their officers to
challenge the constitutionality of state statutes. Board of County Comm'rs v. Fifty-First Gen.
Assembly, 198 Colo. 302, 305 n.1, 599 P.2d 887, 889 n.l (1979). See infra notes 102-06 and
accompanying text.
74. E.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n. Il (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
493 n.2 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1968).
75. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n.l 1 (1974); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n.2 (1974). See also Schlesinger v. Reservist Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 224 n.14 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
76. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979).
77. E.g., Reed v. Dolan, 195 Colo. 193, 577 P.2d 284 (1978); People v. Stage, 195 Colo.
110, 575 P.2d 423 (1978); Garcia v. City of Pueblo, 176 Colo. 96, 489 P.2d 200 (1971).
78. Although litigants in federal courts ordinarily do not have standing to press the rights
of third parties eg., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1973) (per curiam), this
limitation is only a prudential rule of standing that may be set aside in appropriate circumstances. Eg., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 100;Arlington Heights,

429 U.S. at 263; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 253 (1953).
79. 626 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1981).
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ence of a substantial relationship between the claimant and the
third party . . . . Second, the difficulty or improbability that the
person who has suffered deprivation of a constitutional right will
be able to assert it. . . . Third, the need to avoid dilution of the
third party's constitutional rights if third party standing is not
permitted. 80
The result in Augus/in was not particularly surprising under federaljus
terlii standing principles. 8 ' In Auguszn, vendors of life insurance policies
were permitted to challenge a Colorado Division of Insurance regulation
that required certain disclosures by insurers who replaced an existing insurer
at the insured's behest. The basis of the challenge was the insured's right to
privacy. The Auguslin court opined that the case fit comfortably within the
NAACP. v. Aabama82 mold because the moment the insured filed suit to
prevent disclosure of the replacement, the fact of the replacement would be
known to the replaced insurer. Thus, it seemed improbable that insured
parties would attempt to enforce their own rights of privacy.83 The court
also found the case analogous to Craig v. Boren,84 because plaintiff's compliance with the regulation would directly result in violation of the insured's
right of privacy in those cases where the insured had requested
85
confidentiality.
Another exception to the rule that a litigant may predicate standing
only upon his own interests is the exception recognized in first amendment
cases. 86 In these cases, the rules of standing are relaxed to permit challenges
80. Id. at 628 (citations and footnote omitted).
81. See generaly Note, Standng to Assert Constitutionaljuts Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REv. 423
(1974). Reliance on the rights of third parties for standing in federal court is generally not
permitted unless the would-be federal litigant also sustains injury in fact. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1976). Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that one who suffers no injury in fact lacks
standing and cannot rely on injuries to third parties to maintain suit. Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-67 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam). Actions
6
brought by associations as representatives of their members, see it a note 99 and accompanying
text, and by the sovereign in itsparenspatriae capacity, see infra note 101 and accompanying text,
are notable exceptions to this rule.
82. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
83. 626 P.2d at 629.
84. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
85. In Craig, a vendor of 3.2% beer was allowed to assert the rights of males 18-20 years of
age in an equal protection challenge to an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to
females under the age of 18 years and males under the age of 21 years. The Court based this
result on the fact that the vendor incurred direct economic injury through constriction of the
market for beer, and the fact that the rights of males 18-20 years of age would be "diluted or
adversely affected" were the vendor's challenge to fail and the statute to remain in effect. The
Court also observed that unless the vendor were permitted to assert the rights of these third
parties, vendors of 3.2% beer might be deterred from selling beer to young males, thereby indirectly violating third parties' rights. Accord Carey v. Population Serv., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 68184 (1977).
86. In United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), the Supreme Court, indictum, listed yet
another category of cases where the rights of the third parties may be asserted in federal court.
These cases all involve the issue of statutory severability. The Ranes court indicated that they
fit into four classes: 1) cases where a statute imposes criminal penalties and a decision limiting it
to situations of valid application would preclude the statute as written from giving intelligible
warning of the conduct prohibited; 2) cases where the statute has already been declared invalid
in the vast majority of its intended applications and it can be fairly said that it was not intended
to be valid in only a fraction of cases; 3) cases where the state statute under attack has already
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to the facial constitutionality of laws that may chill the freedom of expression of persons not before the court, despite the fact that application of the
87
law to the litigant challenging it does not offend the federal Constitution.
The reason that the Colorado court has fashioned this "overbreadth" exception, similar to the federal overbreadth rule, 88 is that "the possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and
perceived grievances left to fester because of the possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes." 89 Nevertheless, the Colorado court has said that as
the ability to narrow the applicability of a statute by judicial construction
increases, the appropriateness of allowing one within the legitimate sweep of
the statute to challenge it on overbreadth grounds diminishes. 9° Overbreadth challenges are also less favored when the statute is neutral in its
application rather than directed at particular groups or viewpoints. 9 ' Finally, it has sometimes been said that the overbreadth doctrine may be employed only by those whose conduct is at the periphery of the activity
proscribed by legislation or regulation; it is unavailable to those whose
"speech" is clearly of a type regulated by the law in question. 9 2
Several other types of lawsuits involve the assertion of the rights of persons or entities not before the court. Class action litigation, 93 for example,
embraces the presentment not only of the claims of class representatives, but
also of the claims of those "similarly situated." However, putative class representatives do not have standing to press class claims in Colorado's courts
been pronounced by the state supreme court as having an otherwise valid provision or application inextricably tied up with an invalid one; and 4) those rare cases where the court is confident
that Congress would not have desired the legislation to stand at all unless it could validly stand
in all cases. Id. at 22-23.
87. Eg., Parrack v. Town of Estes Park, 628 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Colo. 1981); Marco Lounge,
Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 985 (Colo. 1981); Williams v. City & County of
Denver, 622 P.2d 542, 544-45 (Colo. 1981); Veterans of Foreign Wars, Post 4264 v. City of
Steamboat Springs, 195 Colo. 44, 48-49, 575 P.2d 835, 838-39, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 809
(1978); Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 396-97, 541 P.2d 80, 82 (1975).
88. E.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815-17 (1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-16
(1973); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-21 (1972); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
486 (1965).
89. Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 985 (Colo. 1981) (quoting Bolles v. People, 189 Colo.394, 396, 541 P.2d 80, 82 (1975)). Veterans of Foreign Wars, Post
4264 v. City of Steamboat Springs, 195 Colo. 44, 48, 585 P.2d 835, 838, appeal dsmissed, 439 U.S.
809 (1978), indicates that the more liberal standing rule adopted in first amendment cases also
results from the fact that overbroad statutes vest inordinate discretion in those charged with
enforcement and administration of their provisions.
90. Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 986 (Colo. 1981). Moreover, a person whose activity is plainly and legitimately proscribed by a statute has standing to
challenge on overbreadth grounds under the first amendment if and only if the court determines
as a threshold matter of law that the statute in question is "substantially overbroad," especially
where conduct rather than pure speech is involved. Parrack v. Town of Estes Park, 628 P.2d
1014 (Colo. 1981); see Marco Lounge, 625 P.2d at 986; Williams v. Denver, 622 P.2d 542, 545
(Colo. 1981); see alsoBigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817 (1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
91. Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 986 (Colo. 1981).
92. People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo. 1980); People v. Weeks, 197 Colo. 175, 179, 591
P.2d 91, 94 (1979). But cf. Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 986 n.5
(Colo. 1981) (questioning the consistency of this limitation with prior case law).
93. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; COLO. R. Civ. P. 23.
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unless they are members of the class of injured parties. 94 A similar rule has
generally emerged in federal court 95 with some rather notable, recent clarifi96
cation involving the mooting of the representative's claim on the merits.
Suits prosecuted by associations on behalf of their members fit into the thirdparty litigation category as well. The law of standing for actions by associations97 is not well developed in Colorado, 98 but in recent years it has undergone significant fine tuning in the United States Supreme Court. 99 Finally,
lawsuits brought by legislators in their official capacity to challenge the le94. Davis v. Pueblo, 158 Colo. 319, 325, 406 P.2d 671, 674 (1965); CoLo. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
95. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320 n.23 (1980); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502
(1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33
(1962).
96. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398-403 (1975), the Court held that a class representative whose claim was mooted after certification could continue to represent the class on the
merits. Accord Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 752-57 (1976).
Five years later the Court decided two more important cases. In Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank
v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980), the justices ruled that a purported class representative may
appeal a denial of certification after being tendered the amount of the representative's claim by
the defendant. Central to the decision was the representative's interest in spreading the attorneys' fees and other costs of litigation to the members of the class. This interest was deemed
sufficient to maintain a case or controversy on the certification issue. Id. at 338 & n.9. Cf.
Lyman v. Bow Mar, 188 Colo. 216, 220-21, 533 P.2d 1129, 1132 (1975) (entertaining the issue of
improper denial of certification on the basis of a possible award of legal fees).
The most remarkable of these cases, however, is United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty,
445 U.S. 388 (1980). In Geraght, a federal prisoner filed a class action suit challenging the
parole board's release rules. After the district court had denied certification and ruled against
him on the merits Gerahty filed a notice of appeal. But he was released from prison before the
appeal could be heard. Unlike the class representative in Roper, Geraghty did not argue that
certification of the class would redound to his benefit. Id. at 413-14, 417 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless the Third Circuit held that the case was not moot, and that the lower court had
improperly refused to certify the class. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed that
Geraghty could continue to press the "procedural claim"-the right to represent the classnotwithstanding the expiration of his claim on the merits and the absence of alleged benefit to
him from certification. The jurisdictional case or controversy was found despite apparent mootness because: 1) the merits question remained "live" between the defendants and at least some
members of the class Geraghty sought to represent, id. at 396, and 2) Geraghty's counsel vigorously advocated his right to have the class certified. Id. at 403-04.
It is at least arguable that a contrary result would be reached on similar facts by the Colorado courts. See generally Doe v. Seccombe, 177 Colo. 127, 493 P.2d 30 (1972).
97. Although cast in terms of "real party in interest" and "capacity to sue," Hidden Lake
Development Co. v. District Court, 183 Colo. 168, 172, 515 P.2d 632, 634-35 (1973), indicates
that the "association" must be more than a loosely formed group to be entitled to sue. That
case listed several factors for determining whether an "association" as a juridical entity exists.
Among the factors are: 1) the existence of by-laws governing the association's organization and
operation, 2) a stated purpose for existence, 3) provision for continuity despite change in membership, and 4) officers elected according to by-laws whose duties and responsibilities may be
ascertained and upon whom process can be served. Id. at 172, 515 P.2d at 635.
98. In Summerhouse Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Majestic Say. & Loan, 44 Colo. App.
495, 615 P.2d 71 (1980), the court of appeals held that a condominium association lacked standing to sue on behalf of its members to redress defective original construction because the condominium declaration and by-laws did not expressly authorize such a suit. A provision in the bylaws empowering the association to "protect and defend the condominium from loss and damage by suit or otherwise" was interpreted as being limited to loss or damage sustained subsequent to original construction. Id. at 497, 615 P.2d at 74.
99. An association has standing to sue in federal court to redress injury to itself, and in
attempting to secure relief from such injury, the association may assert the rights of its members,
at least so long as the challenged infractions adversely affect its members' associational ties.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). Even in the absence of injury to itself, however, the
association may have standing to sue solely as representative of its members. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-45 (1977); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Wel-
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gality of executive conduct and policies 00 and those suits by the sovereign in
itsparenspatri'aecapacity' 0 ' are virtually unknown in the Colorado courts.
Suits by political subdivisions, or an officer thereof, challenging the constitutionality of state legislation governing the political subdivision's performance activate a special application of the legally protected interest
prong of the Colorado law of standing. The often-repeated rule is that such
fare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976); Warth, 422 U.S. at 511-12; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 355-56 n.5 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
In Hunt, the Supreme Court announced the current tripartite test for ascertaining whether
an association has standing to sue on behalf of its members in federal court. An association has
"representative" or "derivative" standing only when: "(a) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the association's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual membes in the lawsuit." 432 U.S. at 343. See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 320-21 (1980) (association lacks standing because free exercise case requires individual
showing of coercive effects of legislation).
100. As amended, S. 406, 53d Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1981), would have vested members
of the general assembly with standing to enforce the public policy of the state as set forth in the
state statutes and constitution in any civil action or proceeding. The bill was vetoed by the
Governor, however, in June 1981.
See Note, CongressionalAccess to the Federal Courts, 90 HARV. L. RE'. 1632 (1977); Note, Should
Congress Defend Its Own Interests Before the Courts, 33 STAN. L. REV. 715, 718-24 (1981) for a
discussion of the few federal cases involving suits by congresspersons challenging executive actions and policies.
101. The common law concept ofparenspatrae is derived from the English constitutional
system in which the king retained certain powers and duties, known as the "royal prerogative,"
and exercised them in his role as father of the country. Traditionally, the term was used to refer
to the king's power as guardian of persons under legal disabilities, such as infants and those
mentally incapacitated, and as the superintendent of all charitable uses in the kingdom. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1972). In the United States, the "royal prerogative" and the parens patriae function passed to the states. Id But see In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895); United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 367 (1888); United States v. San
Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 285-86 (1888) (all suits by the federal government in theparens
patriae capacity). Decisions in this country establish the right of the state to sue asparenspatriae
to prevent or repair harm to its "quasi-sovereign interests," Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 257-58,
but not as a volunteer merely litigating the personal claims of its citizens. Pennsylvania v. New
Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665-66 (1976).
There is no lodestar for determining whether a "quasi-sovereign interest" is implicated. In
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907), the Court described a "quasisovereign" interest as "an interest independent and behind the titles of [the state's] citizens;" in
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923), it was said to be "an interest apart
from that of the individuals affected." It follows, therefore, that the doctrine may not be invoked simply because a limited class of a state's citizens is affected. Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 451 (1945). See also Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 394
(1938); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1923).
Although the complexities of modern life make it impossible to catalog all the interests that
can be protected under the sovereign's common law parens patriae power, the courts have enumerated several factors that normally determine whether an interest is sufficiently important to
permit parens patriae standing. These factors include: the size of the population adversely affected, the magnitude of the harm inflicted, and the ability of those injured to obtain complete
relief without intervention of the sovereign. Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapps &
Sons, Inc., 632 F.2d 365, 369 (4th Cir. 1980); Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 675 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). The defendant against whom the action is brought can also be determinative. See
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Kleppe, 553 F.2d at 673.
Although there are a number of reported cases evidencing the state's use of common law
parenspatriae authority in its ancestral sense of protecting infants and incompetents, e.g., S.A.S.
v. District Court, 623 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1981); Block v. District Court, 620 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1980);
People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo.1980); People v. Lane, 196 Colo. 52, 581 P.2d 719 (1978),
the power has yet to be exercised beyond its primordial scope in the Colorado courts.
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plaintiffs lack standing to prosecute these suits.10 2 For although application
of the statute may "injure" the political subdivision, other competing considerations generally prevent the spawning of a legally protected interest.
Among those competing considerations is the fact that "[p]ublic policy and
public necessity require prompt and efficient action from [ministerial officers
of the state]."' 10 3 Moreover, political subdivisions exist only "for the convenient administration of the state government, created to carry out the will of
10 6
0 5
provithe state."1 0 4 Thus, in the absence of statutory1 or constitutional
sions conferring a legally protected interest, these considerations operate to
bar suits by this potential class of litigants.
Litigation by parties relying solely on taxpayer status for standing to
challenge governmental action in state court evokes a different set of considerations. With respect to suits by taxpayers alleging that public funds are
being expended illegally, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that the
Wimberly test is the appropriate test for determining standing.1 0 7 In so holding, the court expressly declined to adopt the standing test employed in fed08
on
eral court for taxpayer suits challenging federal expenditures'
09
The federal test requires the taxpayer to establish
constitutional grounds.'
a nexus between his taxpayer status and: 1) the type of legislation challenged-the target must be an exercise of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of article I, section 8, of the Constitution (it is not
enough to attack an incidental expenditure in the administration of an essentially regulatory scheme); and 2) the precise nature of the constitutional
infringement alleged-the expenditure must exceed specific constitutional
102. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1379-80 (Colo. 1980); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Fifty-First Gen. Assembly, 198 Colo. 302, 599 P.2d 887 (Colo. 1979); Lamm
v. Barber, 192 Colo.511,565 P.2d 538 (1977); Martin v. District Court, 191 Colo. 107, 550 P.2d
864 (1976); Denver Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 188 Colo. 310, 535
P.2d 200 (1975); Board of County Comm'rs v. State Bd. of Soc. Serv., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d
244 (1974); Board of County Comm'rs v. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 470 P.2d 861 (1970); People v.
Hively, 139 Colo.49, 336 P.2d 721 (1959); Clear Creek School Dist. RE-I v. Holmes, 628 P.2d
154 (Colo. App. 1981).
103. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Colo. 1980) (quoting
Ames v. People, 26 Colo. 83, 90, 56 P. 656, 658 (1899)).
104. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Colo. 1980) (quoting
Board of County Comm'rs v. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 125, 470 P.2d 861, 862 (1970)).
105. Eg., Board of County Comm'rs v. Denver, 194 Colo. 252, 255 & n.2, 571 P.2d 1094,
1096 & n.2 (1977).
106. See Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1734, 1380-81 (Colo. 1980).
107. Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 667-69 (Colo. 1982); Dodge v. Department of Social
Serv., 198 Colo. 379, 600 P.2d 70 (1979). Although Conrad and Dodge involved expenditures
alleged to violate the state constitution, there has been no indication from the Colorado courts
that a different test is appropriate when the expenditure is alleged to offend a state statute or
federal law.
108. In federal court, taxpayer challenges of purportedly illegal expenditures by municipalities are apparently governed by traditional standing principles and not by the test announced in
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923); Bradfield
v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). In Frothingham, the Court stated that a taxpayer's interest in
the use of municipal tax monies is "direct and immediate," whereas the effect of payments out
of the federal treasury upon the future taxation of any individual taxpayer is "remote, fluctuating and uncertain." 262 U.S. at 487.
109. This test was first enunciated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) and was reaffirmed
recently in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 478-81 (1982).
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limitations on the taxing and spending power rather than simply being beyond the powers delegated to Congress. 1 10
When, however, suit is brought in state court on behalf of a public body
by a taxpayer seeking to vindicate a governmental right, the Wimberly test
has been found to be "not functional" because it "unduly restrict[s] taxpayer
standing in this context."11 I Rather, the Colorado court has substituted a
different two-prong test for standing. First, the governmental body must
have the right and power to bring the action, and the taxpayer must allege
1
that he has made a demand on the administration that has been refused. 12
Second, the action must be one which the governmental body has discretion
to bring, but has refused to do so because of fraud, bad faith, or ultra vires
nondiscreacts, or the governmental body must have a specifically enjoined
113
tionary duty to bring the action and has failed to do so.
IV.

THE CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEM

The frequent divergence of the rules of standing in state court from
those which prevail in the federal system accentuates the importance of applying the correct standard. Although it is well-settled that standing to raise
state law issues in state court is a matter of state law,'' 4 standing to raise
federal issues in state court is more complicated. Certainly a state may open
its courthouse doors to those asserting federal issues who would not have
The converse may not be true, however.
standing to sue in federal court.'
110. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968). Curiously, the Colorado Supreme Court in
Dodge described the Flast standing test as "similar to the criteria adopted by this Court in
Winmberly." 198 Colo. at 383, 600 P.2d at 72. Not only are the tests very different, but it appears
that the Flast Court specifically formulated its test to avoid saddling the federal courts with the
deluge of taxpayer suits that would have been generated by a more general test such as that
used in Data Processing. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text. See generally Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
478-81 (1982).
111. McCroskey v. Gustafson, 611 P.2d 984, 987 (Colo. App. 1980), affid, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo.
1981).
112. McCroskey v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51, 54 (Colo. 1981). The majority described the first
part of the test as:
the functional equivalent of requiring the taxpayer to allege injury in fact to himself.
However, rather than examining the interest of the particular citizen-taxpayer who is
before the court, this test focuses upon the [governmental body's] right and power to
bring suit and its refusal to do so upon the taxpayer's demand.
Id. at 55.
113. Id. at 54. The majority stated that the second part of the test "addresses the policies of
judicial restraint and constitutional limitations on the exercise of judicial power." Id. at 55.
114. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1933); Columbus & Greenville
Ry. Co. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96, 99 (1931); Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14, 16 (1915);
Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192, 197-98 (1908); Conrad v. Denver, 656
P.2d 662, 669 (Colo. 1982).
115. Bateman v. Arizona, 429 U.S. 1302, 1305 (1976) (application for bail or stay) (RehnquistJ.); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952); Comment, Protecting Fundamental
Rights in State Courts- Fitting a State Peg to a Federal Hole, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 91
(1977). Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001 n.2 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(political questions).
Before the United States Supreme Court can review a case from the state courts, however,
the "case" or "controversy" requirement of article III must be satisfied. E.g., Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 277 n.7 (1979); Bateman, 429 U.S. at 1305; Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434.
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Alhed Sores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers"1 6 indicates that the state courts may not
deny standing to raise federal issues to litigants who would possess standing
to raise those issues in federal court.
Alied Sores involved a suit in state court challenging the constitutionality of a state ad valorem tax scheme. The state had chosen to afford more
favorable tax treatment to certain nonresident owners of personal property
than that faced by resident owners of personal property. The plaintiff assailed the statute on equal protection grounds under the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled
that the plaintiff lacked standing, reasoning that even if the plaintiff were
successful, the appropriate remedy would be to increase the tax liability of
nonresidents; the plaintiff's tax liability would remain unaffected. Nevertheless, the Ohio court went on to uphold the validity of the statutory proviso
affording more favorable tax treatment to nonresidents. On direct appeal to
the United States Supreme Court, however, standing was not seen as a problem. In the Court's language: "With the proviso thus validly remaining in
the statute it is quite immaterial that appellant's claim necessarily would fall
if it were out. It follows that appellant does have standing to prosecute its
constitutional claim." ' 1 7 The justices then proceeded to address the merits
of the claim without ever alluding to the then well-established doctrine that
the Court will not review a federal question if the state judgment is supported by an adequate and independent ruling grounded in state law." 8
Allied Stores should be contrasted, however, with Cramp v. Boardof Pubhc
Instruction of Orange County. 1' 9 In Cramp, a public employee attacked a state
statute requiring all state employees to execute a loyalty oath or face possible
discharge. The plaintiff attacked the statute on four federal constitutional
grounds. He claimed that the law was a bill of attainder, was an ex post facto
law, impinged on first amendment freedoms, and that the language of the
oath was so vague and uncertain as to constitute a denial of due process.
The state courts upheld the statute, although the state supreme court appeared to rule that the plaintiff lacked standing to raise the first two constitutional issues. Addressing the standing problem on review from the state's
highest tribunal, the United States Supreme Court assumed that if Cramp
had confined his attack against the statute to ex post facto law and a bill of
attainder grounds, the state court's ruling would have precluded the Court's
consideration of the appeal. Plaintiff, however, also attacked the statute as a
restriction of his rights of free speech and association as well as a denial of
due process. In referring to these last two arguments, the Court stated: "As
we read the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, both of these federal
constitutional issues were decided upon their merits, without even implicit
reliance upon any doctrine of state law."' 120 The Court then proceeded to
116. 358 U.S. 522 (1959).

117. Id. at 526.
118. The doctrine had been applied as early as Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall (87
U.S.) 590 (1875) (statutory construction) and Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361 (1893). Accord Herb
v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935).

119. 368 U.S. 278 (1961).

120. Id. at 281-82

(footnote omitted).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:3

the merits and struck down the statute on vagueness grounds.
The assumption in Cramp is difficult to reconcile with the quoted language from Alied Stores.12 ' The better practice, however, is to presume that
Alhied Stores is controlling because its pronunciation on standing came in the
form of a holding rather than an assumption.
Unfortunately, the presumption that Allied Stores is the controlling authority does not resolve the choice of law problem. On the one hand, A//ied
Stores can be read to dictate that state courts must employ federal standing
principles whenever the complaining party asserts violations of federally protected rights. This interpretation implies that potential litigants can ignore
state standing principles that are more restrictive than the federal law of
standing.' 22 Indeed, one of the reasons the Court has given for the recent
paring of federal jurisdiction is the sensitivity of state courts to federal constitutional rights and their obligation to uphold federal law.' 23 Alternatively,
Allied Stores can be read to hold that although the state courts are free to
apply more restrictive state rules of standing, the refusal to adjudicate federal challenges in state court on standing grounds will not preclude the
United States Supreme Court from entertaining the issue on appeal if the
"case" or "controversy" requirement' 24 is satisfied.' 25 Although not
couched in terms of "standing," there is some older case support for this
second interpretation. 126 Nevertheless, this latter interpretation of Allied
121. See supra text accompanying note 117. Of course, reconciliation is not impossible. In
Alhid Stores, the Ohio Supreme Court had chosen to address the merits of the constitutional
claim, notwithstanding its ruling that the plaintiff lacked standing. Because the state court had
not considered a decision on the merits to be foreclosed by the plaintiffs lack of standing, it may
be that the United States Supreme Court, once it was satisfied that a "case" or "controversy"
existed, see supra note 114, was also free to address the constitutional claim. Cf. 13 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531, at 191-92 (1975)
(Supreme Court review of state taxpayer cases alleging federal constitutional transgressions).
122. See 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 4023, at 714 (1977) ("Federal standards may require recognition of standing if a
right is asserted that the state courts are obligated to protect.").
123. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976). The Colorado Supreme Court recognized the obligation of the Colorado courts to uphold and enforce federal law more than 60
years ago. People v. Western Union Tel. Co., 70 Colo. 90, 94-95, 198 P. 146, 147-48 (1921).
124. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. By way of analogy, it is useful to note that
the Court has indicated that state courts cannot preclude review of a federal constitutional
claim by a more severe mootness test than is employed by the federal courts. Costarelli v.
Massachusetts, 421 U.S. 193, 197 (1975); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964). The analogy
is made stronger by the fact that the Court has described the standing question as bearing a
"close affinity" to questions of mootness. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n. 10 (1975).
125. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 107, at 545 (3d ed. 1976) ("Review will not
be defeated by a state court decision that a case that otherwise would turn on a federal question
is moot or that the party lacked standing to raise the federal claim.").
126. In Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932), an individual brought suit
challenging an income tax assessment under Mississippi law. The plaintiff contended that it
was a denial of equal protection under the federal Constitution to exclude income earned from
sources in other states from the taxable income of corporations, but not from the taxable income
of individuals. The state court refused to pass on the claim because it ruled that if the tax were
invalid the result would be that corporations owed more taxes, not that the plaintiff owed less.
The United States Supreme Court expressly found this an inadequate state ground to defeat its
jurisdiction to review the equal protection issue:
[Tihe Constitution, which guarantees rights and immunities to the citizen, likewise
insures to him the privilege of having those rights and ithmunities judicially declared
and protected when such judicial action is properly invoked. . . . If the Constitution
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Stores suggests that the Court may be required to rule on difficult federal
constitutional issues with only minimal factual development, and in some
instances it may be incompatible with the Court's rule against reviewing
state court decisions that rest on adequate and independent state law
grounds. Furthermore, the former interpretation appears more consistent
with more recent decisions such as Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commis12 8
sion '2 7 and Bige/ow v. Virgi*ia.
In Boston Stock Exchange, six regional stock exchanges located outside of
New York filed suit against the New York tax commission and its members
in New York state court. Alleging discrimination against interstate commerce, plaintiffs assailed a provision of the New York transfer tax on securities transactions that taxed deals involving out-of-state sales more heavily
than most transactions involving sales of similar magnitude within New
York. The commission moved to dismiss, claiming that the exchanges lacked standing to sue. The state trial and appellate courts disagreed. On direct
review, the United States Supreme Court, in a footnote, agreed that the exchanges had standing to pursue the constitutional claim. Without addressing whether state law might control in state courts, Justice White, writing for
a unanimous Court, cited one of the landmark federal standing decisions:
We also agree that the Exchanges have standing under the twopart test of Data Processing Service v. Camp. . . . Appellants' complaint alleged that a substantial portion of the transactions on their
Exchanges involved securities that are subject to the New York
transfer tax, and that the higher tax on out-of-state sales of such
securities diverted business from their facilities to exchanges in
New York. This diversion was the express purpose of the challenged statute. . . . The allegation establishes that the statute has
caused them "injury in fact," and that a case or controversy exists. . . . The Exchanges are asserting their right under the Commerce Clause to engage in interstate commerce . . . and they
allege that the transfer tax indirectly infringes on that right. Thus,
they are "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected...
129
by the . . . constitutional guarantee in question."'
exacts a uniform application of this tax on appellant and his competitors, his constitutional rights are denied as well by the refusal of the state court to decide the question,
as by erroneous decision of it . . .for in either case the inequality complained of is left
undisturbed by the state court whose jurisdiction to remove it was rightly invoked. .... We therefore conclude that the purported non-federal ground put forward by the state court for its refusal to decide the constitutional question was
unsubstantial and illusory, and that the appellant may invoke the jurisdiction of this
Court to decide the question.
Id. at 282-83 (citations omitted).
127. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
128. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
129. 429 U.S. at 320-21 n.3 (citations omitted). Boston Stock Exchange is not dispositive because rather than holding that federal rules of standing govern in state court with respect to
federal issues, the Court may simply have been noting that it had jurisdiction to review the state
court judgment under article III of the United States Constitution. If so, however, the Court
chose to do so in an oblique fashion. Moreover, as discussed at supra note 31, the second prong
of the Data Processing test, the "zone of interest" requirement, is a prudential rule of standing
rather than a jurisdictional limitation.
Alternatively, the Boston Stock Exchange Court may have been making an observation about
New York standing precepts. The appellate division cited Data Processing as dispositive of the
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In Bigelow, an editor of a local newspaper in Charlottesville, Virginia
was convicted under a state statute that made it a misdemeanor to encourage or prompt the procurement of an abortion by sale or circulation of
any publication. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, and
as part of its holding ruled that Bigelow did not have standing to challenge
the statute on overbreadth grounds because his first amendment rights had
not been violated. On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court indicated that the overbreadth ruling of the state supreme court was in error,
130
citing federal case law.
Declaring a statute facially unconstitutional because of overbreadth "is, manifestly, strong medicine," and "has been employed
by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort." Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). But we conclude that the Virginia courts erred in denying Bigelow standing to make this claim,
where "pure speech" rather than conduct was involved, without
any consideration of whether the alleged overbreadth was or was
not substantial. Id. at 615, 616. The Supreme Court of Virginia
placed no effective limiting construction on the statute. Indeed, it
characterized the rights of doctors, husbands, and lecturers as "hypothetical," and thus seemed to imply that, although these were in
the noncommercial zone, the statute might apply to them, too.'31
These remarks in Bigdow are dicta, however, because the challenged
Virginia statute had been amended in the period after Bigelow's conviction.
Thus, there was no possibility that the pre-amendment form of the statute
would chill the rights of others-the issue of overbreadth had become moot
for the future. Recognizing this development, the majority expressly de132
clined to rest their decision on overbreadth grounds.
Regrettably, the Colorado Supreme Court has also failed to provide any
definitive assistance on resolving the choice of law problem. For whatever
reason, there are no Colorado cases squarely confronting the issue. A brief
review of some of the more recent decisions from the state's highest tribunal
demonstrates that it has provided no polestar.
Augustin v. Barnes133 involved a suit by insurance purveyors who were
standing issue. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 45 A.D.2d 365, 357 N.Y.S.2d 116,
118-19 (1974). And the New York Court of Appeals, after noting the standing dispute and the
appellate division's resolution, proceeded to the merits without further addressing the issue.
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 37 N.Y.2d 535, 375 N.Y.S.2d 308, 337 N.E.2d 758
(1975), rv'd, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). The difficulty with this possibility, however, is that the New
York courts may have been erroneously applying federal rather than state rules of standing.
Furthermore, if the Supreme Court believed it was applying state principles of standing, the
footnote evidences a rare instance in which the Court has chosen to opine that the state court
has correctly applied its own rules.
130. 421 U.S. at 817 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 603 (1973)). Earlier in
the Bjgelow decision, the majority had noted that the Supreme Court of Virginia had previously
recognized the appropriateness of overbreadth challenges by those whose conduct could be legitimately proscribed when it stated that "persons who engage in non-privileged conduct are
not precluded from attacking a statute under which they were convicted." 421 U.S. at 816
(citing Owens v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633, 638-39, 179 S.E.2d 477, 481 (1971)).
131. 421 U.S. at 817.
132. Id. at 818.
133. 626 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1981). Augustin is discussed more fully at supra notes 79-85 and
accompanying text.
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asserting the rights of privacy of their potential vendees. Although the Colorado court recognized that the right to privacy is embedded in the federal
Constitution, it seemingly applied Colorado principles to resolve a standing
challenge. Nevertheless, however, the Colorado court frequently looked to
decisions from the United States Supreme Court in formulating and applying the appropriate state standing rules.
Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne 1 34 is in the same vein. In that
case the defendants challenged the validity of a cooperative agreement between Denver Urban Renewal Authority (DURA) and the City Council for
the City and County of Denver. The vast majority of defendants' challenges
were premised on the Colorado Constitution, but they also contended that
the agreement constituted an impairment of contracts in violation of article
I, section 11 of the federal Constitution. Nevertheless, without even considering whether different standing tests might be implicated by the various
claims, the court simply looked to the Colorado rules of standing.
Finally, DiLeo v. Boardof Regents of the Universty of Colorado 135 involved an
equal protection challenge under the fourteenth amendment to the law
school's special admissions program. Once again, without pausing to weigh
the possibility of a choice of law problem, the court employed Colorado
standing principles in holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to prosecute
36
the claim. 1
These cases, however, should be juxtaposed with Marco Lounge, Inc. v.
Federal Heights.' 3 7 In Marco Lounge, the court relied upon Supreme Court
authority (and Colorado cases which, in turn, had cited United States
Supreme Court precedent) for an "exception" to standing orthodoxy recognized in first amendment challenges on overbreadth grounds. This "exception" has been repeatedly recognized in the Colorado cases, 138 each of which
cite federal Supreme Court authority as the source of the more liberal stand139
ing rule applied with respect to overbreadth challenges.
In summary, neither the decisions from the United States Supreme
Court nor the Colorado Supreme Court afford an unshakable foundation for
deciding whether federal or state rules of standing govern when federal issues
are raised in state court. When confronted with an attack on standing,
134. 618 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1980).
135. 196 Colo. 216, 590 P.2d 486 (1978),cert. denied, 441 U.S. 927 (1979). DiLeo is discussed
more fully at supra note 50.
136. It is evident that the DiLeo court employed Colorado rules of standing in reaching this
holding because federal principles preclude the denial of standing to raise equal protection
claims when the state can conceivably remedy disparate treatment without altering the complaining party's status. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
A recent case from the Colorado Court of Appeals also looked to state law in deciding
whether to grant standing in the context of a challenge based on federal constitutional grounds.
Olson v. State Bd. for Community Colleges and Occupational Educ., 652 P.2d 1087 (Colo. App.
1982), cert. granted, VI BRIEF TIMES RPrR. 975 (Colo. Oct. 18, 1982) (No. 82SC271).
137. 625 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1981).
138. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
139. It is possible that the Colorado decisions are incorporating one aspect of the federal
standing doctrine as part of the state standing principles. If so, the intent to incorporate federal
law, as distinguished from the intent to yield to it, is tacit rather than explicit. Moreover, dicta
in Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 669 (Colo. 1982), suggests that the Colorado courts are
bound by federal standing rules when federal constitutional rights are asserted.
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therefore, the prudent course is to assume that the more restrictive rule governs when addressing the aspect of standing under attack, and to recite that
satisfaction of the more restrictive rule implies fulfillment of the more liberal
rule.
V.

THE PROCEDURAL MECHANISM FOR CHALLENGING STANDING

Although no Colorado decisions discuss in depth the procedure for challenging standing, there are some indications that this may be yet another
area of divergence from federal law. As an initial proposition, the burden of
alleging facts sufficient to confer standing lies with the plaintiff under both
state' 40 and federal precedent.' 4 ' All material allegations in the Colorado
complaint are accepted as true, 142 and at least in federal court, the complaint is construed in favor of the complaining party regardless of whether
standing is challenged by motion to dismiss' 43 or by motion for summary
judgment.' 44 Averments of injury in federal pleadings, however, must reflect more than the imaginable; in the words of the Court: "Pleadings must
be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the
45
conceivable." '
A number of recent federal Supreme Court cases, however, have subtly
shifted the initial standing requirement from mere allegations of injury in
fact to a requirement that complaining parties must "show" that they have
been injured in fact.' 4 6 Indeed, the federal courts have the power to require
complaining parties to supply affidavits and other discovery material to supplement the allegations of fact deemed supportive of standing.' 4 7 These
cases indicate that, at least with respect to constitutional limits on standing,
the burden on the complaining party may be heavier than simply alleging
damage; 148 proof of the factual basis of the alleged injury may be necessary
140. See, e.g., Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051,
1056-57 (Colo. 1980).
141. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 377-81 (1982); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1977); Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 49899 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962).
142. Thornton v. Board of County Comm'rs, 629 P.2d 605, 609 (Colo. 1981). Cf. Bell v.
Arnold, 175 Colo. 277, 281, 487 P.2d 545, 547 (1971) (failure to state a claim); Martinez v.
Southern Ute Tribe, 150 Colo. 504, 506, 374 P.2d 691, 694 (1962) (motion to dismiss for want of
subject matter jurisdiction).
143. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). The Colorado courts construe pleadings in
favor of the complaining party when the opposing party moves to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. E.g., Bell v. Arnold, 175 Colo. 277, 281, 487 P.2d 545, 547 (1971); McDonald v. Lakewood Country Club, 170 Colo. 355, 363, 461 P.2d 437, 441 (1960).
144. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109 n.22 (1979).
145. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975) (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S.
669, 688 (1973)). Accord Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 403 (1975).
146. E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
(1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261
(1977); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); see also Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
147. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1975).
148. In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973), the Court stated that if the
allegations of injury in fact are a sham, the defendant should challenge them by way of a
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as a threshold matter when standing is challenged.' 4 9 Nevertheless, a very
recent United States Supreme Court case indicates that standing is to be
0
resolved solely on the basis of pleading allegations. 5 In Colorado, the emphasis appears to be exclusively on the contentions in the pleadings. If the
state a claim for relief, the
complaining party merely alleges facts which
15 1
standing hurdle is apparently surmounted.
VI.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO STANDING

Even if the complaining party is denied standing to sue in the state trial
court, judicial resolution may be obtained with respect to important social
issues in the Colorado Supreme Court via the doctrine of pubhcijuris. The
paucity of cases that discuss this doctrine manifests that a thorough discourse
of its parameters is not possible; but the existing decisions do provide some
guidance. For example, the justices have said that the Colorado Supreme
1 53
to decide quesCourt' 52 is empowered as part of its original jurisdiction,
tions of manifest public importance under this doctrine when those seeking
54
The
resolution of the issues may not otherwise have access to the courts.'
exercise of publiciJuris is a matter of judicial discretion, however, and the
court will entertain the issues brought before it only when there are impor15 5
tant reasons for doing so.
motion for summary judgment where the burden of proving that the allegations are a sham
would lie with him. The Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and that the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction must shoulder the onus of
supporting jurisdictional allegations when challenged. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 44546 (1942); KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 278 (1936); McNutt v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936).
149. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (providing for hearing to determine, inter a/ia, motions and defenses challenging subject matter jurisdiction); 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531, at 71 n.84.2 (Supp. 1980).
150. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 362, 372, 377-81 (1982).
151. Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668-69 (Colo. 1982); Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v.
Colorado Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051, 1056-57 (Colo. 1980). But see Colorado Chiropractic
Ass'n v. Heuser, 177 Colo.434, 438, 494 P.2d 833, 834 (1972) (indicating that the complaining
party must make a "showing").
Strictly speaking, the case law does not foreclose the possibility that the standing inquiry
will go beyond the allegations in the complaint. Nevertheless, in the analogous situation of
determining whether the court has in personam jurisdiction under the Colorado "long-arm statute," the Colorado courts have refused to require plaintiff to do more than allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that defendants engaged in the conduct described in the statute. The
courts have likewise required no more than allegation of the facts even when the allegations
were controverted by affidavits. Pioneer Astro Indus., Inc. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 409, 411,
566 P.2d 1067, 1068 (1977); Alliance Clothing Ltd. v. District Court, 187 Colo. 400, 406, 532
P.2d 351, 354 (1975); Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo.432, 436, 506 P.2d 367, 369
(1973). But see Le Manufacture Francaise v. District Court, 620 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Colo. 1980)
(determination of whetherprimafacie showing of threshold jurisdiction has been established may
be based upon evidence adduced at a hearing on the motion to dismiss and the affidavits and
discovery material before the court when it rules on the motion).
152. The doctrine is not available in the state trial courts. Board of County Comm'rs v.
Fifty-First Gen. Assembly, 198 Colo. 302, 308 n.2, 599 P.2d 887, 89.1 n.2 (1979).
153. See COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
154. See Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Colo. 1980).
155. Board of County Comm'rs v. Fifty-First Gen. Assembly, 198 Colo. 302, 308, 599 P.2d
887, 891 (1979). See also Board of County Comm'rs v. Denver, 194 Colo. 252, 255-56, 571 P.2d
1094, 1096 (1977); Lamm v. Barber, 192 Colo. 511, 521, 565 P.2d 538, 545 (1977).
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CONCLUSION

Few would disagree that the doctrine of standing serves a salutary goal
in American jurisprudence. The courthouse doors should not be flung open
to anyone willing to file a complaining pleading regardless of the relationship of the complaining party to the purported injury. It must be borne in
mind, however, that the Colorado and federal law of standing differ in significant respects. Furthermore, in Colorado the doctrine of standing is
grounded in constitutionally mandated separation of powers rather than the
jurisdictional restriction to cases and controversies obtaining in federal court.
Apparently, these differences are not always appreciated by Colorado's appellate judges because there are a number of opinions which blithely adopt
axioms from the federal law of standing without considering whether these
maxims follow from article III of the Colorado Constitution.
Adding to the muddle is the fact that the hodge-podge of case law in
this state fleshing out the doctrine of standing is often confusing and frequently inconsistent. Prediction can be haphazard at best. Unfortunately, it
appears unlikely that the current disarray in the law of standing will be ordered in the foreseeable future.

A LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
EFFECT OF COMPUTERS ON PRIVACY
JOHN

T.

SOMA* AND RICHARD A. WEHMHOEFER**

INTRODUCTION

Alexander Solzhenitsyn observed that "as every man goes through life
he fills in a number of forms for the record, each containing a number of
There are thus hundreds of little threads radiating from
questions ....
every man." 1 Computer technology collects, combines, and analyzes these
threads in an efficient and timely manner. 2 An increasing amount of information is being collected by government and private industry. This information includes data collected from census and tax files, medical and credit
reports, arrest and criminal records, and magazine subscription files. When
accumulated in centralized data files, this information has the potential of
being used as an instrument of control or, at the very least, may be used to
3
Many comtrace and regulate an individual's movements and activities.
mentators are concerned that the computer's insatiable appetite for information, image of infallibility, and eternal memory may cause it to become the
heart of a surveillance system that will make society a transparent world in
which our homes, finances, and associations will be bared to a wide range of
4
observers.
The use of collected data, however, is indispensable in our modern society. Personal information in both individual and aggregated contexts is in.
J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver, College of Law. B.A.,
Augustana College; J.D., M.A., Ph.D., University of Illinois, Urbana. Dr. Soma is currently
completing a book on Computer Technology and the Law for Shepard's/McGraw-Hill.
** J.D., Ph.D., associated with Akolt, Dick & Akolt, Denver, Colorado. B.A., M.A.,
Ph.D., University of Colorado, Boulder; M.P.A., Graduate School of Public Affairs, University
of Colorado, Denver; J.D., University of Denver, College of Law. Dr. Wehmhoefer is currently
writing a book on Practical Statistics for Lawyers.
1. Linowes, Must Personal Privacy Die in the Computer Age,', 65 A.B.A. J. 1180 (1979). A
fundamental issue of privacy is the amount of freedom each individual possesses. Freedom is of
course directly related to the number of people in a defined space. Herbert wrote that beyond a
critical point,
within a finite space, freedom diminishes as numbers increase. This is as true of
humans in the finite space of a planetary ecosystem as it is of gas molecules in a sealed
flask. The human question is not how many can possibly survive within the system,
but what kind of existence is possible for those who do survive.
F. HERBERT, DUNE 493 (1965).
2. Seegenerally A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 158-68 (1967); Bazelon, Probing Prtacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587 (1977).
3. See A. MILLER, supra note 2, at 38-46. This fear resulted in considerable opposition to
both the government's proposed National Data Center in 1967 and President Reagan's proposal
in 1981 to create a centralized data file in the Department of Health and Human Services in
order to track welfare recipients.
4. See, e.g., V. FERKISS, TECHNOLOGICAL MAN 227 (1969); Miller, The NationalDataCenter
and PersonalPrtacy, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 1967, at 53; Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323,
353 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450 (1963) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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creasingly needed to understand and formulate policies to solve social,
economic, and political problems. Prior to the development of the computer, vast data collection and interpretation were not possible. 5 Some contemporary prophets have predicted that the advent of these new information
transfer technologies will prove to be as significant as the invention of mova6
ble type.
An inherent problem in the development of computers is its effect on
individual privacy. This article will examine that effect from historical, contemporary, and futuristic perspectives. It will also evaluate contemporary
constitutional, judicial, and statutory responses to the protection of individual privacy in the United States and internationally.
The simplest definition of privacy was stated by Justice Brandeis in his
dissent in Olmsteadv. Untled Stales. 7 He said that privacy is "the right to be
left alone." 8 Other more comprehensive definitions of privacy include Professor Westin's statement that privacy is "the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others." 9 Professor Emerson noted
that "[tihe right of privacy, in short, establishes an area excluded from the
In this articollective life, not governed by the rules of collective living.'"
cle, privacy will be defined as the unitary concept of separation of self from
society.
I.

COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AS RELATED TO PRIVACY

After World War II, the United States witnessed a tremendous expansion of commercial and governmental activities, which resulted in a substantial increase in the volume of transactions requiring the maintenance of
records on individuals. The number of bank checks written doubled and the
5. Ruggles, Symposium. Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy: On the Needs and Values
of Data Banks, 53 MINN. L. REv. 211, 233 (1968).
6. A. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE 265-79 (1962); H. KAHN & A. WIENER, THE
YEAR 2000, at 88-98 (1967); M. McLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY 11-279 (1962); A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 163-68.
An example of the scientific community's views of the impact of the computer on our
society is the following excerpt from a speech by Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission, reprinted in Computer Privacy: Hearings Before the Suhcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure, Senate Comm. on the Judiiary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1967):
Springing from our Scientific Revolution of recent decades is what is being called our
"Cybernetic Revolution." This revolution which, comparatively speaking, is only in
its infancy today amplifies (and will to a large extent replace) man's nervous system.
Actually, this is an understatement because computers amplify the collective intelligence of men-the intelligence of society-and while the effect of the sum of man's
physical energies may be calculated, a totally different and compounded effect results
from combining facts and ideas . . . . Add this effect to the productive capacity of
the machine driven by an almost limitless energy source like the nucleus of the atom
and the resulting system can perform feats almost staggering to the imagination. That
is why I refer to cybernation as a quantum jump in our growth.
7. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
8. Id at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
9. A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 7.
10. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 545 (1970).
11. id
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number of income tax returns quadrupled.1 2 Automated data processing
blossomed into a separate industry, serving the demands of business and in13
dustry for fast, accurate, and efficient data handling.
During the late 1960's, business and social planners began to use the
concept of systems analysis, which involves the mathematical simulation of a
complex activity or task. Systems analysis was applied to problems concerning health care delivery, income transfer payments, air pollution, urban
transportation, and higher education. The introduction of the disciplined
methods of computer-assisted management gave business and social planners
new tools for evaluating the performance of programs and institutions dealing with social problems. This auditing process included tracking transactions between organizations and their clients, measuring performance
against goals, providing information for planning, and assessing workload
and productivity.
Many of these functions necessarily involved the collection and storage
of data on individuals. For example, administrative data were needed for
management of individual transactions and statistical data were needed for
planning and assessing program performance. Intelligence data were needed
for judging individual character and qualifications for employment, credit,
welfare assistance, and other aid. Health data were needed to provide adequate health care and medical assistance. The demand generated by all
these uses of personal data, and the corresponding record-keeping systems to
store and process this information, challenged conventional legal and social
controls to protect individual privacy.
Computer technology can be expected to continue to improve the capacity, speed, and complexity of storing and analyzing data concerning individuals. The federal government continues to sponsor the development of
advanced computer systems for the military and space programs. Strong,
world-wide economic pressures exist for automating various operations in
the public and private sectors. Public opinion is becoming increasingly receptive to the provision of better data and faster information processing.
There has been a tremendous infusion of venture capital into computer development to the extent that this has been described as the "last frontier of
14
entrepreneural capitalism."'
Given this pattern of rapid innovation and technological development,
policymakers have legitimate concerns that computer technology can severely impinge on individual privacy. As early as 1972, Professor Westin
found that computer technology existed that could maintain an on-line file
containing the equivalent of twenty single-spaced pages of typed informa12. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND
THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 7-10 (1973).
13. Segenerally B. GILCHRIST & R. WEBER, THE STATE OF THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY IN
THE UNITED STATES 54 (1973); M. HOLOIEN, COMPUTERS AND THEIR SOCIETAL IMPACT 4344 (1977); E. TOMESKI & H. LAZARUS, PEOPLE-ORIENTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS: THE COMPUTER IN CRISIS 130-32 (1975).

14. Michael Shields, a catalogue marketer for Apple Computers said that "living [in the
Silicon Valley of northern California] is like riding in the nose cone of the space shuttle. We are
riding into the future." Taylor, Striking it Rich.- A New Breed of Risk Takers is Betting on the High
Technology Future, TIME, Feb. 15, 1982, at 38.
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tion about the personal history and selected activities of every man, woman,
and child in the United States.15 It would have been possible to retrieve this
information on any given individual within thirty seconds. 6
Although Americans enjoy the convenience and speed of information
processing, a recent Harris poll found that nearly two-thirds of those interviewed were concerned about threats to their privacy; one-third said that the
United States is or would soon be similar to the fictional "Oceania" in
George Orwell's novel 198?41 7-a nation that kept every activity of its citizens under constant surveillance.18
A.

Major Areas of Computer Technology That WVi Affect Privacy
1.

Input

Direct-entry input devices and optical scanning methods represent techniques by which data, either numeric or alphabetic, can be entered directly
into machine-readable form. Some forecasters believe voice input devices
will become widespread by the late 1980's. 19
2. Storage
Larger memory storage capacities are being developed to place great
volumes of personal data into direct-access storage for on-line access. These
new techniques include laser beam technology allowing data to be stored at
20
the molecular level.
3.

Configuration Arrangements

More flexible options are available for arranging the configuration of
computer systems. Included in this array are minicomputers and personal
microcomputers which can be used for self-contained record-keeping and
data processing applications. There are also improved capacities for linking
terminals into on-line systems, thereby giving greater flexibility to organizations and government. Some organizations have become more decentralized
in their record-keeping activities while others have elected to use large, mul21
titerminal centralized systems.
4.

Data-base Management Software

Considerable
15.

improvement

is expected

in data-base management

A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY 337-406 (1972).

16. Id at 321-30. While there may not exist a single giant databank to hold all this information, it is possible to link separate computer systems within a separate organization or between organizations. Given the linkage technology already available, and if problems of
common personal identifiers, compatible record formats, and appropriate software instructions
for the desired use could be worked out, there would never be a need for one central processing
unit to operate this data system.
17. G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
18. Report on Prwiacy: Who is Watching You? U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., July 12, 1982, at 34-

37.
19.

To Each HiS Own Computer, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1982, at 50.

20. Seegenerally Boraiko, The Chip, 162
21.

NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 921 (1982).

Seegenerally TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 12-24.
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software. The movement toward management information systems allowing
separate data files to be unified and processed will continue. Some experts
believe the continued upgrading of those systems will depend largely on an
improved understanding of business, social, and political processes, and ma22
jor administrative reforms within these organizations.
5.

Availability of Computers

The development of low-cost personal computers and relatively inexpensive terminal links into commercial time-sharing services has greatly increased the availability of computers to individuals and small organizations.
23
AlIn 1980, over $1.8 billion was spent worldwide on personal computers.
most 2.8 million computers were sold in 1981 at an average cost of approximately $2,000 each. 24 Predictions for 1985 are that over 50 million personal
computers will be sold worldwide. 25 As computers become more readily
available to individuals, more personal data will be accessible in machine
readable form.
6.

Communication Systems

Less expensive and more specialized communications systems for data
transmission have been developed. 26 Microwave systems, satellites, cable television, and laser communications have been, or will be, developed for regu27
lar use.
7.

Output Devices

More flexible and less expensive computer output technology has been
developed. Computers will more frequently be used as "support" for microfilm and microfiche systems. Consequently, the sorting and preparing of
hard-copy media through computer-output-to-microfilm devices will conhowever, the cost
tinue to grow. 28 Hardware costs will continue to decline,
29
of increasingly complex software systems will rise.
These technological advances make the computer essential for coping
with the "information explosion."' 30 It has been estimated that by 1987, six
to seven times the present volume of new information will be produced, however, the ability of computers to automate the information may approach
22. Interview with Timothy Skinner, Staff Attorney, Lowery Air Force Base, Denver,
Colo., (Dec. 22, 1982) (federal legal information through electronics).
23. TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 14.
24. Strikihg it Rich, supra note 14, at 41.
25. To Each Hs Own Computer, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1982, at 50.

26. The break up of AT&T on January 8, 1982 will lead to the continued development of
telecommunications systems capable of providing efficient and effective methods for data transmission. See, e.g., ATLANTIC, May 1979, at 68.
27. G. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 254-86 (1981).
28. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, LIBRARIES AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY:
NATIONAL SYSTEM CHALLENGE 73 (1972).

29. The Tail that Wags the Dog, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1982, at 55.
30. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1979, § 3, at 1.
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3l
one hundred times the current capacity.

B.

Major Issues Resultingfrom Computer Development

Computer development and the projected use of computer technology
carry many implications for society. Four issues which have been raised con32
cerning this impact are automation, power, individuality, and privacy.
1.

Automation

Just as the Industrial Revolution enhanced man's physical strength
with machines, computational technology has begun to supplement some
aspects of human thought processes. Computers are doing work that some
people consider to be burdensome, tedious, and boring. 33 As a result, productivity and production costs have been optimized. 34 Some observers believe that computers create more jobs than they displace, while others
theorize that computers will eventually destroy many more jobs than are
35
created.
2.

Power

It is said that "information is power." Computers create the potential
for a few individuals to accumulate large amounts of data that can be readily accessed. Sophisticated computers create a power gap between those persons technically trained to interpret and use this information and those who
do not have such skills. Computers can also dictate our actions. Systems
failures, for example, can result in confusion and catastrophe. Recent system
failures such as the blackouts in New York City, the accident at Three Mile
Island, and air traffic control problems in Southern California have created
36
chaotic situations.
3.

Individuality

In the United States, the right to pursue happiness has historically been
highly valued. Computers have significantly altered this emphasis on individuality. At times, our very essence is reduced to numbers on a terminal
screen. Computers store aggregations of data such as fiscal and credit transactions, medical records, consumer habits, and communications. With access to so much accumulated data, however, social planners might easily
begin to envision a society with goals that can be dealt with in mass, rather
31. See SCIENCE NEWS, Oct. 4, 1975, at 220; Etzioni, Ejicts of Small Computers on Sctentists,
SCIENCE, July 11, 1975, at 93.
32.

W. MATHEWS, MASTER OR MESSIAH? THE COMPUTER'S IMPACT ON SOCIETY 32-36

(1980).
33. Robots are used to weld and attach machine parts for automobiles, steel work, electronic circuits, and other assembly line products. Japan has developed robots to build other
robots. SeeJapan's High- Tech Challenge, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9, 1982, at 48.
34. See TIME, Dec. 8, 1980, at 72-83.
35. Machines Smarter than Men? An Interview with Robert Weiner, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
Feb. 24, 1964, at 84.
36. See TIME, Dec. 8, 1980, at 72-83.
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than in terms of the individual. 37
4.

Privacy

Some observers have argued against the trend to link data banks and
access information on individuals because such trends could serve as the beginning of "individual data images." '38 In particular, Professor Westin has
argued that existing computational technology capable of integrating several
data banks into networks would allow personal data provided by an individual for one purpose to be used at a later time for unrelated purposes. 39 The
likelihood that an individual would realize, much less approve of, such uses
isremote.
There appears to be little legal or social movement at this point to place
additional protections on privacy. Professor Westin has observed that privacy is a quality-of-life issue that is usually considered less important than
40
economic and foreign policy concerns.
II.

THE THREAT TO PRIVACY

The threats posed to the individual from computer technology have
been described by one commentator as: illicit access to personal information; unexpected consequences of making information freely available by
mechanical means; use of information for purposes other than those for
which it was collected; actions based on inaccurate or outdated information;
placement of the individual at a disadvantage as compared to organizations
with ready access to large amounts of computerized information; and the
undue credence given to information merely because it is stored in a computer. 4 1 Other threats include the "secrecy" of personal information; unauthorized or illicit collection methods and omissions; the visibility of the data
collection and analysis process; and the regulation of computers. 42
Another commentator has observed that the major effect of the computer on privacy is the removal of the individual from the decision of
whether personal information may be released. 43 This loss of control can
take two forms: loss of access control and loss of accuracy control. 44 When
an individual is the sole source of information, he has at least some control
over what information is disseminated to others. The advent of the computer databank added a new source of personal information over which the
individual has no access control. Related to this development is the individual's diminished control over the accuracy and reliability of the personal
information that is released through computer databanks.
37.

A. VAN TASSEL, THE COMPLETE COMPUTER 153 (1976).

38. Koehn, Privay, Our Problemfor Tomorrow, J. oF SYs. MGMT., 8-10 (July 1973).
39. See A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 111-67, 317-54.
40. Id at 14-20.

41. Barron, People, Not Computers, in PRIVACY 320 (J. Young ed. 1978).
42. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,

POLICY ISSUES

IN DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY 148 (1976).

43. Beaney, The Right to
44. Id at 254.

iaqcy
andAmerican Law, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (1966).
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Key Forces Threatening Pri'vacy

As computer technology improves, the ways in which privacy may be
invaded increase. There are four forces in America that compel the need for
45
legal protections of privacy.
1.

Eavesdropping

There are increasingly more sophisticated devices available for eavesdropping. Professor Westin documented both governmental and private sector actions geared to secretly penetrate private places and intercept private
conversations. 46 The assumption that persons can carry on a conversation in
a home or room in private, is apparently no longer justified.
2.

Sophisticated Databases

When records were kept on paper and requests for information had to
be manually processed in writing, central files combining credit information,
employment histories, and arrest records were unknown. The past as well as
the present could be hidden or forgotten unless someone had the time and
resources necessary to conduct an exhaustive search. Today, government
and business maintain extensive records in computer databanks. Management information systems allow computers to be linked together to provide a
comprehensive picture of a person's finances, employment, education, and
reputation. Such systems are not immune from being tapped and having
information stolen, nor does anything exist to prevent those with legal access
47
from checking the records of selected individuals.
3.

Growing Need for Information

As the ability to process information becomes greater, the public's perception of the need for additional data expands. Professor Miller attributes
the explosion of information-keeping not only to advances in computer technology, but also to the federal government's entry into the areas of taxation
and social welfare.4 8 Many governmental agencies are beginning to ask
complex, probing, and sensitive questions. Some of these questions have required the disclosure of a person's associations, medical history, and attitudes
toward various institutions and people. 4 9 Similar trends are apparent in social science and private market analysis research where lie detector tests and
personality examinations have been used to gather data relating to such private domains as a person's sexual preferences, religious beliefs, and other
50
personal habits.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
note 18,

See Bazelon, supra note 2, at 597-600 (1977).
See A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 158-68.
See, e.g., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., supra note 18, at 34-37.
See generally A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 158-68.
See A. MILLER, supra note 2, at 21.
A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 133-70, 216-78. See alo U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., supra
at 35-36.
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Increased Regulation

As the population grows and resources diminish, individual economic
freedom will probably give way to increased governmental intervention.
While this larger role for government may be condemned in principle, demands for economic security, education, adequate health care, and improved criminal justice systems require increased governmental involvement.
The danger is that, while providing some benefits, the government will exert
unnecessary controls that diminish individual autonomy and privacy. 5 1
Bazelon argues that the law must increasingly intervene to guard
against the erosion of privacy through administrative regulations, statutes,
and the common law. 5 2 Whenever law affecting privacy is made by the
courts, legislature, or executive branch, policymakers should engage in simi53
lar sorts of analysis to mediate among the inevitable competing interests.
This, according to Bazelon, is probably the only way to protect privacy in
54
the future.
B.

Types of PersonalInformation

The use of computers to store personal information is exemplified by
three hypothetical composite cases in which a loan, a life insurance policy, and
a credit card are rejected. Although these cases are hypothetical, they typify
the extent to which information can be used and abused once the data is
stored in a computer.
John Smith, a forty-year-old engineer and honorably-discharged veteran, was denied a Veterans Administration (VA) guarantee on a home
mortgage. He asked to review his file at the savings and loan association
where he applied for the loan. The accepted banking practice in the United
States is to permit the applicant to review only the file, not the credit report
or the home appraisal. 55 Smith's review of the file revealed that he was
convicted of a felony in 1965. The bank official told him that the credit
report contained other adverse information and gave him the name of the
credit reporting agency that supplied this information.
Smith and his attorney called the credit reporting agency. Under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 Smith has the right to review his entire file,
except for the medical information. 5 7 Credit reporting agencies generally
base credit reports on contacts with their customers who have requested reports on individuals over the past years. They also contact references sup51. Some social commentators criticize Westin's notions of privacy and individualism as
antagonistic to the general welfare. See J. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, PRIVACY
NoMos XIII 18-23 (1971).
52. Bazelon, supra note 2, at 600.
53. A. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 370-77.
54. Id
55. Banks generally consider credit reports and appraisals to be their own information.
When a potential customer completes a credit application, he consents to the bank's consulation
of practically any person or institution about his credit, character, and general reputation. See,
e.g., Annot., 98 A.L.R. 3d 561 (1980).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).

57. Id. § 1681(b).
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plied by the credit applicant. These references are usually friends,
merchants, and banks who have a record of the applicant's purchasing habits. Information from these sources, as well as from such court records as
divorce decrees, garnishments, or bankruptcy documents, are then supplied
to a requesting party such as the savings and loan association.
To Smith's surprise, his file contained a notation that he had been identified as a person known to have attacked or ridiculed a major doctrine of
the Christian faith and the American way of life. As required by the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, the credit reporting agency reinvestigated this notation after Smith protested. 58 It concluded that the notation, based solely on
the fact that Smith's father had been investigated in the 1950's by the House
Subcommittee on Un-American Activities, was not applicable to him. The
agency, therefore, deleted the notation from his file and notified the savings
and loan association.
The alleged felony conviction was, in fact, a conviction for civil disobedience when Smith was involved in a sit-in as a civil rights worker in the
South. The bank obtained this information from Smith's veteran's files.
The veteran's files also contained the name and address of his ex-wife. With
this information and the credit reporting agency's file, 59 the bank conducted
its own investigation. It contacted the FBI, 60 whose files also showed the
conviction.
Smith has two remedies: he may seek expungement of his criminal record or sue the VA under the Privacy Act. 6 ' Expungement is generally available only when there is either an acquittal or dismissal of the charges and a
showing of "significant abuse of authority" by the law enforcement officials. 62 Expungements have also been ordered in cases where the sole purpose of an arrest was to harass civil rights workers. 63 A suit to obtain
expungement, however, is uncertain and time consuming. A better option is
to seek a remedy under the Privacy Act. 64 If the VA refuses to amend his
military record, Smith may seek compulsion of such action through the
courts. 65 The VA can argue that it is exempt from the requirements of the
Privacy Act because its disclosure to the bank was a "routine use" of such
records. 66 Smith undoubtedly signed a waiver as part of his application for
58.

Id § 16 8 1(g).

See also A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 82 (1971); D. Linowes,

Are New Prwvacy Laws Needed-, 44 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 436 (1978).

59.
notified
Privacy
60.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976). If the bank already had this information, it could have
the VA, whose activities are excluded from the provisions of the Right of Financial
Act under the circumstances described here. Id.
Id. The FBI's activities are also excluded under these circumstances.

61. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
62. See, e.g., Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); D. Weinstein, Confidentzah y
of CriminalRecords: Orivacy v. the Pubhc Interest, 22 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1205-11 (1977), points out
that data collection, not just computerization, is at least part of the problem. The criminal
justice system has a genuine need, however, for data to prevent crime, move caseloads, and
analyze statistics.
63. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
65. See id § 552a(g)(2)(A).
66. See id § 552. The term "routine use" means, with respect to the disclosure of a record,
the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was
collected. Id § 552a(a)(7).
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the mortgage guarantee, permitting the bank and the VA to investigate his
record and use any information they received. Any information disclosed
under the Privacy Act must be "timely" 6 7 and Smith's seventeen-year-old
conviction does not meet this requirement.
Smith's available remedies do not necessarily provide certainty of outcome and the process required to pursue these remedies is extremely timeconsuming. As a practical matter, the house Smith sought to purchase
would probably be sold to another bidder. His best non-legal remedy may
be to seek a conventional loan from another bank using a different credit
reporting agency.
Mary Brown, a thirty-year-old television reporter in perfect health and
with an excellent financial reputation, was informed that she would not be
issued an insurance policy. The insurance company notified Brown that it
had received adverse information about her that she could inspect. At the
insurance company's office Brown was shown her file with the exception of
her medical and credit reports. 68 She was, however, given the names of the
credit reporting agency and the doctors the company had contacted for this
information. The insurance company told Brown that it had received an
adverse report from the Medical Information Bureau (MIB), 69 and that this
report had been used to supplement the credit and medical reports.
The MIB, which is subject to the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 70 was required to show Brown her file, excluding medical information. The file contained a report from a neighbor who stated that Brown
entertained people of questionable character at all hours and that she used
drugs. 71 Brown disputed the report and the insurance company reinvestigated. It found that the neighbor was nearly senile and disliked Brown because her dog occasionally wandered into the neighbor's yard.
The
insurance company deleted the report.
The file of the credit reporting agency contained no adverse comments.
The doctor's report, however, indicated that Brown had disclosed to her col67. Id § 552a(e)(6). The Fair Credit Reporting Act does not permit disclosures of convictions over seven years old.
68. Although this is an accepted industry practice, routine medical information, such as a
blood pressure reading, may be disclosed to the individual. Id § 552a(f)(4).
69. See Stern, Medical Information Bureau: The Life Insurer's Databank, 4 RUTGERs L.J. OF
COMPUTERS AND THE L. 1, 1-19 (1974). The MIB is an association of 700 life insurance companies whose members underwrite 90% of the life insurance policies in the United States and
Canada. Members may obtain information on the records of over 11,000,000 people contained
in the MIB's computer files. Whenever an applicant is declined life insurance, the life insurance
company reports this information to the MIB. This list is not checked for accuracy and the
person is placed on a list of "impairments." The traits of an "impairment" include nervousness,
sexual deviation, and unhealthy appearance. The purpose of the MIB is to prevent an applicant who is a poor risk and who is refused insurance by one company from applying to subsequent companies or from withholding certain information. While the MIB will not divulge
such medical information directly to an applicant, it will provide information to the applicant's
personal physician, who may then inform the applicant. Under the MIB rules, such medical
information is to be used only to supplement the life insurance company investigation. Id
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(i) (1970).
71. Linowes, Must Personal Pvac.y Die in the Computer Age?, 65 A.B.A. J. 1180, 1182 (1979).
This was an actual case reported to the Privacy Commission in 1978.
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lege physician that her mother had been treated by a psychiatrist. 72 The
college was precluded from releasing this information under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (Act) 7 3 without Brown's consent. This
Act, however, does not provide a private remedy; it merely permits the Secretary of Education to terminate federal funds to the institution.7 4 Brown
does have a remedy against the credit reporting agency for continuing to
carry the doctor's report. The agency is precluded from disclosing the information because it is more than seven years old. 75 If the agency refuses to
both delete the information and inform the insurance company of this action, the agency may be liable for actual and punitive damages. 76 If the
agency changes its report, Brown should be issued her policy.
Richard White, a forty-year-old small businessman who owns his own
hardware store, was denied a credit card. The credit card company showed
White his file, with the exception of his credit report, and gave him the name
of the credit reporting agency. The file at the credit reporting agency revealed that shortly after graduating from college twenty years ago, White
was adjudicated as bankrupt and received welfare for a year.
Under the terms of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, bankruptcies that
occurred over ten years prior to a report may not be disclosed. 77 The agency
is required to delete the information and inform the credit card company or
be subject to actual and punitive damages. 78 Other types of adverse information may be subject to a seven-year limitation on disclosure. 79 The agency
may not, therefore, report that White received public assistance. 80
The more interesting question is how the credit reporting agency obtained this information since these records are subject to strict requirements
of confidentiality. 8 It is possible that White's social security number was
obtained when he received public assistance 82 or when he applied for the
72. This is another actual case reported to the Privacy Commission in 1978. A young
woman was refused employment as a public school teacher because she had reportedly told her
school doctor her mother had once seen a psychiatrist. See Diamond, How to Protect Your PrIvacy,
MCCALL'S, Feb. 1980, at 51.
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(i) (1976).
74. See, e.g., Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267, 1276 (8th Cir. 1977) (a former
student could not use the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act to force a college to
release his transcript after he had defaulted on his National Defense Student Loan and was
discharged in bankruptcy).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(6) (1976).
76. Id. § 1681n.
77. Id. § 1681c(a)(I). The credit report is used in connection with a transaction or life
insurance policy involving an amount in excess of $49,999 or employment at a salary of $20,000
or more. There are no time restrictions placed on reporting bankruptcies.
78. Id § 1681c.
79. Id. § 1681c(2)-(6).
80. Id. U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(6).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (Supp. IV 1980). In Colorado, information on individuals who
applied for public assistance since 1972 is in computer files. Printouts of these files contain a
note that the recipient is responsible for the confidentiality of the files. See 6 Colorado Department of Social Services Manual, §§ 6.210-6.220 (effective June 1, 1983).
82. Chambers v. Klein, 419 F. Supp. 569 (D. N.J. 1976), affd, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977)
(requiring disclosure of a social security number in order to secure Aid to Families With Dependent Children is neither a violation of the Privacy Act nor the Constitution). The use of social
security numbers makes it easier to access different computer files containing personal informa-
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credit card. A computer search for information based on White's social security number might reveal such information. In any case, the agency must
delete this information from its files and notify the credit card company,
which then has the discretion to issue a card based upon this changed
8 3
information.
These three cases suggest the pervasive impact that computer storage
and retrieval of personal information can have on an individual's life. The
burden of correcting inaccurate information or deleting dated material rests
most often with the individual rather than the agency. This is because in
many computerized databanks the cost to delete data is significantly higher
than the cost to store it perpetually.8 4 The real threat to privacy, therefore,
may not be the fact that computers can collect and store facts about individuals, but rather that inaccurate or dated information can be repeatedly used
to evaluate the character, reputation. employability, or credit-worthiness of
an individual. That person may never know what information was used in
the evaluation or from where the information was derived.
III.

A.

LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES

The Judital Response

Although the word "privacy" does not appear in the text of the Constitution, in the mid-1900's the Court found that such a right could be implied
from its various amendments. In NAACP v. Alabama,85 the Court found a
"vital relationship between the freedom to associate and privacy in one's
associations, '8 6 ruling that the "right of the [NAACP] members to pursue
their lawful private interests . . .privately" was protected by the first and
87
fourteenth amendments.
tion. Davis, A Technologist's View ofPrivaqy and Security in AutomatedInformation Systems, 4 RUTGERS
LJ.OF COMPUTERS AND THE L. 264, 273 (1975).
83. Credit card companies are a major source of information on millions of individuals.
To obtain a credit card, the applicant must provide a significant amount of financial, credit,
and personal information. When he uses his card, information concerning items purchased,
travel movements, and financial status are posted to his account. By 1976, Master Card had
40.6 million cardholders. N. PENNEY & D.I. BAKER, THE LAw OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS § 1.01[3] (1980). Credit card companies such as American Express, VISA, and
Master Card contain specific instructions on their applications that the information requested,
and information from later transactions, will be used and exchanged by other companies. This
information is then sold to generate further profits for the credit card companies. One startling
example of how information can be used occurred when a laboratory which tested women for
pregnancy, sold its list of pregnant women to a diaper service. The diaper service mailed advertisements to the names on the list. One husband learned of his wife's pregnancy from the cheerful greeting and congratulations on the cover of the advertisement. See, Comment, The Prtvacy
Side ofthe Credit Card, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 183, 187 (1973). In Denver, Colorado, banks seem to be
concerned about protecting the confidentiality of their customers' files. Most banks keep only a
customer's balance, available credit line, and the past few months' transactions on computer
files. The rest of the customer's information is stored by month, not by name, on microfiche,
which is stored under tight security in the bank's vault. Interview with Jack D. Molloy, Law
Department of Colorado National Bankshares, Inc., in Denver, Colo. (Dec. 14, 1982).
84. Interview with James R. Young, Advisory Engineering Manager of Storage Technology Corporation, in Louisville, Colo. (Sept. 23, 1982).
85. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
86. Id at 462.
87. Id. at 466.
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In holding that a constitutional right of privacy exists, Griswold v.Connecticut 38 struck down a state statute that made it a crime to prescribe or use
contraceptive devices.8 9 Justice Douglas found a right of privacy emanating
from the penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth
90
amendments.
The Court, however, has been reluctant to hold that a similar right to
privacy exists for individuals in commercial settings. In 1976, the Court in
United States o. Miller 9 t held that a bank depositer has no "reasonable expectation of privacy" as to copies of checks, financial statements, and other documents that the bank depositer had supplied to the bank. 92 The Court
reasoned that because such records were merely business records, rather than
private papers, and because the depositor voluntarily revealed personal affairs to the bank by surrendering these records, he took the risk that this
93
information might be conveyed to others.
In 1972, the Court in Lairdv. Tatum 94 avoided the issue of whether the
existence of a broad system of domestic surveillance by the United States
Army "chilled" the first amendment rights of those who were the targets of
such surveillance. 95 Information concerning the activities of the plaintiffs in
this class action had been stored in a computer at Fort Holabird, Maryland. 96 This information was freely disseminated to numerous military and
civilian intelligence officials throughout the country. 9 7 The Court's holding
was limited to a finding that the mere existence of broad governmental investigative and data-gathering activities was insufficient to constitute a justiciable claim. 98 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger added that
the ruling intimated "no view with respect to the propriety or desirablity,
from a policy standpoint, of the challenged activities .

. .

.

99 The dissent

pointed out that danger exists as long as computer files are kept on the membership, ideology, and policies of any political activist group in the United
States. 100
The latest Court decision dealing directly with this question of privacy
occurred in 1977. In Whalen . Roe, t 0 ' the Court held that as long as the
security of the computer is adequate and the information stored therein is
only passed to appropriate officials, sensitive information may be stored and
88. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
89. Id at 485.
90. Id at 484. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy includes the
right to have an abortion); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (overruling Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)). Katz held that wiretaps without a warrant or the permission of at least one of the communicating parties was an illegal search, because the wiretap
constituted an invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 389 U.S. at 350-53.
91. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
92. Id at 442. See also California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
93. 425 U.S. at 440-43.
94. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
95. Id at 3.
96. Id. at 6.
97. Id
98. Id at 10.
99. Id at 15.
100. Id at 24-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
101. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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retrieved without an invasion of a person's right to privacy.' 0 2 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that the right to collect personal information "is typically accompanied" by a duty to avoid disclosure, and that
the proper concern and duty were shown in this case. 10 3 Justice Brennan,
concurred, recognizing that databanks increase the opportunity for abuse of
privacy and that future developments in computer technology may necessi04
tate a judicial curb on that technology.'
Although a number of privacy and computer-related cases have arisen
since Whalen, none have gone beyond the court of appeals level. 10 5 Consequently, the Court has yet to take up the issues foreseen by Justice Brennan.
B.

The Legislative Response: FederalSatutog Developments

As a result of growing public concern about perceived abuses of privacy
through computerized databanks and in response to the Supreme Court's
reluctance to find constitutional violations of privacy in areas such as personal credit information, Congress enacted several statutes creating remedies
for dealing with privacy violations.
1.

Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970

The first major legislation concerning credit data was the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (Act).' 0 6 The main provisions of the Act are intended to protect individuals from inaccurate reports and to prevent invasions of privacy.1 0 7 The applicability of the Act is limited to reports for credit,
employment, insurance, and related benefits.' 0 8 To guard against inaccuracies, the Act gives the individual the right to access and to challenge data
that a credit reporting agency may have in its data files. The statute also
mandates procedural requirements for imposing civil penalties on credit reporting agencies if they fail to correct inaccurate information. ' 0 9 The Act
allows the individual access to both the data and its source. If an individual
is either completely or partially denied credit based on the credit report, the
Act requires the creditor to disclose both the reason for the rejection and the
102. Id at 601-02.
103. Id at 605. Information in the databank included the names and addresses of everyone
in New York who had acquired narcotic drugs such as opium and cocaine with a doctor's
prescription. Id at 591-93. The computer's security system included a locked wire fence, an
alarm system, and off-line reading of the data files and tapes such that no computer terminal
outside the computer could read or record the information. Id at 594. The plaintiffs argued
that the availability of their names and addresses from the databank created a concern that
people in need of such drugs would refuse to seek medical assistance for fear of being discovered
and stigmatized as drug addicts. Id This argument was rejected. Id at 603-04.
104. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Ash v.
United States, 608 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 965 (1980); Doe v. Webster,
606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Roberto Benlizer, 459 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1978).
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976).
6
107. Id § 1 81a.
108. See ORGANIZATION FOR EcONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 42,
at 170.
109.

15 U.S.C. § 168In (1976).
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name and address of the credit reporting agency. 110
The Act requires that an individual be notified within six months that a
credit report has been requested. The scope and nature of the request and
the name of the creditor requesting the information must also be divulged.ll Perhaps the most important provision in the Act gives an individual the right to challenge the accuracy of information contained in the credit
reporting databank files. 1 2 As long as the challenge is neither frivolous nor
irrelevant, the agency must reinvestigate and delete information found to be
unverifiable. If the dispute is not resolved, the individual may file an account of the supposed inaccuracy with the credit reporting agency. This
account must be included in all subsequent reports that the agency passes on
to requesting creditors.
The Act also requires that reasonable procedures be followed by agencies in assuring the accuracy and proper use of credit information. 113 If an
agency is negligent in this area, an individual who is harmed may recover
actual damages, costs, and attorney's fees. "i 4 If the agency's action is willful,
punitive damages may be awarded. 1 5 Criminal penalties, including fines
up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment up to one year, may be rendered for the
willful misappropriation or unauthorized disclosure of credit information. 116
Federal courts have jurisdiction over violations without regard to the
amount in controversy.' ' 7 To guard against invasion of an individual's privacy, the Act restricts the purposes for which credit reporting agencies may
provide information. Proper uses include determining eligibility for additional credit and disclosure pursuant to a court order." l8 Limitations are
imposed on the length of time certain derogatory information may be retained by the credit reporting agency. For example, bankruptcy information
can be retained only fourteen years.' 19 Arrest records, indictments, and con120
victions can be retained for only seven years.
The Act has certain weaknesses. It lacks a formal procedure to ensure
that an individual be given due process and it provides a haphazard approach to deal with disputes about the accuracy of information in an individual's file.' 2 ' For example, objections and accounts by an individual in
unresolved disputes concerning the accuracy of credit information are not
reported retroactively to prior recipient-creditors of the individual's file.
Further, the Act only mandates that a credit reporting agency provide the
individual with an oral report of the contents of the credit files. The agency
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id
Id.
Id
Id

§
§
§
§

1681m.
1681g.
1681i.
1681e.

114. Id § 1681o.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id
Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id

121.

Se TASK FORCE, CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND COMMUNICATIONS,

§ 1681n.
§§ 1681q-r.
§ 1681p.
§ 1681b.
§ 1681c.

VACY AND COMPUTERS 164 (1972).
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need not provide the individual direct access or a written copy of the file. 122
Finally, civil action remedies are difficult to obtain because the burden of
proof is on the plaintiff-individual and it is often difficult to show actual
123
monetary damages.
2.

Privacy Act of 1974

The Privacy Act (Act) 124 supplemented the Freedom of Information
Act
and was the second major piece of legislation dealing with privacy.
The Act prohibits federal government offices from disclosing personal information about an individual without his written consent, unless it falls within
one of eleven exceptions. 126 Restrictions on disclosures include not only
hard copy, but also display and telephone transmissions.' 2 7 The Act requires federal agencies to reveal their data-collection activities on individuals, to make their justifications for the collection and use of such data public,
128
and to give individuals a right of access to the collected information.
125

The right of access permits the individual to inspect the information in
the presence of a companion. He may request that corrections be made and,
if the request is denied, may file a statement of disagreement. 129 The agency
holding the information has ten days to respond to this statement. If the
agency refuses to amend the information, the individual has thirty days in
which to request a review'of that refusal. If the review supports the agency's
decision, the individual has the right to judicial review. 130 If the agency
agrees to amend the file, it must notify those to whom the record has been
disclosed.13' An agency is not required to maintain records of the entities to
which disclosures have been made.
In regulating the release of information, the federal agency is required
to disclose the name of the agency or authority requesting the information,
to determine whether the request is voluntary or mandatory, and to determine the intended uses of the information.' 32 The agency must publish an
annual notice of each record system it maintains. This notice must include:
the name of the system, its location, categories of data files maintained, routine uses and users, storage policies, retrieval, access control, retention and
disposal of data, procedures to notify individuals as to the existence of and
122.

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 42, at

174.

123.

d. at 177.

124. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
125. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.

126. The exceptions under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976) are: 1) to officers and employers of the
agency in the performance of their duties; 2) when required by statute; 3) for routine use; (4) to
the Census Bureau; 5) for statistical research; 6) to the National Archives; 7) for a civil or criminal law proceeding; 8) to protect an individual's health or safety; 9) to Congress; 10) to the
Comptroller General; and 11) pursuant to court order.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id
130. Id § 552a(g)(l).
131. Id § 552a(e).
132. Id
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133
requests for their files, and inspection and challenge procedures.
Individuals who believe that their rights have been violated and who
have been denied relief from the offending agency may sue in federal court
for injunctive relief and civil damages.1 34 Damages for willful violations of
the Act are limited to $1000 plus attorney's fees. Criminal misdemeanor
charges and fines of up to $5000 can be imposed on agency employees for
willful disclosure. 135

3.

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (Act) 136 permits federal funds to be terminated to any institution of higher education
that denies parents the right to inspect the educational records of their children.' 3 7 The Act does not apply to confidential letters of recommendation;
to financial statements concerning the parents of college students; or to a
38
situation where a student has waived his or her rights in these matters.'
The Act provides that funds will be denied to an institution that releases
such records to persons other than: school officials "with a need to know,"
state or federal education officials, research organizations, or persons with a
lawful subpoena.' 3 9 Private remedies are not available to students or their
parents.
4.

Freedom of Information Act

The Freedom of Information Act (Act)140 was intended to compel federal agencies to divulge various records, procedures, and statements of policy
to those requesting such information. The Act requires each agency to publish in the Federal Register 14 1 a description of the place and manner in
which the public may obtain such information. 142 Agencies are not required
to disclose information which would: constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;" jeopardize national defense; impinge upon internal personnel rules; reveal confidential financial information, trade secrets,
personnel or medical files, geological information, or agency memoranda; or
reveal investigatory records that can be obtained only by a valid subpoena.' 4 3 Persons who are refused inspection of federal records may sue to
enjoin the agency from withholding the information and recover costs and
44
attorney's fees. '
133. Id
134. Id
135. Id at 13.

136. 20 U.S.C. § 1232 g (1976).
137. Id § 12 32g(o.
138. Id § 1232g(a)(1)(B) (waivers may not be required for admission or receipt of financial
aid).
139. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also Girardier v. Webster College,
563 F.2d 1267, 1276-77 (8th Cir. 1977).
140. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
141. Id
142. Id
143. Id See also id § 552(a) and Rose v. Dep't of the Air Force, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
144. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also Mervin v. Bonfanti, 410 F. Supp.
1205 (D.D.C. 1976).
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5.

Tax Reform Act of 1976

The Internal Revenue Service is exempted from statutes that deny access to an individual's personal records held by third parties. The Tax Reform Act of 1976,145 however, requires that a taxpayer be notified when
are subpoened from a bank, credit reporting
records of his transactions
46
agency, or other party. 1
6.

Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978

47
was intended to restrict the fedThe Right to Financial Privacy Act'
eral government's access to financial records. In apparent response to United
States v. M/l/er, 148 Congress imposed a duty of confidentiality on financial
institutions.' 49 Financial institutions often serve as creditors and their
records are likely to contain credit reporting agency reports.
The federal government may be permitted access to such records by
securing the written consent of the individual. Other methods include ob50
Whenever the
taining: a subpoena, a court order, or a search warrant.'
federal government seeks access to financial records, the individual must be
notified. 1 5 ' Governmental access may be challenged in every instance except those in which a search warrant was obtained. A civil remedy against
52
A fine of $100 per
the government or the financial institution is available.'
be awarded.
violation, actual damages, court costs, and attorney's fees may
153
Punitive damages are available, if the violation was willful.

7.

Fair Credit Billing Act

The Fair Credit Billing Act (Act) 154 enhances the protection that an
individual has from inaccuracies in credit data. Detailed provisions exist for
correcting billing errors. '55 The Act establishes a procedure for an obligor to
identify his or her account, register the alleged error, and state the reasons
for believing that an error exists. 156 The creditor has thirty days in which to
respond.' 57 Upon receiving notice from the obligor that an error might exist, the creditor may not issue an adverse report concerning the obligor's
58
credit. '
145. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
146. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
147. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
148. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
149. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7,repri)tedzh 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 9273, 9305-06.
150. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3406-3409 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
151. Id. § 3405.
152. Id. § 3417.
153. Id.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1976).

155. I. § 1666(a).
156. Id.
157. Id

158. Id
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Federal Reports Act

Section 3508 of the Federal Reports Act' 59 restricts the exchange of information between federal agencies and imposes penalties for unauthorized
disclosures. 160 When the agency seeks to acquire confidential information
61
on an individual, its justification defense is limited by the Act.'
C.

State Legislation

Supreme Court policy has generally been to allow individual states to
define privacy rights. In Katz v. United States,' 62 the Court held that:
"[P]rotection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone
by other people-is, like the protection of his property and of his very life,
163
left largely to the law of the individual States."'
At the state level, legal protection afforded privacy remains limited, inconsistent, and fragmented. Only ten states have provisions in their constitutions, which expressly protect privacy. 164 Seven of these states confer more
limited recognition on the privacy right by closely associating it with the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 165 Florida, for example, extends protection "against the unreasonable interception of private
communications by any means."' 66 The Illinois, Hawaii, Louisiana, and
South Carolina privacy provisions are broader, protecting against "invasions
of privacy."' 67 Washington and Arizona have narrower privacy provisions,
which serve as the functional equivalent of the prohibition against illegal
searches and seizures. 168
Privacy in the state context is also protected through judicial interpretation. Some state courts have imported a limited constitutional right of privacy into general provisions of their respective state constitutions. ' 69 Some
of these states later inserted an express privacy provision into the appropriate
section of their constitutions through legislation.17 0 While the notion of privacy is a relatively new area for the United States Supreme Court, it is even
newer to the states. With the exceptions of Arizona and Washington, the
right of privacy has been included in state constitutions only since 1968.
159. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

160. Idd§ 3508(b).
161. See United States v. Davey, 426 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970).
162. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
163. Id at 350-51 (emphasis in original).
164. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONsT. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST.art. § 12; FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 12; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 5; ILL. CONsT. art. I, §§ 6, 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST.art. I, § 7. For an excellent
discussion of state legislation in the privacy area and a full text of each state's statutes, see Cope,
Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 631 (1977).
165. Id at 636.
166. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. Set Cope, supra note 164, at 637.
167. See Cope, supra note 164, at 637.
168. Id
169. See Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Ala. 1972) (right to be let alone concerning hair
length); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (invasion of privacy tort); Cason v.
Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944) (invasion of privacy tort).
170. Alaska, California, and Florida adopted privacy provisions subsequent to the dates of
the court decisions discussed supra note 169.
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State constitutional privacy provisions add another degree of protection
against such devices as computer databanks.
The experience of the states suggests that the most effective means of
protecting privacy is the adoption of a "package" of privacy measures in
state constitutions. One commentator argues that three elements are essential in such a package. The first is the inclusion of a provision relating to the
interception of communication. This provision is normally within the section on searches and seizures. The second is a freestanding right of privacy,
following the models of Alaska, California, and Montana, that protects
against governmental intrusions. Finally, appropriate language should be
included to assure that the courts and legislatures have a mandate to fashion
remedies against intrusions by the private sector.' 7 ' A state's adoption of
such a package would help protect an individual's privacy right across the
spectrum of possible invasion, including those involving computer
databanks. Most states, unfortunately, have not been very active in the privacy area. Colorado, for instance, has acted particularly slowly. Other than
various restrictions on the dissemination of information concerning people
172
who apply for welfare assistance, little Colorado privacy law exists.

IV.
A.

TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF PRIVACY

Transborder Data Flows

The development of complex computer systems, with greatly enhanced
data processing capabilities enabling vast quantities of data to be transmitted within seconds across national frontiers, has made it necessary to consider international privacy protection of personal data. Privacy protection
laws have been, or will shortly be, introduced in approximately half of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to prevent violations of certain fundamental human rights.' 73 The privacy rights having considerable bearing on international law include:
unlawful storage of personal data, storage of inaccurate data, and abuse or
74
unauthorized disclosure of such data.1
While certain countries have enacted legislation aimed at protecting individual privacy, there is a danger that disparities in national legislation
might hamper the international flow of appropriate and necessary personal
data. Such data flows have increased significantly in recent years and are
bound to grow with the continued widespread use of computer and telecom171. Cope, supra note 164, at 730-43.
172. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-1-114 (1982).
173. The OECD has 24 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Members who have introduced privacy protection laws are: Austria,
Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and the United
States. Belgium, Iceland, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and United Kingdom have prepared draft bills. OECD, GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER
FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1981).

174. Id. at 5.
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munication technology. 175 Overly restrictive or disparate legal constraints
could lead to serious disruptions in sectors of the international economy such
176
as banking and insurance.
A recent report by the United States House of Representatives Committee on Governmental Operations outlines the issues in the international regulation of transborder data flows. ' 77 The difficulty of the problems involved
can be observed from that report which noted, inter ah'a, the following kinds
of situations: 1) a diversified consumer products company rented a house
which straddled the border of two European countries to maintain the option of having computer tapes in the venue most expedient to management
purposes;' 1 7 2) a German multinational corporation established a central
personnel information system in Sweden for administration and planning.
This system contained information concerning the family, nationality, and
skills of its employees. Company officials were not permitted to export this
information;' 7 9 3) a United States company complained that its whollyowned subsidiary in Germany is required by German banking law to process
totally within that country. Thus, the computer hardware, software, and
operations must be located in Germany, thereby, excluding the economies of
on-line processing from its Chicago data center.18 0
These problems are due, in part, to individual nations passing disparate
privacy protection laws to control what many argue is an inherently international commodity-information. 18 According to Professor Nanda: "[International] law has been rather slow in responding to the 'information
revolution'-the development and application of technology in electronics
and information processing, and application of technology in electronics, resulting in sophisticated computers, cable and two-way television, direct
broadcast satellites, and the like.' 8 2 Nanda argues, however, that a rush to
pass laws limiting transborder data could upset the "balance between the
needs and interests of society for free flow of information and of the individ183
ual for adequate safeguards of personal data and protection of privacy."'
Present legal norms primarily apply to issues that can be fixed to a definable geographic locus, where responsibility can be attached and jurisdiction can be established. Data transmission and storage do not follow formal
geographic boundaries. Traditional legal approaches have, therefore,
proven unsatisfactory to governments attempting to maintain control over
personal computer databanks. A related problem is where responsibility lies
175. For .adetailed discussion concerning transnational data flow regulation, see Patrick,
Prvacy Restrictions on TransnationalData Flows." A Comparisonof the Council of Europe Draft Convention
and OECD Guidelines, 21 JURIMETRICS J. 405 (1981).
176. Id

177.

HOUSE

COMM.

ON

GOVERNMENT

OPERATIONS,

INTERNATIONAL

INFORMATION

FLOW: FORGING A NEW FRAMEWORK, H.R. REP. No. 1535, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).

178. Id at 24.
179.
180.
181.
182.
ting, 30
183.

Id at 18.
Id at 17.
Patrick, supra note 175, at 406.
Nanda, The Communication Revolution and the Free Flow ofInformation in a TransnationalSetAM. J. COMP. L. 411 (1982).
Id at 412.
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with respect to internal data networks and commercial timesharing services
that operate across national borders. Four possible parties to whom responsibility may be attached in a fairly simple data communication transaction
are: the originator of the data message, the telecommunications carrier, the
data processor, and the recipient of the data.
Two major legal issues surround transnational data flows. The first
concerns the instruments that governments must develop in order to know
what computerized data exists. The second involves the legal framework
that can be developed to assure that agreements among various public and
private parties can be enforced to enable the continuous, uninterrupted flow
of data vital to economic prosperity and national security.
Data flowing across borders is affected by two jurisdictions. As the internal laws of countries differ, the legal assessment of the data and its uses
may also differ. The thrust of legislative efforts has been to regulate personal
information. Some law exists for regulating telecommunications and economic information, however, regulation of transborder data flows is almost
nonexistent.
A fairly common area to consider with respect to potential regulation is
data throughflow. This involves transportation of information across a
country without the data being used in that country. For instance, in transmitting data from Germany to the United States, data might be transmitted
telephonically to London and then by satellite or undersea cable to the
United States. England is a passive way-station in the data flow between
Germany and the United States. Some data processing, however, may occur
in London. One example is the creation of a temporary file for more efficient transmission. The data are not used in England and typically do not
include information on English subjects. Consequently, there will rarely be
any English privacy problems associated with this data throughflow. There
may be little reason to restrict such throughflow with national legislation. In
contrast, if Sweden were the throughflow country, Swedish law places restrictions on the creation of a machine-readable file.i84 Although the file is
temporary, Swedish legislation governs. 185 The file could not be established
8 6
without prior issuance of a license by the Swedish government.i
A second area to consider in developing sound regulations is the use of
foreign service bureaus where processing of data for use in one country takes
place outside that country. The privacy issue is not involved with the nature
of the data processed, but rather with the effect of the relevant national privacy legislation that governs where the data are processed.
A third area is the nature and extent of data collected in one country to
be marketed in another country. Examples include information relating to
subscriptions to foreign periodicals and foreign credit reporting for credit
cards and other forms of credit. As the economies of different countries become more interrelated, the sharing of personal information by credit reporting agencies becomes increasingly significant. Many countries, particularly
184.

Data Act of Sweden, 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 2 (July 1, 1979).

185. Id §2.
186. Id.
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those in Scandinavia, have severely restricted the use of data among credit
87
reporting agencies in foreign countries.1
A fourth area to consider is the growth of multinational corporations.
When companies expand across national borders, a need for personal data to
be transmitted across those boundaries arises. Companies engaged in international trade communicate commercial and personnel information between
countries. Employees tend to be more concerned about privacy issues than
suppliers or clients because of the nature of data stored in personnel files.
Two approaches have been taken to restrict access to personnel data. Swe188
Norden requires a license to create and export personnel information.
access
to
on
and
restrictions
data
agreements
way has incorporated
for
local
management
and
personnel data into contracts between employees
and multinational corporations.1 89
Outside the personal data context, transnational data regulations constrain the movement of data across national borders. These constraints conflict with the administrative and technological programs of most
multinational organizations.
A traditional tenet of national sovereignty has been the ability of a
country to manage its economic and social activities. Telecommunications
and computer technology have the potential of reducing the ability of a
country to manage its internal activities. For example, Canada is concerned
about the drain of computerized data to the United States, and its inability
to control this drain effectively. According to the Canadian Minister of Science and Technology: "Transnational data flow has created the potential of
growing dependence, rather than interdependence, and with it the dangers
of loss of legitimate access to vital information and the danger that industrial
and social development will be governed by decisions of interest groups residing in another country."' 19 Similar concerns have been voiced in France,
where the economic data bases used to develop monthly and quarterly forecasts of European economic trends are designed in the United States and
disseminated in Europe via networks owned by American firms.
Many nations are attempting to protect their computer industries and
job bases through privacy legislation aimed at gaining an economic advantage over other nations in the areas of computers and data processing.
Stricter privacy legislation encourages the storage of information in computers within that country. Information processing is a field in which
thousands of jobs could be lost to foreign nations. Developing viable national information industries with the necessary technical infrastructure
must be considered by these nations in developing legislation.
Telecommunications falls within this area because each nation's laws
and policies will affect the services telecommunications carriers offer. The
187. Id §11.
188. id
189. Norwegian Personal Data Registers Act, 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 5, § I

(May 18, 1977).
190. Address by J. Hugh Faulkner, Canadian Minister of Science and Technology, before
the United Nations (Aug. 1977).
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telecommunication rates and tariffs levied by governments will affect transborder data flows. Finally, the way in which telecommunication carriers
view their role in new fields, such as electronic funds transfer, electronic
mail, interactive home communications, and international data traffic monitoring, will also have a major affect on transborder data flows.
One reason for processing data in a specific country may be to obtain
special protection for personal information. Personal data files could easily
be placed outside the jurisdiction of the country in which the persons are
located. Consequently, national authorities would need multi-party governmental agreements to obtain disclosure of a particular personal data file.
Another reason for placing a data file under the jurisdiction of a foreign
country having stricter privacy legislation is to encourage people to store
privileged personal information. Consequently, the high privacy standards
of a country will be associated with the high standards of the data company.
The most obvious reason for moving personal data files and processing
to a foreign country is that more lenient privacy legislation may exist in that
country. Such countries are known as "data havens" and represent a substantial problem with respect to transborder data flows. It is feared that
national privacy legislation will be ineffective due to transborder
"datadrains." This fear is well-placed, primarily because of the practical
difficulties in attempting to control foreign data drains. For example, it is
difficult to determine the legality of the use of merged data in files in a foreign country whose privacy laws allow such mergers but where the use takes
place in a country whose laws do not allow for such mergers. This problem
is a major threat to the establishment of effective international privacy
legislation.
B.

Selected Examples of Foreign Pr'oacy Legislation
1.

Canada

Protection of privacy has been incorporated into the Canadian Human
Rights Act (Act). 19 ' The Act requires annual publication of a catalogue
identifying each federal information bank, the type of records contained,
and their derivati<e uses. i92 Exceptions to this requirement concern information on international relations, national security, federal-provincial relations, and law enforcement.' 9 3 The act grants an individual the right to
inspect records containing information about himself and to correct inaccurate information. 1 1 4 A member of the Canadian Human Rights Commission is designated a Privacy Commissioner in charge of receiving and
investigating complaints arising under the Act.' 9 5
British Columbia enacted a Privacy Act in 1968, creating a tort action
for willful invasion of privacy.'9 6 Proof of damages is not required.' 9 7 No
191. Act of July 14, 1977, ch. 33, 1976-77 Can. Stat. 887.
192. Id. § 51(1).

193.

d. §§ 53, 54.

194.

d. §§ 2(b), 52.

195. Id § 58.
196. 5 B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 336 (1979). Seealso TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 137.
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other nation has enacted a privacy tort. The Privacy Act in the United
States provides only a civil cause of action for damages.' 9 8
Quebec enacted a Consumer Protection Act (Act)' 99 in 1972. Sections
forty-three and forty-six allow individuals to examine credit reports and register comments. The Act, however, has no provisions to ensure the accuracy
of credit reports since it lacks specific requirements and procedures for correcting false information.
Saskatchewan enacted the Credit Reporting Agencies Act, 2° ° which is
penal in nature and regulates credit reporting agencies through licensing.
The licensed agencies are governed by rules requiring: release of information, the recording of only certain data, disclosure to the individual, registration of disagreements, and informing recipients that certain facts have been
20 1
disputed.
2.

Sweden

The major privacy legislation in Sweden is the Data Act of 1973
(Act). 20 2 The Act prohibits computer databanks from holding personal information without the permission and supervision of the Swedish Data Inspection Board. 20 3 The Board's regulations extend to: the type of data that
may be collected, the design and technical equipment of the data systems,
notice and access to the public, disclosure of information, storage of data,
and security. 2° 4 Penal sanctions for negligent or willful violations of the Act
include fines and imprisonment of up to one year. 20 5 A two-year sentence
may be imposed for unauthorized access or alteration of data, referred to as
"data trespass." 20 6 Civil liability for damages may result from inaccurate
20 7
information.
3.

West Germany

West Germany's Data Protection Act 20 8 subjects databanks to criminal
sanctions for privacy violations. 20 9 In 1976, the Federal Data Protection
Law (FDPL) was enacted which regulates the type of information that may
be stored, processed, and transmitted.2 10 The FDPL bars use of certain confidential data.2 1 ' Data processing is protected when an individual consents
197. Id
198. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6 (1976); O.E.C.D., POLICY ISSUES IN DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY 13 (1974).
199. Ch. 74, 1971 Que. Stat.
200. Ch. 23, 1972 Sask. Stat.
201. Id
202. COMPUTER L. SERV., supra note 184.
203. Id

204. Id § 6.
205. Id § 20.

206.
207.
208.
209.

Id
Id § 23.
Data Protection Act, 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a (Oct. 7, 1970).
Id at 6.

210. Id at 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 3 (Jan. 1, 1978).
211. Id § 1.
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or legal authorization exists concerning the data's use. 21 2 Once a data file is
created, the individual must, upon request, be provided with information on
stored data concerning him. 2 13 Individual access is denied under the FDPL
where it would prejudice the function of the data base. 21 4 Time limitations
for the retention of data bases are not specified, but are determined by
need. 2 15 The German law lacks a provision for notification of disputes between individuals and databanks. Individuals may, however, report their
2 16
differences to the Data Protection Officer.
4.

France

2 17
The French Data Processing, Files, and Liberties Law of 1978 (Law)
created a supervisory Commission to enforce and regulate implementation of
the Law. An unusual provision is that databanks must disclose to the public
their authorization, purpose, access rights, categories of information, and recipient organizations. 21 8 An individual's right of access is subject to a preliminary inquiry by the Commission, which determines the relevance and
necessity of the disclosure. 2 19 If the Commission decides in favor of the individual, the databank must release a copy of the file. 220 No provision exists,
however, for resolving disputes between individuals and databanks.

5.

Norway, Denmark, and Austria

The Norwegian Personal Data Registers Act 22 1 mandates the legal presumption of obsoleteness of any unfavorable personal credit information
more than five years old. 222 The Austrian Privacy Act of 1978223 requires
databank users to correct or delete inaccurate or incomplete information on
individuals. 224 The burden of proving the accuracy of the information lies
with the user, not the individual or databank. 225 The Danish Private Registers Act 226 requires that when a credit bureau discovers inaccurate information on an individual the bureau must: make the necessary corrections,
notify the individual, and send corrected reports to those who have re22 7
quested credit information within the past six months.
The previous discussion illustrates that a number of nations have begun
to realize the importance of protecting confidential, personal information.
212. Id. § 3.

213. Id § 13.
214. Id
215. Id

§ 14.

216. Id § 21.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

France: Law No. 78-17, 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 4 (Jan. 6, 1978).
Id. art. 22.
Id art. 21.
Id
COMPUTER L. SERV., supra note 189.
Id § 15.
5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 8 (Oct. 18, 1978).
Id § 11(1).
Id
5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 6 (June 8, 1978).
Id § 14.
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Their privacy laws suggest some basic principles that could be incorporated
into privacy legislation in the United States.
V.
A.

POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS TO PROTECT PRIVACY

Industy Sef-Disct'rhne

Self-discipline by the computerized credit industry is one inexpensive
control. By developing a professional code of ethics, credit reporting agencies could police themselves. The Code of Ethics for the Association of
Credit Bureaus of Canada serves as a tool for self-discipline in the Canadian
credit reporting industry. 228 Disadvantages of the system are that no specific
person or entity may be held accountable for breaches of the code and that
no specific penalties or authority exist to ensure compliance. Enforcement of
'229
the code is based on "moral suasion.
B.

Ombudsman

An ombudsman does not have regulatory or legislative powers, however, he can recommend regulations and legislation. The ombudsman could
report to Congress periodically and publicize adverse effects of data collection and invasions of privacy.2 30 Suggested functions of the ombudsman
include: considering specific injuries from misuse of information; advising
and commenting on potential databank development; researching data classification; adjudicating complaints; establishing professional standards; examining types of information stored and used; licensing databanks; requiring
periodic reports on systems procedures by operators of databanks; and approving the interchange or collation of information between systems. The
simplicity and low cost of the ombudsman approach makes it particularly
attractive. The ombudsman could immediately respond to an individual's
privacy concerns. One problem, however, is that the ombudsman does not
review systemic problems. Instead, he concentrates on individual databanks
and individual complaints. Also, there can be no investigation until a complaint has been made. Difficulties may also arise when the ombudsman
lacks the technical expertise to analyze a problem. 23 1 The concept of the
ombudsman has never been widely understood or accepted in the United
232
States. Implementing such a system, therefore, could prove difficult.
C. Single Identification Number
A single identification number (SIN) for all records and information on
an individual could reduce the social harm caused by identification errors.
A SIN system compiles and retrieves information quickly and cost-effectively. It would promote centralization of data which could facilitate imple228. See TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 164.

229. Id.
230. Id at 162. See also R. FREED, COMPUTERS AND LAW: A REFERENCE WORK 42 (1976).
231. See TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 162.
232. See R. FREED, rupra note 230, at 42.
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233
mentation of other technical controls. Germany employs a SIN system.
Under that system, if a person changes his residence only one agency is notified; other agencies are notified automatically. Sweden, Norway, Finland,
and Denmark also have SIN systems. 23 4 Sweden uses a ten digit number,
which refers to an individual's birthdate, geographic location, and check
number. 23 5 Although there have been proposals for SIN systems in the
United States and Canada; neither country has adopted one. A proposal in
the United States to utilize social security numbers as the basis of a SIN
system was abandoned in 1970.236

Opponents argue that SIN systems can be abused and result in the loss
of anonymity. 23 7 Other risks associated with personal data, particularly
computerized credit information, may not be eliminated by a SIN system.
By reducing the identification factors to a single number, the possibilities for
mismatching information on an individual may be increased. Errors made
with respect to the assignment of the SIN could result in the information on
an individual being lost or destroyed.
D.

Centralized Databanks

Centralized databanks serve a function similar to the SIN system. Centralization standarizes all records into one central intelligence system. Like
the SIN, the centralized databank concept is attacked because of the potential for too much power and control. In an investigation by the House Special Subcommittee on Invasions of Privacy in 1966, the concern for misuse
and control became paramount. 238 Public discussions indicated the need for
a system of safeguards through federal legislation which would include coding procedures, codes of conduct, and a system for data verifications. Centralized databanks might perpetuate facts without methods or provisions for
Another privacy consideration is the high
updating the information.
probability of error that exists when data are collected from several sources.
E.

Open Access

Open access provides a means of holding the databank and its personnel accountable.23 9 In Canada, an individual who disagrees with the infor24 °
Legal problems arise when
mation may insert statements into the file.
someone other than the individual inspects the record, as in the case of minors or incompetents. 24 1 If access is extended to include sources and uses of
the information, an undue burden might be placed on the custodian of the
233. TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 86.

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id at 87.
Id
Id.
Id. at 85.

Hearngs Before the Special Subcomm. on invasions of Privacy ofthe House Comm. on Governmental
Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
239. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 42, at

59.
240. TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 155.

241.
150.

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note

42,

at
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data thereby increasing the difficulty of obtaining confidential information.2 4 2 Costs in providing access present another problem. In 1972, the
Younger Committee estimated that mailing a complete printout on every
2 43
individual in the United States could cost around $2 million plus postage.
Reports including a full explanation of the codes could cost twice as
much. 244 The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 allows databanks to charge
an individual requesting access. 245 It is ironic that such a request and the
subsequent visit to the databank allows the databank to gather more infor24 6
mation on the individual.
F. Systems Controls
Given the massive yet inexpensive storage capacities, it may be more
costly to delete or update data than to retain it. Limitations can be placed
on the kind of data that may be collected. 24 7 Guidelines concerning updating and deleting data can be implemented. 248 Nevertheless, problems still
arise concerning the accuracy of data. Factual mistakes should clearly be
corrected. The issue, however, is complicated when accuracy is a question of
context. For example, an accurate account of unpaid debts may present a
biased view without an explanation for nonpayment. If a question of context arises, the individual should be permitted to file a personal accounting.
2 49
This approach is used in Canada.
Data must be protected while in storage. Unauthorized persons who
gain access to the databank could pirate or alter the information. One
method of protecting confidentiality is to keep logs of those who access the
files. Passwords, authentication, and authorization provide additional safeguards. Controls restricting access to the machinery itself may be incorporated into the software program. Physical processing restrictions which
revoke certain features of the computer system also protect stored data.
Data output or dissemination must be protected. Exchanges of information between databanks could be restricted to persons having a demonstrable "need to know" or a common connection with the primary purpose
for which the data was collected. 250 Other controls include: individual approval for data exchanges, approval when the data are used for unintended
25 1
purposes, and regularly providing lists of exchanges to the individual.
G.

Computer Security
252
Security is the technical means by which confidentiality is ensured.

242. Id
243. TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 155.
244. Id
245. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
246. TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 156.

247. Id at 150.
248. Id at 151.

249.
250.
251.
252.

Id
Id at 153.
Id
Id

COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY

19831

Passwords, limited access, audit logs, physical security, limitations on data
links, and automatic labeling of sensitive files are examples of computer security. 253 The costs of protecting privacy within a computerized system are
primarily in the area of computer security. The expenses include: analysis,
design and implementation of the protective system, tests and validations,
operation and maintenance, salaries of security personnel, and computer
time and maintenance costs. 254 Hardware security costs include key-cards,
closed circuit television, and shielded transmission cables. 2 55 Password and
audit procedures are added cost factors.
One commentator suggests that safeguards may cost more in "management attention and psychic energy than in dollars. ' 256 These costs should
be regarded as insurance against privacy invasions. Provisions exist that
charge security costs to the subjects of the data rather than to consumers of
the information. Access mechanism expenses, for example, are imposed on
25 7
the individual under the New York Fair Credit Reporting Act.
H.

Cyplo/ogy

Cryptology encompasses signal security and signal intelligence. Signal
security involves keeping secret messages between computers such as telegrams, telephone conversations, and electronic messages. Messages may be
put into secret form by code or cipher. Elements of the message can be
scrambled or replaced by other elements. The receiver, knowing the key to
the encryption, reverses the process to read the original message.
Signal intelligence involves extracting information from transmissions.
These methods include intercepting messages which are in plain language,
electronic impulses, and radio or radar transmissions. Cryptanalysis breaks
the codes or ciphers. Cryptology makes it difficult to intercept messages
passing over lines or by radio signal between users and computer databanks.
As with general databank security measures, cryptology can restrict access to
those having a right to the information. Costs may rise with the use of
cryptology, however, further insurance against privacy intrusions would be
provided.

VI.
A.

FUTURE LEGAL TRENDS TO PROTECT PRIVACY

The United States

Additional legal steps may be taken to ease the tension between the
need for rapid availability of data and the desire to protect privacy rights.
253. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SUpra note 42, at
244; TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 103.
254.

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,

248.
255. Id.at 249.
256. R. FREED, supra note 230, at 45.
257. N.Y, GEN. Bus. LAw § 380e(e)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1981).

supra note 42, at
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Constitutional Amendment and/or Federal Statutes

One commentator argues that a constitutional amendment and federal
statutes are needed: to balance the interests between the need for data and
privacy protections; to restrict access of outsiders to confidential information;
and to provide stricter sanctions and penalties for improper dissemination of
personal data.258 This commentator concludes that federal sanctions and
protections must be implemented because only a nationwide system will ef259
fectively protect privacy rights.
Reliance on state privacy protection systems "will be only as strong as
the weakest state law." 26° In implementing legislation, the following aspects
should be considered: 1) limiting the type of data maintained, 2) controlling
the collection and recording of data, 3) informing an individual of the existence of a file concerning him and disclosing names of persons who have seen
the records, 4) automatically expunging obsolete data, 5) permitting access
to records only on a "need to know" basis, 6) categorizing files as personal or
statistical, 7) easing the obstacles to discovery and proof, 8) limiting access to
on-site retrieval, and 9) restricting the exchange of personal information be26
tween government agencies. '
Those believing that a general right of privacy could be established by
constitutional amendment or federal statute, in effect, propose that courts be
the primary mechanism to enforce privacy rights. An injured party, however, would still need to bring an action. Courts will not initiate actions
against databanks allegedly violating statutes. In today's political climate, it
is unlikely that a constitutional amendment to protect privacy could successfully be enacted.
2.

Federal Control Agency

A federal agency could be established to supervise and control governmental acquisition, storage, and release of computerized information. 262 A
"Data Processing and Management Office" could act as a watchdog over
federal utilization of computerized data and impose sanctions for violations
of privacy standards. If this agency were given authority to register and
license data systems, conformance with privacy safeguards could then be a
263
condition precedent to obtaining a license.
3.

State Control Agency

A state control agency could use licensing and registration to monitor
credit reporting agencies. Granting a state agency broad powers could, however, endanger privacy by giving the state access to confidential data. The
258. Halls, Raiding the Databanks: A Developing Problemfor Technologists and Lawyers, 5 J. OF
CONTEMP. L. 245, 264-65 (1978).

259. Id at 265-66.
260. Id. at 264-65.
261. Id
262. See, e.g. , Comment, Agency Access to Credit Bureau Files: FederalInvarion of rivac?, 12 B.C.
INDUS. AND COMM. L. REV. 125 (1970).

263. Id. at 127.
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agency could be given power to intercede in the event of a violation, but not
the power to correct the situation.264 The advantages of the flexibility of
26 5
such an agency might be outweighed by its potential heavy-handed effect.
Many of the concerns about a state privacy protection system may also be
applicable to a federally-mandated privacy protection system.
4.

Code of Fair Information Practices

A model Code of Fair Information Practices was developed in 1976 by
the Ombudsmen Committee on Privacy of the Association for Computing
Machinery. 266 The code does not distinguish between public and private
sectors. The guidelines apply equally, although it may be more difficult to
control the private sector. A privacy protection code would be a sound foundation upon which states could develop a system for personal privacy, maximizing the utility of the computerization of information while minimizing
267
abuses.

B.

Transnational Trends

Governments recognize that information is a powerful resource with
political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions. They are, therefore,
264. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 42, at

92.
265. TASK FORCE, supra note 121, at 160.
266. OMBUDSMEN COMM. ON PRIVACY, Ass'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND THE INFORMATION INDUSTRY 72-79 (1976).
267. The code contains the following recommendations:
1. There should be no information system containing personally identifiable data
whose existence is unknown to the data subject;
2. Personally identifiable data should not be collected unless the information system
is safeguarded by a level of security commensurate with the sensitivity of the
information;
3. There must be a reasonable method for the individual to find out what information is stored on him or her and how that information is used;
4. There should be no disclosure of any personal information to any organization or
individual until the data subject has given permission for the disclosure in writing.
Such permission may be revoked by the individual at any time, and if it is not revoked, the permission shall expire automatically at the end of one year;
5. Personally identifiable information collected for one purpose shall not be used for
any other purpose without the knowledge and consent of the data subject;
6. In the event of a demand made by means of a compulsory legal proceeding, a
reasonable attempt should be made to contact the data subject and to advise him or
her of the demand prior to such information being given to the authorities;
7. There must be a reasonable method for an individual to contest the accuracy and
completeness, pertinence and necessity of the data; to have data corrected, amended,
or expunged if it is inaccurate or dated; and to assure that when there is a disagreement about a correction or expungement, the individual's claim is noted and included
in subsequent disclosures;
8. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating confidential information must assure its reliability for intended use and take precautions to prevent
misuse of such confidential information;
9. Before creating a databank containing confidential information, a study should be
completed to demonstrate the necessity for the information system as well as the relevancy of the collected data to its intended use. The concept of "useful life" should also
be addressed; and
10. An individual should have the right to have the personal information removed
from any file if the organization maintaining it cannot show any legal, useful, specific,
and productive purpose for maintaining it.
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motivated to consider implementing control mechanisms to promote national interests in the area of privacy. Public and private collectors, users,
processors, and transmitters of this information realize that such mechanisms
can result in constraints and costs attaching to transnational data flows and
can see to participate in these governmental decisions.
The OECD and Council of Europe have taken major initiatives toward
establishing an international legal regime concerning transborder data
flows. 2 68 Recommendations from both organizations recognize the need to
balance privacy protection and the free flow of information. In the opinion
of one commentator, the most significant of the OECD principles is the Individual Participation Principle which:
recognizes the right of an individual to obtain confirmation regarding the existence of data pertaining to the individual; to have such
data communicated to him or her within a reasonable time in a
reasonable manner and intelligible form at a charge, if any, which
is not excessive; to be given reasons for the denial of such request
and the opportunity to challenge such denial; and to challenge
data relating to the individual and have it erased, rectified, com269
pleted or amended if the challenge is successful.
In 1980, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data.2 70 It was opened for signature at Strasbourg, Germany on January 28,
1981271 and seeks to protect individual privacy while allowing for the free
flow of data across frontiers. Unlike the nonbinding recommendations of the
OECD Guidelines, legally enforceable rights are established in countries
272
that become parties to the Convention.
Third World nations are attempting to develop high technology com273
puter industries and will eventually face transnational data flow issues.
They will probably ask multinational corporations for assistance and access
to databanks containing information on economic forecasting, marketing,
and statistical research. These countries will play a more active role in decisions concerning international communications policies and data flows.
CONCLUSION

An international convention ensuring that privacy protections are
maintained is necessary. Increasing interdependence among nations compels the development of binding agreements to govern information flows
while ensuring protection of personal privacy. Without such protection, continued development and sharing of computer and telecommunication technology may not occur at a pace beneficial to all parties involved. Without
268. Nanda, supra note 182, at 422-24.
269. Id at 423.

270. Id
271. d
272. Id.
273. Id at 422-24.
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international protections, the abuses in areas of illegal data storage, inaccurate data transmissions, and unauthorized data disclosures could continue at
an alarming rate.
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cialtonJuvenileJustice Standards (IA-ABA Standards or Standards) 1 has renewed
debates 2 about juvenile justice. This article examines one aspect of that dialogue, the function of criminal law responsibility principles in juvenile delinquency doctrine. The use of infancy, insanity, and diminished capacity
defenses are analyzed in relation to delinquency doctrine and practices.
Section II reviews the foundations of juvenile justice philosophy. Case
law examples are used to illustrate the incongruities between criminal law
and juvenile justice. Section III presents an overview of the criminal responsibility doctrines. Section IV explores the adaptation of these doctrines to
delinquency adjudication. The final section sets forth the recommended theory for integrating the responsibility principles into delinquency
jurisprudence.
II.

JUVENILE COURT PHILOSOPHY

Divergence of juvenile justice doctrine from the adult criminal justice
system is undisputed. 3 Abundant historical evidence indicates that the juvenile court was intended to liberate the child from the punitive aspects of the
adult system.

4

Relaxed procedural requirements structured to promote re-

habilitation of the minor
system.

5

became a normative feature of the delinquency

As the juvenile court matured, however, critics increasingly cited

due process deficiencies as a cause of juvenile injustice. The courts responded by incorporating certain adult due process rights into delinquency

adjudication.

6

1. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION - AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS (1982) [hereinafter STANDARDS]. The standards are reported in multiple
volumes organized by substantive topics, e.g., IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND SANcTIONS. For a history of the project and a summary of its product, see
B. FLICKER, IJA-ABA STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (2d
ed. 1982).
2. Drafting the recommended principles for the IJA-ABA STANDARDS was rife with conflict. The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, for instance, vehemently opposed many
project recommendations, especially those aimed at eliminating distinctions between juvenile
and adult procedures. See Fox, Philosophy and the Principlesof Punishment in theJuvenile Court, 8
FAM. L.Q. 373, 373 n.l (1974).
3. See Fox, supra note 2; Zimring, PursuingJuvenileJustice.- Comments on Some Recent Reform
Proposals, 55 J. URB. L. 631 (1978). For an historical perspective, see Fox, JuvenileJustce Reform.An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Schultz, The Cycle ofJuvenile Court History,
19 CRIME & DELINQ. 457 (1973). See generally Note, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104
(1909) (classic exposition of early juvenile court doctrine).
4. See Fox, supra note 3, at 1187 (challenges the revisionist views of A. PLATT, THE CHILD
SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969)); but see A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977). See Schultz, supra note 3, at 459-72 (reconciles the
Fox-Platt theories).
5. Delinquency doctrine has supported the proposition that the salient treatment needs of
the juvenile require informal adjudicatory rules. It was believed that the formalism of the criminal court interfered with the benevolence of intervention. Additionally, jurisdictional authorities have been broadly defined to encompass assorted disapproved activities. For example,
"status" conduct, such as truancy, incorrigibility, and promiscuity permitted official intervention. As observed by Fox, supra note 2, at 378: "[T]he commission of crime was the opportunity
to save a young life-the nature of the crime was inconsequential."
6. See Schultz & Cohen, Isolationism in Juvenile CourtJurisprudence, in PURSUING JUSTICE
FOR THE CHILD 20-42 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976); McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatoty Rights in Juvenile
Court: An Historicaland ConstitutionalAnalysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 457 (1981); Rosenberg, The
ConstitutionalRights of Children Charged with Crime.- Proposalfor a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27
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Current ground rules of juvenile justice are governed by the landmark
case of In re Gault. 7 In Gault, the Supreme Court criticized the informality of
the juvenile court and announced that the basic due process protections for
adults, the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights, applied to children.8 The Court adopted an analytic framework for evaluation of the constitutional rights of juveniles and made it clear that the laudatory
rehabilitative emphasis of juvenile justice would not prevent scrutiny of procedural and substantive rules. Although the Court has not required the
identical adult protections for the adjudication of delinquents, 9 the Gault
concept has become the dominant influence in juvenile court jurisprudence. 10 In the post-Gau/t era, juvenile rights are evaluated by reference to
both the unique characteristics of the juvenile justice system and to the constitutional mandates of the adult system.
Thus, describing the essence of juvenile justice is a slippery task because
of the system's unique values and procedures."
At a minimum observers
agree that the juvenile court combines civil and criminal law principles to
promote the "best interests" of the child and the community.' 2 Social control objectives are undeniably present, supported byparenspatriae and police
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 656 (1980). Schultz and Cohen evaluate the distinctions, searching for a new
direction. Although inclined initially to recommend abolition of the juvenile court, the authors
propose a more moderate conclusion: "What does need to be abandoned is whatever isolates
the juvenile court from the mainstream of jurisprudence, which includes criminal law and civil
commitment law." Schultz & Cohen, supra at 41. The IJA-ABA STANDARDS project, supra note
1, with which Schultz and Cohen were affiliated, reflects that ideology.
7. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
8. Id at 13.
9. Although lower courts have at times assumed that Gault required a "functional equivalence" of the adult protection, Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 660-718 shows that subsequent
Supreme Court doctrine indicates otherwise. See also infia note 117. Notwithstanding the evolution of that doctrine, lower courts continue to cite Gault as commanding equivalence within the
juvenile justice system and this erroneous perspective is often labeled as "a Gault analysis." In
fact, as observed by Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 660-73, Gault itself combined functional equivalence and fundamental fairness analyses.
10. See generally Schultz & Cohen, supra note 6.
11. In Gault the Supreme Court described the juvenile court as "a peculiar system . . .
unknown to our laws in any comparable context." 387 U.S. at 17.
12. See F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 48-58 (1964); Hazard, The
JurisprudenceofJuventle Deviance, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 3-19 (M. Rosenheim ed.
1976); Rubin, Retain the Juvenile Court? Legislative Developments, Reform Directions, and the Callfor
Abolition, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 281 (1979); Susmann, Practitioner'sGuide to Changes inJuvenile Law
and Procedure, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 311 (1978). These authorities refute the common misunderstanding that the sole responsibility of the juvenile court is the ascertainment and protection of
the interests of the child. Although supporting this goal, juvenile courts frequently reinforce
community values. See also IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
SANCTIONS, Standard 1:1 (1980) [hereinafter STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY]:

The purposes of a juvenile deliniency code should be:
a. to forbid conduct that unjustifiably and without excuse inflicts or risks substantial harm to individual or public interest;
b. to safeguard conduct that is without fault or culpability from condemnation
as delinquent;
c. to give fair warning of what conduct is prohibited and of the consequences of
violation;
d. to recognize the unique physical, psychological, and social features of young
persons in the definition and application of delinquency standards.
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power principles.' 3 Because accomplishment of social goals is regulated by
legal principles, the juvenile court, notwithstanding its social welfare fabric,
14
is a legal institution subject to constitutional standards.
This curious mixture of social objectives and adult criminal law principles often produces incongruous results. For example, since adult proceedings strictly enforce the due process requirement of fair notice, criminal laws
must provide adequate forewarning to the potential violator.15 In the event
of statutory ambiguity, prohibitory terms are generally construed in favor of
the defendant.1 6 Nevertheless, these criminal law principles were compromised in In re A. 17 In this case a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for
possessing a toy pistol during a probation-supervised group therapy session."' Conceding that the conduct did not constitute a violation of any
adult criminal law, the appellate court nonetheless sustained the finding of
delinquency. The act was found to amount to "deportment endangering the
morals, health or general welfare of said child," a statutorily proscribed behavior giving jurisdiction to the juvenile court.1 9
In addition to jurisprudential differences between criminal law and delinquency adjudication, juvenile courts occasionally adopt incongruent jurisdictional doctrines. In the case of In re Sanders, 20 the Nebraska Supreme
Court applied a de mrn'n'mis principle to narrow jurisdiction and exculpate a
minor charged with slapping another youth. The court's reasoning demonstrates operation of the principle:
The charge that appellant was a delinquent child because of this
alleged occurrence or otherwise was not established. . . . There
was no previous misconduct of appellant claimed or shown. It was
established at the hearing that appellant had no record of improper conduct and that his school experience was acceptable and
satisfactory both as to comportment and scholarship. A single violation of a law of the state by a minor does not always permit of a
21
conclusion that the transgressor is a juvenile delinquent.
13. See N. KITrRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 108-68 (1971). The state, in the role of
parens patnhae, acts as guardian of citizens under a legal disability to act for themselves. West
Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971).
14. Although the Supreme Court adheres to this characterization of the juvenile court, it
evaluates application of due process protections on a case-by-case basis. For instance, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court rejected the right to a jury trial at a
delinquency adjudication, reasoning that right to jury trial was not essential to accurate
factfinding. The opinion noted that there are many other acceptable methods to ascertain facts.
Id at 543. For an excellent analysis of the constitutional methodology, see generally Rosenberg,
supra note 6.
15. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1957).
16. See W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-r, CRIMINAL LAW § 10, at 72-74 (1972). See also STANDARDS
RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, Standard 1.1(C).
17. 130 N.J. Super. 138, 325 A.2d 837 (1974).
18. The youth had furnished another toy weapon to a friend who brandished his toy pistol
during the session. A., however, had not waved his toy weapon. Id at 138-39, 325 A.2d at 837-

38.
19. The petition in delinquency alleged the specific deportment of "possessing an offensive
weapon, to wit: a Univerk, Vulcanic .22 caliber toy pistol." Id
20. 168 Neb. 458, 96 N.W.2d 218 (1959).
21. Id at 464, 96 N.W.2d at 222. Presumably, this act of judicial nullification would be
currently unnecessary due to the emergence of diversionary programs. See Cressey & McDermott, Diversionftom the Juvenile Justice System, in JUVENILES IN JUSTICE 228-34 (H. Rubin ed.
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In general, the post-Gault trend has been to conform the procedures of
delinquency adjudication to the principles governing the adjudication of
criminal guilt. Illustrative is the 1978 Rhode Island Supreme Court decision
of In re John Doe. 22 The court held that where the juvenile asserted selfdefense to the charge of murder, the burden of proof shifted to the prosecution to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 23 By its ruling, the
court adopted the Supreme Court's decisions rejecting the criminal law rule
that the defendant must prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 24 It is noteworthy that the state court recognized this due process
right in a delinquency adjudication, thus implying the equivalency ofjuvenile and adult procedural rights.
Despite this general trend, juvenile and adult procedures are by no
means identical. As an example of the dissimilarity between juvenile justice
and criminal law objectives is In re Dewayne f. ,25 a juvenile case involving
non-compliance with a mandatory rule that dispositional (sentencing) hearings be held within thirty days after adjudication. Excusing the infraction,
the Maryland Court of Appeals reasoned:
The State as the representative of the general public has an interest
in seeing that this juvenile is rehabilitated so that he becomes a
useful citizen and in no way a menace to society. In that circumstance it simply does not follow that the proper sanction for viola26
tion of the rule is dismissal of the proceeding.
A 1976 Texas decision also demonstrates adherence to distinct juvenile
law principles. 2 7 Texas criminal law required corroboration of accomplice
testimony to sustain a conviction. Characterizing the requirement as a mere
"statutory rule of evidence," the Texas Supreme Court found no constitutional infringement in excluding juveniles from the scope of the protection.
A sharply worded dissent 28 argued that the corroboration rule applied afortion' in delinquency proceedings in light of the heightened solicitude for
29
juveniles.
Thus, the juvenile court has retained some autonomy, separating it
from the mainstream of adult criminal law. Although Gault and its progeny
1980). See also Binder & Binder,Juvenile Diversion and the Constitution, 10 J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (1982)
(legal issues relating to diversion).

22.
23.
24.
(1975).

120 R.I. 732, 390 A.2d 920 (1978).
Id. at 742, 390 A.2d 926.
See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
For an excellent analysis of these cases and the underlying doctrines, see Jeffries &

Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proofin the Criminial Law Cases, 88 YALE L.J. 1325

(1979).
25. 290 Md. 401, 430 A.2d 76 (1981). The hearing was held on the 31st day and the cause
of the delay was not evident from the record.
26. Id at 407, 430 A.2d at 80.
27. In re S.J.C., 533 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
28. 533 S.W.2d at 749 (McGee, J., dissenting). The case was decided by a 4-3 vote.
29. If anything, it is more logical under the protective concept ofparenspatriae that the
legislature and courts should be more cautious with regard to the requirements the
concept [equivalency of due process protections for juveniles] demands; especially
prior to attaching to the juvenile the stigmas of being institutionalized and being declared a delinquent.
Id at 750 (citation omitted).
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have incorporated large segments of adult criminal law into juvenile justice,
the transformation is incomplete. Juvenile justice continues to maintain an
independence which permits procedural flexibility.
III.
A.

RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW:

AN OVERVIEW

Infan 9

Originating in the common law, the doctrine of infancy functioned to
excuse immature minors from criminal responsibility. 30 Age presumptions
were established to govern the criminal law liability of this protected class.
"Children under the age of seven are conclusively presumed to be without
criminal capacity,"' 3 ' children seven to fourteen years are rebuttably presumed to lack criminal capacity, and children fourteen years or older are
treated as fully responsible. 32 The crux of the infancy doctrine is the principle that to be accountable, a youth must be able "to know what he is doing
and that it is wrong." 33 In addition, successful invocation of the infancy
defense requires proof that any cognitive impairments relate to the act at
34
issue.
The practical value of the infancy doctrine is significant. Successfully
invoked, it produces an acquittal and the defendant is excused from further
social control.3 5 Although American courts initially endorsed the concept of
infancy,3 6 the advent of the juvenile court has diminished its significance.
30. See generally Kean, The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 LAw. Q. REV. 364
(1937).
31. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 16, § 46, at 351.
32. Id Reference throughout this article to the notion of capacity relates to the ability of a
juvenile to perceive and understand legal concepts and to conform his behavior to the dictates
of law. Theoretically, a distinction exists between evidence of an individual's capacity and
evidence that he acted within that capacity on a certain occasion. In assessing responsibility of
an actor with regard to a designated offense, this distinction may be crucial. It is submitted,
however, that the significance is sometimes overstated. As Morse, Dimtnished Capacity." A Moral
and Legal Conundrum, 2"'NT'L J.L. AND PSYCHIATRY 271, 281 (1979), astutely observes, "[i]f a
defendant lacks the capacity to perform a mental operation, it may be conclusively presumed
that he or she did not perform that operation on any given occasion." (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted). Cf Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Crininal Cases for Purposes Other Than the
Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051, 1065 (1975) (impossible to determine by reconstructive examination the exact state of mind of the defendant).
33. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,supra note 16, § 46, at 352. LaFave & Scott, offer this phrase
as "the most modern definition." Id. Alternative definitions include: knowledge of wrongdoing, "a mischievous inclination, an intelligent design and malice in the execution of the act, a
consciousness of the wrongfulness of the act, and knowledge of good from evil." Id. (citations
omitted).
34. Carr v. State, 24 Tex. App. 562, 7 S.W. 328 (1888).
Proof that he knew the difference between good and evil, or that he was possessed
of the intelligence of ordinary boys of his age, does not fill the requirements of the law.
It must be shown that he had sufficient discretion to understand the nature and illegality of the particular act constituting the crime.
Id at 562, 7 S.W. at 328.
35. Unlike an insanity acquittal, courts do not resort to automatic social control commitment. For a discussion of the insanity procedure, see infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
Upon infancy acquittal in criminal court, the prosecution may refer the matter to juvenile
courts for further adjudication. The constitutional guarantee of freedom from double jeopardy,
however, may prohibit this action. For an analysis of the juvenile courts' response to the infancy concept, see infra text accompanying notes 75-114.
36. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, § 46, at 351-53.
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Establishment of delinquency jurisdiction has removed the youthful offender
from the adult system except in aggravated circumstances. 37 Thus, the doctrine's only current criminal law relevance is to juveniles under the age of
fourteen charged as adults by virtue of waiver provisions. 38
Illustrative of the doctrine's restricted use is Adams v. State ,39 a case involving a juvenile, just under fourteen, charged with felony murder.40 Adams had participated in the fatal robbery and had furnished the murder
weapon to a codefendant. The trial judge denied the defense of infancy
based on his assessment of the youth's courtroom demeanor 4 1 and the
youth's admissible confession; the appellate court approved the trial court's
42
careful evaluation of the issue.

B.

Insamo

Although insanity is a controversial topic in criminal law, 43 its ideological foundations are firmly established. The law presumes that free will exists
and that man exercises choice in ordering his conduct. 44 Persons committing criminal acts, consciously choosing the "bad" path, are believed to deserve penal sanctions. Society has different social expectations, however, for
the impaired offender who is unable to cognitively and volitionally 4 5 partici37. For both serious offenses and chronic delinquents, criminal court authority may still be
obtained by means of juvenile court waiver of jurisdiction. Waiver may be effected by direct

filing of a complaint in criminal court or by an order of the juvenile court relinquishing its
jurisdiction. The latter procedure, requiring an adversarial "transfer hearing," is the more common practice. See generally IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS
(1980).
38. This practice is permitted in only four states: Arizona, Illinois, Arkansas, and Washington. In the other states the juvenile court's jurisdiction over children 14 and younger is
exclusive regardless of the offense charged. Id at 18.
39. 8 Md. App. 684, 262 A.2d 69 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928 (1970).
40. For a lucid explanation of the felony murder doctrine, see W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr,
supra note 16, § 71, at 545-61. Essentially, the doctrine imputes homicide liability to felonious
conduct resulting in an unintended death caused during commission of the underlying felony.
41. The youth had testified during pretrial motions and the trial judge was impressed by
Adams' demeanor, conduct, and appreciation of the proceedings. 8 Md. App. at 689, 262 A.2d
at 72.
42. But see People v. Roper, 259 N.Y. 170, 181 N.E. 88 (1932) (the mechanical application
of the infancy doctrine in juvenile felony murder). New York statutes authorized waiver to
adult criminal court only for offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment. Although murder constituted such an offense, the underlying crime, robbery, did not satisfy the criterion.
Reasoning that robbery could only amount to a delinquent act, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the felonious intent required to instigate the felony murder doctrine was unproven. Circumstances attendant to the youth's conduct and deportment were excluded from examination. Id
at 173, 181 N.E. at 91.
43. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967). "The insanity defense is caught up in
some of the most controversial ideological currents of our time." Id. at 20; see also H. PACKER,
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 131 (1968) ("[t]here is no more hotly controverted
issue in the criminal law . . .
44. Pound, lntroduction in F. SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW xxxvi-vii (1927), quoted in
Monahan, Abolish the Insanty Defene?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 719, 725 n.28 (1973).
"Historically, our substantive criminal law is based on a theory of punishing the vicious will. It
postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and
choosing freely to do wrong." Id
45. Involition may excuse the defendant from criminal liability. In addition, the absence
of voluntariness may negate the actus reus of an offense. The classic example is automatism in
which the actor's bodily movements are unconsciously stimulated. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
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pate in the deliberation process. The legally insane defendant is declared
not responsible for his conduct and excused from the consequences of the
criminal law. 4 6 Since he is incapable of making "proper" choices, he is
47
blameless and undeserving of the moral condemnation of the criminal law.
Not every cognitive and volitional impairment, however, will exculpate
the offender. The insanity doctrine is narrowly circumscribed to include
only impairments arising from mental disorder, 48 and only the most severe
disorders activate the defense. 49 In short, successful invocation of the insanity defense requires proof of a mental disorder proximately causing negation of free will with respect to the conduct charged. Mere interference with
cognitive and volitional processes is insufficient.5 ° Furthermore, despite cogent arguments that the exercise of free will is equally frustrated by social
and cultural impairments, 5 ' the law withholds exculpation for disabilities
52
not associated with mental disorder.
Legal insanity is measured by various standards. The principal options
include the McNaughtan rule, 5 3 irresistible impulse, 54 the Durham or product
supra note 16, § 44, at 337-41; Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the
Criminal rocess." The Casefor Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 447 (1980). See also H.
FINGARET-rE & A. HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 44-65 (1979)

(insanity and involuntariness).
46. For a broad examination of the responsibility topic, see Lilly & Ball, A CriticalAnalysis
of the Changing Concept of CriminalResponsibility, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 169-84 (1982).
47. For a discussion of the function of fault in criminal law, see Strong, Fault Threat, and the
Predicatesof CriminalLiability, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 441.
48. The dominant standard for defining mental disorder (commonly phrased as mental
disease or defect) was adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The court reasoned that
"what psychiatrists may consider a 'mental disease or defect' for clinical purposes, where their
concern is treatment, may or may not be the same as mental disease or defect for the jury's
purpose in determining criminal responsibility." Id at 851. Thus the court fashioned its own
standard: "[Tihe jury should be told that a mental disease or defect includes any abnormal
condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls." Id at 851. Many authorities also subscribe to the Model
Penal Code caveat excluding "[any] abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 401(2) (proposed Official Draft 1962).
But see STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, at 34, rejecting that
exclusion in the belief that psychiatrists concluding a defendant is mentally disordered will
invariably discover additional symptoms.
49. See Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL.
L. REV. 527, 640 (1978).
50. Although traditional insanity tests require absolute negation of the requiste capacities,
the Model Penal Code formula introduces the quality of continuousness into the assessment. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 401(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962): "A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." (emphasis added).
51. See Morris, Psychiaty and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514, 520 (1968); cf
Diamond, Social and CulturalFactorsas a Diminished Capacity Defense in CriminalLaw, 6 BULL. AM.
A. PSYCHIATRY & L. 195 (1978). See also United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1010 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (rejecting medical model).
52. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
53. [Ilt must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). Historical investigation has determined that
the correct spelling is "McNaughtan." See R. MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG xi-xiii
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rule, 55 and ALI standards. 56 The McNaughlan rule is limited to cognitive
incapacity, while the irresistible impulse test is restricted to volitional impairment. Since both the McNaughtan and irresistible impulse tests constrain
the use of expert testimony, courts have searched for broader measures to
maximize the benefits of psychiatric opinion. 57 Currently in vogue is the
ALI test authorizing reliance on either cognitive or volitional incapacity.
Although adult criminal responsibility may be nullified by one of these
insanity tests, the defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is generally subjected to quasi-penal commitment.5 8 Because of the risk of repeated
conduct, the insanity acquittee is involuntarily committed for mental health
treatment, usually by special procedures applicable to this "dangerous" defendant class. 59 In effect, the insanity acquittee is excused from the stigma of
6°
criminal labeling but not from the social control of the criminal law.
C.

Dtmnhshed Capacity

Seeking an alternative to the all-or-nothing insanity defense, courts and
legislatures have created partial exculpation doctrines grouped under the
heading diminished capacity. Terminology 6 ' may include partial responsibility, limited responsibility, insane mens rea,6 2 and partial insanity. The
(1981). Moran's study refutes the alternative version proposed in Diamond, On the Spelling of
M'Naghten's Name, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 84 (1964).
54. "Broadly stated, this rule requires a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity if it is
found that the defendant had a mental disease which kept him from controlling his conduct."
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, § 37, at 283.
55. "Under what is usually referred to as the Durham rule, adopted by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or defect." Id. § 38, at 286.
56. See supra note 50.
57. In large part, the Durham or product rule was formulated to remove perceived obstacles
preventing effective use of psychiatric opinion. Mental health professionals contended that the
language of the traditional tests distorted psychiatric concepts. Less than two decades after
announcing the Durham decision, however, the District of Columbia court withdrew that standard in favor of the ALI test. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
(The product test had proved unsuccessful in improving the fit between psychiatric concepts
and legal responsibility). A plethora of legal publications have discussed the Brawner decision.
See, e.g., R. ARENS, INSANITY DEFENSE (1974); Symposium, United States v. Brawner, 1973

WASH. U.L.Q. 17-154.
58. See generally Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 605

(1981).
59. Although jurisdictions differ in regard to the methods of obtaining commitment of
insanity acquittees, only a minority use conventional civil commitment standards. Id at 605-06.
60. In fact, insanity acquittees are often confined for periods disproportionate to their acts.
Releasing authorities are loathe to risk return to the community of "dangerous" insanity acquittees. See generally Burt, OfMad Dogs andSentists: The Perisofthe "CriminalInsane," 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 258 (1974); Kaplan, The Mad and the Bad- An Inquiry Into the DTsposition of the Criminally
Insane, 2 J. MED. & PHIL. 244 (1977). During the 1981-82 term the United States Supreme
Court agreed to review the constitutional contours of insanity commitments. See Jones v.
United States, 432 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 999 (1982).

61. Terms have been used imprecisely and interchangeably.

See generally Arenella, The

Diminished Capacity and DiminishedResponsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 827 (1977); Dix, PsychologicalAbnormality as a Factor in Grading CriminalLiability:
Diminished Capacity, DiminishedResponsibility and the Like, 62 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
SCIENCE 313 (1971); Lewin, supra note 32; Morse, supra note 32.
62. This term was coined by Morris, supra note 51, at 518-19. For criticism of the term as
"internally contradictory," see Monahan, supra note 44, at 728-29.
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aim is development of mitigating theories allowing formal reduction of the
grade of the defendant's offense to take into account his "diminished" criminal capacity.
Two general mitigatory theories may be identified. The first theory will
be referred to as technical mens rea and the second as partial or diminished
capacity. Technical mens rea relates to the mens rea or culpable mental
state that is an essential element of common law crimes. Under this theory,
in order to sustain a conviction, the prosecution is obliged to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant formed the culpable mental state contained in the definition of the crime. By virtue of this evidentiary diminished capacity, or technical mens rea doctrine, 63 the defendant may
introduce psychological evidence bearing upon his incapacity to form the
requisite mental state of the offense.61 Although the principle has been utilized primarily in murder prosecutions to negate premeditation and deliber66
ation, 65 recent developments indicate this restriction may be discarded.
Moreover, courts may be receptive to expanding the scope of inquiry to include any evidence relevant to the formation of technical mens rea. 67 Thus,
the mens rea variant represents a straightforward proof question as well as a

responsibility issue. 68
In addition to the evidentiary aspect of mens rea, the question of disposition is pivotal. The technical mens rea variant, extended logically, requires
63. The mens rea phrase is often used to express two different criminal law concepts. Kadish, The Declte of Innomence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273 (1968), lucidly describes the dual uses

noting:

iThere are two principal categories of mens rea which should be distinguished.
The frst category we can call mens rea in its special sense. In this sense nens rea
refers only to the mental state which is required by the definition of the offence to
accompany the act which produces or threatens the harm ...
The second category of mens rea qualifications to liability is that of legal responsibility, which includes the familiar defences of legal insanity and infancy (emphasis in
original).
d. at 274-75.
For purposes of this article the term technical mens rea is used to describe the initial
construct.
64. See supra note 32.

65. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d 914 (1976). In some jurisdictions, the doctrine is limited to negation of specific intent elements. Clearly, this decision
reflects policy rather than logic since mental disorder is capable of interfering with any mens rea
state. By restricting the doctrine to specific intent crimes characterized by lesser included general intent offenses, the doctrine avoids complete exculpation of the defendant. In this manner,
it supplements the insanity defense as a mitigatory device. See Arenella, supra note 61, at 82829; Morse, supra note 32, at 275-77. For an explanation of general intent, see infta note 192.
66. See People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1978)
(authorizing use of diminished capacity to negate specific intent to commit theft in a burglary
prosecution); Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982) (permitting the use of expert
evidence to negate the mens rea for general intent crimes).
67. See Morse, supra note 32, at 276. Morse contends that diminished capacity is not a
special defense but a derivative of the general proposition that the prosecution must prove each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
68. Unquestionably, Morse, supra note 32, at 275-76, Arenella, supra note 61, at 829, and
others are correct in asserting that the question is ultimately one of proof. However, the doctrine is clearly intended to perform a responsibility function by allowing offenders who fall
outside the insanity category to assert a diminished responsibility. For precisely this reason,
courts have been unwilling to recognize the concept as a general mens rea principle.
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exculpation. If the proffered evidence negates the existence of the mens rea
state and if no lesser included offense is proven, the defendant is entitled to
acquittal. Since legislatures and courts have been disturbed by this prospect,
they have illogically restricted the doctrine to specific intent crimes 69 due to
fear that socially dangerous offenders will escape social control. By contrast,
the second mitigatory theory of partial or diminished responsibility is a more
limited concept. Developed in the context of homicide prosecution, the doctrine performs an ameliorative function for the sane but mentally disordered
defendant deemed to be "less culpable than his normal counterpart who
commits the same criminal act."' 70 The fact-finder is permitted only to reduce the grade of the offense to a homicide category with less drastic penal
consequences. 7 ' Properly analyzed, this theory represents a mini-insanity
7
defense . 2
Thus, the term diminished capacity encompasses several theories pertaining to the adjudication of mentally disordered defendants. 73 The issues
are conceptually complex, affording no simple doctrinal solution. Furthermore, the paramount influence of social control, inextricably woven into responsibility principles, compounds the difficulty of the search for clarity.
Although commentators propose workable models, 74 judicial expressions of
diminished capacity remain in disarray.
IV.

RESPONSIBILITY IN DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION

The role of responsibility principles in juvenile justice has been problematic. Traditionally, the guiding philosophy of the juvenile court has been
rehabilitation. 75 According to this view, the goal of juvenile justice is to secure the proper treatment for delinquent youth. Since punishment is not
encompassed in this philosophy, no theoretical basis exists for doctrines
which excuse criminal responsibility.
The Gault decision has led to a re-analysis of juvenile justice. Observers
have argued that if the reality of delinquency adjudication involves punishment, then incorporation of the criminal "defenses" of infancy, insanity, and
diminished responsibility may be appropriate. 76 With increasing frequency
69. See, e.g., State v. Doyon, 416 A.2d 130 (R.I. 1980); contra Hendershott v. People, 653
P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982).
70. Arenella, supra note 61, at 829 (footnote omitted).
71. Transplanted from the United Kingdom, the doctrine authorizes reduction of murder
to manslaughter. Id. at 830, notes that no American jurisdiction has formally adopted the
concept.
72. Dix, supra note 61, at 322, analyzes the doctrine's use of offense grades to accomplish
mitigation.
73. It has been strongly suggested that limitation of diminished capacity to mental disorder incapacities is illogical. Social, cultural, and other impairments may justify mitigation of
outcome. See generally Diamond, supra note 51.
74. See Arenella, supra note 61, at 849-65; Morse, supra note 32, at 290-96.
75. See generally Fox, supra note 2.
76. See generally Fox, Responsibihty in theJuvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 659 (1970);
McCarthy, The Role ofthe Concept of Responsibility in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 10 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 181 (1976). For a pre-Gault analysis advocating development of responsibility
principles, see Westbrook, Mens Rea in theJuvenile Court, 5 J. FAM. L. 121 (1965).
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courts have been asked to decide these questions and establish principles of
delinquency responsibility.
A.

Infancy
1.

Doctrinal Foundations

The establishment of a separate juvenile justice system recast the function of the infancy doctrine. At issue is the appropriate role of a doctrine
developed to prohibit cn'minal prosecution of immature youths within a system that disavows criminal law aims. The logical conclusion is that theperse
exclusion of juveniles from criminal courts eliminates the rationale for an
77
infancy doctrine in juvenile justice.
In fact, most courts have adopted that position. An early Tennessee
case 78 sets forth the judicial exegesis. Seven-year-old Harry Humphrey
killed a playmate 79 and was adjudicated a delinquent child. On appeal,
counsel for Humphrey argued that the common law presumption of incapacity had not been abolished by the recent (1911) juvenile court act. The
court disagreed. Rejecting the infancy doctrine, the Tennessee Supreme
Court declared, "[tihe child is not found guilty of delinquency as though
guilty of a crime." 80 The opinion emphasized the non-punitive, social wel8
fare nature of delinquency adjudication. '
After Gault there was a split of opinion regarding application of the
infancy defense. Proponents classify the infancy defense as a standard criminal law defense interposed to contest proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
They submit that since the Gault command of fundamental fairness has been
construed to require proof of the delinquency allegation beyond a reasonable
doubt,8 2 the principle necessarily includes disproof of recognized criminal
83
law defenses.
Opponents conceptualize the infancy defense as an ameliorative device
77. Different arguments, however, apply with respect to the role of infancy in transfer
hearings leading to criminal court jurisdiction. See P. Low, J. JEFFRIES, & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL LAW 646-51 (1982).
As a practical matter, waiver cases usually involve youths least eligible for infancy pleading, such as those charged with serious crimes and exhibiting persistent anti-social histories. See
ACADEMY

FOR CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS:

BETWEEN Two

WORLDS (1982); Hays & Solway, The Role of PsychologicalEvaluation in Certifratinofjuvenilesfor
Trial as Adults, 9 HoUs. L. REV. 709, 710-11 (1972); Note, Certification of Minors to the Juvenile
Court.- An Empirical Study, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 404, 413-14 (1971).
78. Juvenile Court of Shelby County v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 139 Tenn. 549, 201 S.W.
771 (1918).
79. The exact circumstances of the homicide were undetermined. Reviewing the record,
the court stated that: "There appears to have been some controversy as to whether the killing
was accidental or designed. The judge . . . came to the conclusion from the evidence that a
1d
I..."
at 551-52, 201 S.W. at 772.
crime had been committed .
80. Id at 556, 201 S.W. at 773.
81. Juvenile Court of Shelby County v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 139 Tenn. 549, 201 S.W.
771 (1918). Employing identical reasoning, the federal courts uniformly have denied infancy
claims in regard to federal delinquency prosecutions. See Borders v. United States, 256 F.2d
458, 459 (5th Cir. 1958).
82. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
83. The constitutional dimensions of criminal law defenses are uncertain as a result of
recent Supreme Court rulings. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 24.
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aimed at prohibiting adult criminal prosecution of immature minors. They
adhere to the reasoning of pre-Gault juvenile authorities rejecting the doctrine. These opponents contend that although Gault is conceded to require
fundamental due process protections, the infancy doctrine, as a policy principle designed to mitigate adult consequences, is outside Gault's constitutional
8 4
ambit.
2.

Decisions
a.

Availability of the Doctrine

Post-Gault decisions8 5 have produced conflicting outcomes reflecting the
doctrinal split. In Commonwealth v. Durham,8 6 a nine-year-old successfully argued that infancy is a principle independent of the criminal law and that its
rationale has been strengthened by the Gault guarantee of fundamental fairness. Application of the infancy defense in juvenile court was also endorsed
by the California Supreme Court in the case In re Gadys R. 87 The significance of the ruling is evident from the existence of an uninterrupted series of
appellate decisions construing its commands.8 8
Other courts have subscribed to the dominant, pre-Gault repudiation of
infancy as a delinquency principle. Illinois,8 9 Maryland, 9° Florida, 9 1 Alabama, 92 and Rhode Island 93 decisions support that proposition. The reasoning advanced by the Alabama Supreme Court is representative:
[W]hile Gault required procedural safeguards to be applied to juvenile proceedings, it did not attempt to define the jurisdiction of
84. Although favoring the application of the infancy defense from a doctrinal standpoint,
the IJA-ABA Standards nevertheless exclude infancy from its responsibility principles. The
Standards expressed concern that the delinquent excused by virtue of immaturity could be
subjected to civil commitment solely on the basis of undeveloped moral capacities. See STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, at 33. Considerable sentiment
existed in favor of incorporating the infancy concept into the standards but disagreement concerning the appropriate dispositional outcome was insurmountable. Telephone interview with
John M.

Junker, Reporter for the IJA-ABA STANDARDS

RELATING TO JUVENILE DELIN-

QUENCY AND SANCTIONS (Apr. 22, 1982) [hereinafter Interview with Standards Reporter].
However, the Standards did adjust the common law capacity presumptions, raising the minimum age level for delinquency jurisdiction to 10 years. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS STANDARDS supra note 12, Standard 2.1(A).
85. Unfortunately, many noteworthy juvenile court rulings concerning responsibility principles are unreported. Only by means of empirical study have researchers been able to document the practices. See, e.g., Donovan, TheJuventle Court and the Mentally DisorderedJuvenite, 45
N.D.L. REV. 222 (1969).
86. 255 Pa. Super. 539, 389 A.2d 108 (1978). See In re Andrew M., 91 Misc. 2d 813, 398
N.Y.S.2d 824 (1977).
87. 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970). Fox, supra note 76, at 668-72,
criticizes the California Supreme Court's analysis. Fox notes that notwithstanding the reference
to constitutional doctrine, the holding relies upon a statutory interpretation that he rates as
being "far from persuasive."
88. See infra text accompanying notes 95-113.
89. In re Carson, 10 I11. App. 3d 384, 295 N.E.2d 740 (1973). See also In re Dow, 75 Ill. App.
3d 1002, 393 N.E.2d 1346 (1979) (supporting Carson rationale).
90. In re Davis, 17 Md. App. 98, 299 A.2d 856 (1973).
91. State v. D.H., 340 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1976). This consolidated opinion resolved a conflict among Florida intermediate appellate courts addressing the issue.
92. Jennings v. State, 384 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1980).
93. In re Michael, 423 A.2d 1180 (R.I. 1981).
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state juvenile courts, or to define the offenses which would bring
juveniles under that jurisdiction. . . . Our legislature . . . removed capacity to understand the wrongfulness of one's conduct
from the elements which the state is required to prove in adjudicatThis it may do without transgressing
ing a juvenile delinquent.
94
constitutional barriers.
b.

Scope of the Doctrine

The courts' application of the infancy doctrine involves inquiry into the
individual circumstance of each case. In jurisdictions recognizing the infancy doctrine, courts are required to evaluate the juvenile's appreciation of
his conduct. Although age is an important factor in this determination,
some courts temper their evaluation with consideration of other factors, such
as intelligence, education, and background. California decisions demonstrate this flexible approach. The following cases construing the Glads R.
infancy defense application, depicts the doctrine as flexible, expansive, and
dependent on individual circumstances.
In re MihaelJohn B. 95 involved a delinquency allegation of burglary of
an automobile. The facts revealed that the nine-year-old respondent had
assisted friends in entering the vehicle and removing a pack of cigarettes.
Overruling the trial court's finding of capacity, the appellate court cited the
minimal evidence, consisting of a colloquy between the youth and the arresting officer:
Murphy asked Michael if he knew right from wrong, if he knew it
was wrong to break into cars and steal. Michael said yes. Murphy
asked Michael how he would feel if someone took something that
meant a lot to him. Michael said he never9 6had anything that
meant a lot to him, so it really didn't matter.
In re Tony C. 7 demonstrated the variation among California courts in
applying the doctrine. The intermediate appellate court reversed the trial
court's finding of capacity for a thirteen-year-old charged with rape
concluding:
Neither the custodial parent's testimony, which is likely to be selfserving, nor the minor's statements describing his understanding,
are sufficient to establish this important element . . . [A] minor
may conduct himself. . . with a hopelessly confused state of mind,
particularly in the area of sexual activity, which has always been a
source of particular concern to the emerging adolescent. 98
94. Jennings v. State, 384 So. 2d 104, 106 (Ala 1980).
95. 44 Cal. App. 3d 443, 118 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1975).
96. Id at 445, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 686. See also In re Carl L., 82 Cal. App. 3d 423, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 125 (1978). Ten-year-old Carl threw matches into a neighbor's garage destroying the
building. The capacity evidence consisted of the father's testimony that "he had, on several
occasions, warned Carl that his fire-setting activities were wrong and should be stopped." Id at
425, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 126. Ruling that "substantial testimony" had been adduced to show
capacity, the intermediate appellate court distinguished its previous MichaelJohn B. opinion. Id.
97. 71 Cal. App. 3d 303, 139 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1977), vacated, 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957,
148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).
98. 71 Cal. App. 3d 313, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 438 (citation omitted).
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Affirming the trial court, the California Supreme Court 9 9 adopted a different mode of analysis, concentrating upon the objective evidence of the circumstances of the offense:
Tony's constant use of the threat of deadly force demonstrates that
he knew his victim would not submit to sexual intercourse without
being exposed to great bodily harm. His conduct in taking her to a
secluded location behind a fence on a dead-end street shows he was
aware that he had to accomplish his intended deed in private in
order to minimize the risk of detection and punishment. And his
act of asking the victim if she intended to call the police, followed
by his flight from the scene, manifested both knowledge of the illegality and consciousness of guilt.l°°
Tanya L.,' 0 ' a twelve-year-old, was adjudicated delinquent for concealing credit cards stolen by her older sister. Asserting incapacity, she denied
knowledge of the wrongfulness of her conduct. The defense was rejected
based on the appellate court's evaluation of the circumstances:
She saw her older sister charge goods that could not be paid
for. . . . When Tanya's father appeared, she said "Dad, I have
some cards here. What do I do with these?" The court could use
this question and infer that she knew she should not be possessing
02
those cards and that it was wrong to do so.
In the case In re HaroldM.,103 a thirteen-year-old juvenile was convicted
of conspiracy to commit burglary. Evidence was introduced showing six
overt acts by Harold in furtherance of the conspiracy. In determining infancy, the trial court relied upon evidence of two prior, sustained delinquency petitions alleging property crimes. Declaring the evidence both
proper and sufficient, the appellate court rejected the juvenile's two contentions that there was insufficient evidence to prove conspiracy 0 4 and that a
thirteen-year-old could not comprehend that "simply the act of agreeing to
10 5
do something wrong is itself wrong."'
Recent decisions indicate judicial routinization of the capacity issue. In
re Cindy R. 106 considered the type of evidence necessary for prima facie satisfaction of the infancy burden.10 7 The appellant advanced the interpretation
that "the court must receive and consider evidence of factors independent of
the acts charged in the petitions"' 08 and submitted that no evidence was
adduced "regarding her intelligence, education, experience, or moral frames
99. 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).

The court affirmed the trial

court in part, and reversed in part.

100. Id at 901, 582 P.2d at 964, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 373. Seealso In re Gregory S., 85 Cal. App.
3d 206, 149 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1978) (minor manifested understanding of wrongfulness of his conduct by his flight from police and his conflicting versions of events).

101. In re Tanya L., 76 Cal. App. 3d 725, 143 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1977).
102. Id at 729-30, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
103. 78 Cal. App. 3d 380, 144 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1978).
104. Id at 387, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
105.
106.
107.
proof."
108.

Id
83 Cal. App. 3d 393, 147 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1978).
Under the Gladys R doctrine, the prosecutor was required to prove capacity by "clear
In reGladys R., I Cal. 3d at 867, 464 P.2d at 136, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
83 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
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of reference."' 0 9 Rejecting psychological testimony as an unnecessary requirement, the court reasoned:
We see no reason to engraft this additional requirement ....
[Ilt would be an idle act, not to mention a wasteful one, to require
the court to take evidence on each and every one of the items ....
In some cases perhaps evidence regarding all of the factors is necessary . . . in others the age of the child, observation of her in the
courtroom, and evidence of her conduct during the crimes charged
in the petition are ..
adequate to establish that she knew her acts
10
were wrong. 1
Finally, In re Clyde H"' demonstrates that in difficult cases, courts may
conduct a probing examination of capacity. Eleven-year-old Clyde threw a
brick at an infant neighbor, inflicting minor head trauma. The evidence
indicated that the child's brick throwing was chronic and he had been cautioned repeatedly concerning the seriousness of the behavior. Despite expert
testimony supporting the stepfather's opinion that Clyde only partially understood the admonition and intelligence tests revealing an intelligence quotient of sixty-seven with little ability to conceptualize or generalize," 12 the
appellate court reviewed the conflicting testimony and sustained the trial
3
court's judgment that the capacity burden had been satisfied."
3.

Analysis

The previously discussed discisions reflect an atheoretical approach to
evaluation of the infancy issue. The current emphasis of the California
courts, the only jurisdiction with considerable case law on the subject, is on
the juvenile's objective conduct. If the instant behavior or a pattern of past
behavior indicates the juvenile's understanding of the quality of the acts,
measured by common-sense standards, the courts are inclined to deny application of the doctrine. By adopting this position, the California courts adhere to an individualized application of the infancy doctrine based on
objective behavior, while avoiding the practical consequences of receiving
detailed psychological and social evidence. Although psychological literature offers relevant guidelines for assessing youthful maturity levels," 14 Cali109. Id
110. Id Set also In re Patrick W., 84 Cal. App. 3d 520, 148 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1978). Considering the argument that the trial court could not use the circumstances of the offense as capacity
evidence, the appellate court reasoned, "[t]o prohibit evidence as to the child's conduct on the
occasion in question would often result in omission of the only truly relevant evidence on the
subject." Id at 527, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
111. 92 Cal. App. 3d 338, 154 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1979).
112. Interpreting the testing and interview data, the psychologist described Clyde's cognitive style as conceptually blunted. She testified, " [alppellant will learn by example and apply
to that example, I think. He cannot generalize, so if he hits A with a rock, maybe, and I say
maybe, he will learn that he is not supposed to hit A with a rock, but he may hit B with a rock."
Id at 342, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
113. After discussing the evidence thoroughly, the appellate court ruled, "[als sole judge of
the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, the trial judge was not required to
accept any inference from conflicting evidence that appellant did not understand these warnings." Id at 344, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (citations omitted).
114. Beginning with Piaget's seminal study of moral development, psychological investigators have examined the cognitive and ethical capacities of children to execute decisions. J.
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fornia courts prefer behavioral evidence and limit evidence of psychological
and social capacities for purposes of the infancy "defense."
B.

Insanity
1.

Doctrinal Foundations

Proponents of extension of the insanity doctrine to juvenile justice rely
on straightforward syllogistic reasoning. Harrington and Keary are representative.1 1 5 First, they argue that the right to plead insanity is included
within the constitutional ambit of due process because of its nearly universal
acceptance in adult jurisprudence.' 16 Citing Gault, they further submit that
juveniles are owed the same measure of fundamental fairness guaranteed
adult criminal defendants."t 7 Proponents add that the policy interests represented by the adult insanity defense apply equally to delinquency.
It is argued further that labeling delinquency a treatment rather than a
penal proceeding is not a sufficient basis on which to withhold elemental
safeguards." 8 The liberty deprivation experienced by the adjudicated juvenile is not redeemed by the change in labels."19 Proponents also belittle the
contention that the social welfare of the child is harmed by a finding of
insanity. They counter that alternative non-delinquency jurisdiction may be
used to secure treatment for the child, 120 which may accomplish the same
social results.
To dispute these contentions, it may be argued that the traditional
PIAGET, MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (M.

Gabain trans. 1965).

See generall

Kohlberg,

From Is to Ought. How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral
Development, in COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND EPISTEMOLOGY 151-235 (T. Mischel ed. 1971).

Scharf, for example, claims that delinquents, compared to matched non-delinquents and to
adults, adhere to a different, less sophisticated understanding of legal events and social order.
Scharf, Law and the Child's Evolving Legal Conscience, in I ADVANCES IN LAW AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1-30 (R. Sprague ed. 1982).
115. Harrington & Keary, The Insanity Defense in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 8 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 272 (1980). Accord, McCarthy, supra note 76, Popkin & Lippert, Is
There a Constitutional Right to the Insanity Defense in Juvenile Court?, 10 J. FAM. L. 421 (1971).
116. Two jurisdictions, however, have recently abolished the insanity defense, substituting
the concept of the technical mens rea defense based on mental disorder. See IDAHO CODE § 18207 (1982). MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-201 (1981). The recent insanity verdict in the case of
John W. Hinckley, Jr., has stimulated additional interest in abolition of the defense. Wash.
Post, June 24, 1982, at A6, cols. 1-3.
117. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 660-73, characterizes this interpretation of Gault as the
"dual maximal" test incorporating values of fundamental fairness and functional equivalence to
adult safeguards. She adds that in recent juvenile decisions the Supreme Court has attached
less constitutional significance to functional equivalence. Id. at 673-94.
118. The Gault decision emphasized preventing treatment labels from masking the ultimate
consequences of juvenile justice system involvement. Appraising the nature of the consequences, the Court noted, "[tihe fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a
'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which
the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time." 387 U.S. at 27.
119. Cf Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (involuntary mental health commitments of
juveniles). In Parham, the Court distinguished mental hospitalization from delinquency confinement in terms of liberty deprivation Tj nsequences. See Garvey, Children and the Idea of Lzberty: A
Comment on the Civil Commitment Cases, 68 KY. L.J. 809 (1980).
120. Fox, supra note 76, at 680-82, rejects the insanity defense itself, but proposes adoption
of an analagous procedure designed to obtain appropriate care. Moreover, Fox would include
the grossly immature as well as the mentally ill juvenile as eligible candidates for his procedure.
Id at 683.
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function of criminal responsibility principles, excusing those who are morally
blameless from penal consequences, is inapposite to delinquency adjudications which have no penal consequences. Furthermore, recognition of such a
defense for behaviorally disordered juveniles would frustrate treatment
goals. Advocates of this position propose that criminal responsibility be considered systematically at disposition. In contrast to the adult system, juvenile disposition ordinarily focuses on moral factors, selecting sanctions aimed
at refining personal moral codes. By deferring the criminal responsibility
inquiry to the dispositional stage, the system would take simultaneous account of responsibility and treatment principles.
Opponents of extending the insanity defense to juvenile proceedings
further argue that the major premise of the proponents' syllogism may be
subject to challenge. Although the insanity defense has been constitutionalized by state courts,1 2 1 the Supreme Court has not incorporated it within the
concept of due process. 1 22 In fact, the Court has evinced a reluctance to
decide the question, 123 and existing precedents are unfavorable to the propo24
nents' position of constitutional status of the insanity defense.'
2.

Decisions
a.

Availability of the Doctrine

Several appellate courts have examined the competing arguments of the
applicability of the insanity defense in delinquency adjudication. Relying
on policy and constitutional principles, the decisions generally endorse the
insanity doctrine. In addition, survey data' 25 and unreported judicial practices 126 indicate further support for the concept.
In the Wisconsin case of In re WZhbum,1 27 antedating Gault, 12 8 uncontroverted expert testimony concluded that the conduct of the fifteen-year-old
charged with murder was the product of psychotic mental illness.' 29 The
121. See Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581 (Miss. 1931); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P.
1020 (1910).
122. See Wales, An Analysts of the Proposal to Abolish the Insanity Defense in S I: Squeezing a

Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 702-04 (1976). See also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). In
dicta, the Powell Court noted, "[niothing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled
into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms." Id at 536.
123. See Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976). The case concerned the constitutionality
of a Delaware statute requiring a criminal defendant asserting insanity to prove the contention
by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial
federal question.
124. Although Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), established the rule for federal
courts that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court has restricted the holding to the federal system. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), the Court
upheld an Oregon statute requiring the defendant to prove his sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Court was urged to reconsider Leland in Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
125. See Donovan, supra note 85, at 234.
126. See Popkin & Lippert, supra note 115, at 431 n.40.
127. 32 Wis. 2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966).
128. The Wisconsin court relied upon Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), which
affirmed the right to counsel at juvenile court waiver hearings. Although restricted in scope, the
Kent decision laid the doctrinal foundations for incorporation of adult due process protections.
Gault was decided during the next Supreme Court Term.
129. The psychiatrists disagreed, however, regarding satisfaction of the McNaughtan test. 32
Wis. 2d at 155, 145 N.W.2d at 179.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that "the juvenile law is not to be
administered as a criminal statute, and the rules of criminal procedure are
not to be engrafted upon the children's code."' 30 Nonetheless, the court
emphasized the punitive realities of delinquency sanctions. The possibility
of liberty deprivation was held to require fair treatment for the juvenile and
1 31
the opinion reasoned that due process included the insanity plea.
Is it fair to convict of crime when the defendant [sic] .. .is unable
to exercise the restraints upon his conduct that would enable him
to conform to acceptable standards. It would seem incongruous
that this great outpouring of concern should be lavished only upon
adults who may be criminals while the children whom
we profess
32
to be particular objects of solicitude are bypassed.'
A New Jersey trial court opinion reached the opposite result in In re
H.C,133 another homicide prosecution. The court considered W/,Zbum but
found its reasoning both flawed and inapposite to New Jersey delinquency
proceedings. 134 Several arguments were combined in the court's analysis.
The opinion stressed that treatment and rehabilitation, not punishment,
were the consequences of delinquency adjudication.' 35 Moreover, without
entering an order of adjudication based on the instant conduct, the juvenile
court would lack jurisdiction to enforce orders of treatment. 136 The opinion
adopted a limited view of Gault, restricting its constitutional reach to procedural and substantive "individual rights." The court found the insanity defense to be a social policy rather than a due process safeguard for individual
rights. H.C was disapproved by a New Jersey appellate decision, In re
R.G W. 137 The court's analysis was uncomplicated. Noting that the New
Jersey legislature, subsequent to H.C, enacted a statute granting juveniles
"all defenses available to adults," 138 the opinion found this statutory authority controlling.
The Louisiana Supreme Court considered, the juvenile insanity issue in
the 1978 case of In re Causey. 139 The Louisiana court examined the pre and
post-Gault United States Supreme Court delinquency decisions in Wi'nshzp
and McKeiver for constitutional guidance.1 40 These cases were interpreted as
mandating access to safeguards amounting to a guarantee of fundamental
fairness. With regard to the insanity defense, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reasoned:
The only courts ever squarely confronted with the issue have held
130. Id at 156, 145 N.W.2d at 180.
131. Id at 163-64, 145 N.W.2d at 183-84.
132. Id at 164, 145 N.W.2d at 184.

133. 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (1969).
134. Id.at 596, 256 A.2d at 328.
135. Id at 597, 256 A.2d at 329.

136. The opinion did not consider alternative bases of jurisdiction. See tnfra note 145 and
accompanying text.
137. 135 N.J. Super. 125, 342 A.2d 869 (1975), afd, 70 N.J. 185, 358 A.2d 473 (1976) (per
curiam).
138. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-60 (West 1981).
139. 363 So. 2d 472 (La. 1978).
140. Id at 474 (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1970); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970)).
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that, at least in adult proceedings, the denial of the right to plead
insanity, with no alternative means of exculpation or special treatment for an insane person unable to understand the nature of his
act, violates the concept of1 fundamental fairness implicit in the due
4
process guaranties [sic].,
The Causey opinion held that "the right to plead insanity, absent some other
effective means of distznguishing mental illnessfrom moral culpability, is also fundamental."1 42 Although alternatives were not presented, the court's reasoning
indicated a willingness to entertain options compatible with juvenile justice
principles.
A similar fundamental fairness rationale was used in a California intermediate appellate court decision, In re M.GS 143 The opinion declared, "[a]
deprivation of the right to present such a defense [insanity] violates the constitutional guarantee of due process of law .... "144 Ruling that a successful insanity defense amounted to exculpation extinguishing jurisdiction, the
court considered alternative jurisdictional bases. Without deciding its application in the instant case, the court noted that California's dependent child
jurisdiction includes juveniles found to be physically dangerous to the
public. 145
In addition to the New Jersey-. C opinion, only one reported appellate
decision, In re C WM ,146 has rejected application of the insanity defense in
delinquency adjudication. In an extensive analysis, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals acknowledged a conceptual distinction between technical
mens rea and responsibility doctrines. As for Gault and its progeny, the court
determined the McKeiver logic 14 7 apposite and reasoned, "[w]e find the central question is whether the insanity defense serves some function essential to
fundamental fairness that cannot otherwise be performed adequately by
other procedures in the juvenile justice system."' 148 Unlike the Louisiana
Supreme Court, the District of Columbia court found alternative procedures
available to ensure fundamental fairness. The existing laws and regulations
were determined to provide adequate options for rehabilitation of the mentally disordered juvenile. ' 49 The court further ruled that the constitutional
mandate of fundamental fairness must be considered at disposition. To assure fairness in result, the mentally disordered delinquent is guaranteed the
141.

363 So. 2d at 474 (citations omitted). But see supra notes 121-24 and accompanying

text.

142. 363 So. 2d at 476 (emphasis added).
143. 267 Cal. App. 2d 329, 72 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1968).
144. Id at 336, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 811. The Nevada Supreme Court has also endorsed the
insanity defense in delinquency adjudications. In re Two Minor Children, 95 Nev. 225, 592
P.2d 166 (1979). Relying on Gault, the court concluded that "the concepts of due process and
fairness mandate permitting juveniles to plead and have tried the defense of insanity." Id at
230, 592 P.2d at 169 (citations omitted). The Montana Supreme Court is in accord. See In re
Stapelkemper, 172 Mont. 192, 562 P.2d 815 (1977).
145. 267 Cal. App. 2d at 337, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 812 n.3. See infra note 159.
146. 407 A.2d 617 (D.C. 1979).
147. See supra note 14.
148. 407 A.2d at 621.
149. To assure that the delinquent's mental capacity is in fact considered in relation to
disposition, the court mandated evaluation of "the mental health of the child at the time of the
offense as well as at the time of the hearing." Id at 623.
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same release and treatment benefits afforded the adult found not guilty by
reason of insanity.150
b.

Scope of the Doctrine

Determining the substance of the insanity standard has been a principal
theme of criminal justice debate.15' By contrast, jurisdictions approving the
insanity plea in delinquency proceedings have devoted minimal attention to
the issue, implying that the insanity standard's criteria are to be found in the
penal law.
In the adult system, mental disorder, however denoted, 52 constitutes a
necessary predicate to the insanity defense.' 53 Despite the commendable
efforts of psychiatry to improve its classification system,' 54 the meaning of
155
mental disorder has proven to be an anathema in the insanity context.
The potential for confusion of terminology in juvenile justice is greater. For
example, developmental immaturity is occasionally confused with psychopathology, and transient conditions are often assumed to represent fixed disorders.' 56 Accurate classification of the emotional state of an adolescent is
especially challenging.157 Courts have not addressed this issue directly, and
150. Id at 625. See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., the leading case of United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
See also supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. For a summary of the contours of the debate,
see H. FINGARETrE & H. HASSE, supra note 45, at 15-65.
152. The American Psychiatric Association has recorded an official preference for the term
"mental disorder." See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 5-6 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM-III]. See also
supra note 48.
153. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
154. DSM-IlI, supra note 152, represents the psychiatric profession's latest attempt to refine
diagnostic standards in relationship to evolving scientific knowledge. See Spitzer, Williams &
Sokol, DSM-IIT The Major Achievements and an Overview, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 151 (1980).
Criticism of earlier DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS editions.
has often been acerbic, challenging the validity of mental health diagnostic methods. See, e.g.,
Livermore, Malmquist, & Meehl, On theJustifcationsforCivil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75
(1968). The authors opine, "[b]ecause of the unavoidably ambiguous generalities in which the
American Psychiatric Association describes its diagnostic categories, the diagnostician has the
ability to shoehorn into the mentally diseased class almost any person he wishes, for whatever
reason, to put there." (footnote omitted). Id at 80. One persistent critic has discounted the
ability of DSM-III to correct such deficiencies. See J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 130-58 (3d ed. 1981).
155. H. FINGARETrE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 26-27 (1972), documents various categories of psychiatric opinion:
(1) There is no such medical entity as mental disease, or we would do well not to use
the phrase.
(2)
Mental disease is psychosis but not neurosis.
(3)
Mental disease is any significant and substantial mental disturbance, or is any
condition at all that is authoritatively dealt with by the psychiatrist or physician treating mental conditions.
(4) Mental disease means substantial social maladaptation, or incompetence, or both
as judged by legal criteria.
(5) Mental disease is the failure to realize one's nature, capacities, or true self.
156. See Achenbach, Psychopathology of Childhood. Research Problems and Issues, 46 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 759 (1978); Hornick, Healthy Responses, Developmental Disturbances,
and Stress or Reactive Disorders, II Adolescence, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
1366 (A. Freedman & H. Kaplan ed. 1967).
157. Hornick, supra note 156, at 1366, observes:
Adjustment reactions of the adolescent are the rule rather than the exception. . . . It
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the few decisions considering "mental disorder" questions in juvenile insanity adjudications have not established general principles for application
58
of the doctrine to children.'
c.

Dispositional Outcomes

Decisions applying the infancy defense rarely discuss disposition; however, in insanity cases, courts are more apt to consider ultimate outcome for
the juvenile offender. Again, California is the forerunner in confronting this
issue. 159 Its statute governing use of the insanity defense in delinquency proceedings establishes a presumption in favor of mental health treatment. 160
Unlike the adult criminal justice system,161 social control is subordinated to
treatment. Outpatient treatment, in lieu of institutional confinement, may
be ordered for the juvenile at the discretion of the court. 162 Analyzing the
is vital to a valid interpretation of any adolescent behavior that it be seen in its developmental process against a background that includes the physiology and psychology
of adolescence, the family dynamics, and the wider scope of culture itself.
See also Nicholi, The Adolescent, in THE HARVARD GUIDE TO MODERN PSYCHIATRY 519-40 (A.
Nicholi ed. 1978).
158. In one case the California Supreme Court addressed use of mental retardation as a
means of demonstrating legal insanity and adopted the adult standard. See In re Ramon M., 22
Cal. 3d 419, 584 P.2d 524, 149 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1978). Earlier that year the California Supreme
Court had adopted the ALI test for adult insanity proceedings. See People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d
333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978). In Ramon M., the court concluded, "[t]he ALI
test with its reference to 'mental defect' was carefully drafted to encompass any defense based
upon the idiocy or mental retardation of the defendant [sic]." 22 Cal. 3d at 422, 584 P.2d at
526, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 389. The court also adopted for juveniles the adult standard for defining
"mental disease or defect." Id.at 427, 584 P.2d at 530, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 393. Elaborated on in
McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the standard requires proof of
"[any] abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional
processes and substantially impairs behavior controls." Note, however, that this standard requires both cognitive and volitional impairment. This duality conflicts with the ALI test itself
requiring either cognitive incapacity ("either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct") or
volitional incapacity ("or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law"). See supra note
50. Presumably, drafting of the McDonald standard in the conjunctive represents judicial
oversight.
159. See Gladys R., I Cal. 3d at 864-66, 464 P.2d at 134-36, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 678-80. The
California Supreme Court recommended that trial courts substitute alternative juvenile court
jurisdictional bases suitable to accomplishment of treatment objectives. Although the court
contemplated resort to both status offense and dependency jurisdictional bases, a preference was
expressed for the status offense category. Contemporary juvenile justice jurisprudence rejects
the status offense model, however, and favors dependency actions for regulating non-criminal
circumstances. See IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO NON-CRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR (Tentative Draft 1977).
Fox, supra note 76, in his proposal for a partial responsibility doctrine for grossly immature
and mentally ill juveniles, recommends "care and protection" and involuntary civil commitment actions. Although preferring the minimalist "care and protection" intervention, Fox
would allow the more stringent sanctions for juveniles displaying "aggressive and dangerous
defiance of other people's rights." Id at 681-82.
160. [I]f the court finds that the minor was insane at the time the offense was committed, the court, unless it shall appear to the court that the minor has fully recovered his
sanity, shall direct that the minor be confined in the state hospital for the care and
treatment of the mentally disordered . . .or the court may order the minor to undergo outpatient treatment ...
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 702.3(b) (West Supp. 1981).

161. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
162. For a general description of delinquency civil commitment practices, see Donovan,
supra note 85, at 246-48; Rubin, The' Emotionally Disturbed Juvenile Offender-An Interim Re-
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statute in People v. Superior Court,' 63 the California court sustained the legislative purpose of providing dispositional authority to the juvenile court subse164
quent to insanity exculpation.
In the case of In re C WM ,165 the District of Columbia court considered
the issue of disposition. The court reviewed the general dispositional requirements for mentally disordered delinquents and found the provisions
satisfactory. Essentially, the applicable provision authorized involuntary inpatient civil commitment, reviewable at six month intervals. ' 66 To assure
use of the procedure, the decision held that "the Uuvenilel Division must consider, at the dispositional hearing the mental health of the child at the time
of the offense, as well as at the time of the hearing."' 167 Although denying
the insanity defense, the District of Columbia's decision attempted to create
an equivalent to an insanity commitment.
Other decisions applying the insanity defense in delinquency adjudication have not addressed the dispositional issue. 16 8 Presumably, those courts
have concluded that the juvenile court is empowered with sufficient jurisdictional authority to accomplish equitable results for the juvenile insanity acquittee. Although the data are scattered, there is some empirical evidence to
169
confirm that proposition.
3.

Analysis

In general, the decisions are characterized by an unsatisfactory analysis
of the insanity question. Citing Gault most courts grant juveniles the right to
plead insanity. In nearly every instance, the analysis is summary and devoid
of the reasoned thinking ordinarily exercised in major constitutional and
policy decisions. The courts do not address in depth the doctrinal functions
of the insanity defense in relation to the special characteristics of juvenile
justice. 170 Additionally, the courts fail to address the application of the inport, 17-19 (Report Prepared for Dep't of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention and Nat'l Ass'n of Juvenile Justice Administrators Jan. 1981).
163. 95 Cal. App. 3d 380, 157 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1979).
164. Whether the petition be viewed as sustained and in effect suspended when the
minor is found not guilty by reason of insanity, or declared "not true" by reason of
such finding, we hold that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity on a 602 petition [delinquent act] does not per se deprive the juvenile court of the power to make
an otherwise valid commitment order under section 702.3, and that such petition carries with it continuing jurisdiction justifying disposition under the latter section.
Id.at 391, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
165. 407 A.2d 617 (D.C. 1979).
166. Id at 623 n.13.
167. Id at 623 (emphasis in original). Harrington & Keary, supra note 115, at 277-78, misinterpret this element of the holding. They criticize the opinion by arguing that the dispositional
mode of insanity consideration ignores both juveniles no longer mentally ill and juveniles sane

at the time of the rffense but currently mentally ill. The quoted portion of the opinion contradicts that interpretation, however, requiring mandatory consideration of the mental state at
both intervals.
168. But see
supra note 136 and accompanying text.
169. To obtain treatment results, courts may invoke dependency and neglect and civil commitment procedures. See Donovan, supra note 85, at 234-35; Popkin & Lippert, supra note 115,
at 431 n.40.
170. Advocating incorporation of adult responsibility principles into delinquency adjudication, McCarthy, supra note 76 at 207-19, offers an equally unsatisfactory analysis. Although he
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sanity defense. The decisions are largely silent with respect to the insanity
standard and dispositional procedures.
D. Dmi'nshed Capacty
1.

Doctrinal Foundations

Scant attention has been paid to the function of the diminished capacity doctrine in juvenile delinquency. With respect to the partial responsibility theory of diminished capacity, culpability determinations are intrinsic to
juvenile dispositional decisionmaking. The identical mitigating factors used
by this theory to distinguish between grades of offenses are routinely incor71
porated into delinquency outcome determinations.1
Diminished capacity in the technical mens rea sense requires a different
analysis. The technical mens rea defense is properly analyzed as a proof
rather than as a responsibility question. 172 Statutory offenses, whether
crimes or delinquent acts, ordinarily require proof of a defined culpable
mental state.1 73 Because Winship demands proof of all delinquency offense
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, mens rea has acquired constitutional
dimension.1 74 This principle does not require extended case analysis unless
75
courts confuse the technical mens rea and responsibility doctrines.'
In delinquency adjudication, technical mens rea has received minimal
scrutiny. When considered, the issue is usually analyzed within the familiar
Gault framework. Juvenile courts are reluctant to separate the technical
mens rea from the wider scope of criminal responsibility.1 76 Occasionally,
devotes considerable attention to the function of responsibility principles, McCarthy's examination of constitutional doctrine is superficial. Furthermore, McCarthy's investigation of his proposal's impact is incomplete.
171. See generally L. Cohen, Juvenile Dispositions: Social and Legal Factors Related to the
Processing of Denver Delinquency Cases (Utilization of Criminal Justice Statistics Project, Analytic Report 4 1975); Scarpitti & Stephenson, Juvenle Court Dz'positions-Factors in the DecisionMaking Process, 17 CRIME. & DELINQ. 142 (1971).
172. See infa notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
173. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 16, § 27, at 191-95; id. § 31, at 218-23.
174. See generally Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 24. STANDARDS RELATNG TO JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, have implicitly proposed this rule for juveniles. Although the
IJA-ABA Standards do not expressly adopt the principle, its drafters assumed that constitutional doctrine required the result. Interview with Standards Reporter, supra note 84. Moreover, the Standards propose that a mens rea state be required to substantiate even minimal
culpability and that liability without fault be abolished. See STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, Standard 3. 1.
175. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). In Fisher, the Supreme Court
rejected an appeal to fashion a diminished capacity doctrine for the District of Columbia. The
petitioner contended that mental deficiency, short of legal insanity, was relevant to disproving
the premeditation-deliberation element of first-degree murder. The Court interpreted the argument in terms of the responsibility doctrine, which it categorized as a matter of local concern.
For an analysis of Fiher'scontemporary viability, see Comment, Men Rea and Insanity, 28 ME.
L. REV. 500, 525-29 (1976).
176. See In re Betty Jean Williams, No. 27-220-J (Juv. Ct., D.C. Oct. 20, 1959) (quotedin
Westbrook, supra note 76, at 121-22). Judge Ketcham declared:
Counsel's motion also states that an assessment of respondent's mental state as of the
time of the alleged delinquency is required. This appears to involve a serious misconception of the philosophy and spirit of the Juvenile Court Act. . . . Free will, evil
intent, moral responsibility and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are the language of the criminal code.
Id at 121.
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however, decisions focus on the mens rea states and utilize the Winship rule.
2.

Decisions

Notwithstanding the conceptual distinction between technical mens rea
and responsibility questions, courts persist in consolidating the doctrines,
sometimes understandably. A classic example involves a criminally negligent act committed by a juvenile. In State v. Peterson,' 77 a fifteen-year-old
was convicted in criminal court of manslaughter arising from a reckless driving episode.1 78 On appeal, Peterson claimed that the trial court had erred in
refusing his tendered instruction asserting age as a factor in determining the
criminal negligence mens rea. *79 Emphasizing the objective standard of
criminal negligence, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
reasoning that "[w]here intent is an ingredient . . .the age and mentality of
the accused should be taken into account. This may be also true where judgment and understanding affects the criminality . . . . Intent or knowledge
is not an ingredient of [the statute charged]." 180
People v. Nichols,181 involving a thirteen-year-old prosecuted in criminal
court, posed a more orthodox subjective mens rea issue. The emotionally
unstable adolescent had abducted a five-year-old for sexual purposes and
impulsively murdered the child. Accepting a plea of guilty, the trial court
entered a judgment of first-degree murder. The appellate court disagreed,
finding insufficient evidence of premeditation-deliberation. The opinion
cited Nichols' panic and shame arising from the belief that the victim would
inform adults of the illicit sexual conduct and characterized the behavior as
82
"desperate and frantic."i
177. 153 Minn. 310, 190 N.W. 345 (1922).
178. The reckless character of the minor's driving was undisputed. The principal fault was
excessive speed for the prevailing conditions. Id. at 312, 190 N.W. at 346.
179. The indictment charged "manslaughter, through culpable negligence in the operation
of an automobile" and the prosecution submitted as its case-in-chief evidence of the defendant's
excess rate of speed. Id, 190 N.W. at 346.
180. Id, 190 N.W. at 346. STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note
12 adopts the defendant's position. Standard 3.2 states:
Where an applicable criminal statute or ordinance penalizes risk-creating conduct, it
should be a defense to juvenile delinquency liability that the juvenile's conduct conformed to the standard of care that a reasonable person of the juvenile's age, maturity,
and mental capacity would observe in the juvenile's situation.
181. 88 Cal. App. 2d 221, 198 P.2d 538 (1948).
182. Eschewing reliance upon the objective criterion of "length of time available for deliberation," the court examined the totality of the minor's cognitive and emotional circumstances to
assess the premeditation-deliberation formula. The opinion noted, " [tjhis crime was committed
by a 13-year old girl, with a mental age of 11, who was mentally and emotionally defective, who
had a natural tendency toward cruelty to animals, and who was then going through a period of
extreme mental and emotional stress." Id at 228, 198 P.2d at 542. These data were interpreted
as explanatory of an impulsive, immature reaction, inconsistent with the objective standards of
premeditation-deliberation.
See also People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964) involving a
similar determination. Fifteen-year-old Dennis Wolff, a seriously disturbed juvenile obsessed
with sexual ideation, murdered his mother. He believed it was necessary to kill his mother in
order to use the family home for sexual activities. Significant planning preceded the homicide.
Reversing the jury verdict of first-degree murder, the California Supreme Court ruled "[t]he
true test must include consideration of the somewhat limited extent to which this defendant
could maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated act." Id at 821, 394
P.2d at 975, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287. (emphasis in original).
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The following cases illustrate various judicial determinations of technical mens rea. The eleven-year-old in the case of In re TR.S 183 was adjudicated delinquent on the basis of a finding of criminally negligent homicide.
While playing with a neighbor, T.R.S. discharged a loaded weapon from a
distance of four feet. The appellate court combined subjective and objective
factors in assessing the reasonableness of the conduct. With respect to the
child's frame of mind, the court cited his propensity for playing with firearms despite adult warnings. For the objective test, the opinion employed
the standard of "a boy of his age, mental capacity, experience, and
,,184
intelligence ....
A recent New York trial court opinion 185 considered the mens rea of a
nine-year-old charged with bank robbery. Acknowledging that the offense
required proof of a specific intent, the court ruled that the appropriate evidence had been adduced. 86 To evaluate the mental state, the court utilized
18 7
a broad concept of mens rea incorporating the factor of maturity.
Finally, a Rhode Island decision, In re Michae,' 88 emphasizes another
variant of the doctrine. The twelve-year-old asserted the absence of mens
rea as a defense to rape.189 Characterizing the issue as "the mental state that
is required by the definition of the offense to accompany the act that produces or threatens the harm,"' 9° the court evaluated the evidence and declared that the mens rea had been proven.' 9 ' Furthermore, the court
refused to consider a diminished capacity claim based on immaturity, noting
that the Rhode Island construction of the doctrine did not apply to general
93
192
such as the instant violation.'
intent offenses,
183. 1 Cal. App. 3d 178, 81 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1969).
184. Id at 181, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 575 (citations omitted).
185. In re Robert M., 110 Misc. 2d 113, 441 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1981).
186. Id at 117, 441 N.Y.S.2d 863.
187. "Moreover, if the Respondent offers evidence that any combination of factors, includId at 116,
ing immaturity, negatives the requisite specific intent, he will be exonerated .
441 N.Y.S.2d at 863 (footnote omitted).
188. 423 A.2d 1180 (R.I. 1981).
189. In addition, Michael asserted the infancy doctrine. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
190. 423 A.2d at 1183.
191. The court stressed the calculated manner by which the respondent lured the five-yearold victim into a park in order to commit the offense. He had asked her to assist him to "catch
birds' eggs." Id
192. The phrase "general intent" is troublesome because of its multiple meanings in the
criminal law. See W. LA FAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, § 28, at 201:
Sometimes "general intent" is used in the same way as "criminal intent" to mean the
general notion of mes rea . . . . Or, "general intent" may be used to encompass all
forms of the mental state requirement . . . . Another possibility is that "general intent" will be used to characterize an intent to do something on an undetermined
occasion.
Arenella, supra note 61, at 828 n.7, provides a simplified definition: " 'General intent' crimes
require only that the individual voluntarily commit the forbidden act."
In Mzchael, the Rhode Island Supreme Court described a general-intent offense as one
which "requires proof that the defendant intended to do the proscribed act, that it was done
unlawfully, and that it was not done inadvertently." 423 A.2d at 1183.
193. For persuasive criticism of the limitation to specific intent crimes, see Arenella, supra
note 61, at 832 n.25; Morse, supra note 32, at 276-77. See also Hendenshott v. People, 653 P.2d
385 (Colo. 1982).
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When courts are able to separate the culpability question from the more
general framework of responsibility, the decisions indicate a relatively sophisticated examination of mens rea states. Analyzing the capacity of the
juvenile to form the requisite mens rea, the courts take into consideration
relevant subjective and objective factors. The child's maturity and judgment receive particular attention and the courts are sensitive to emotional
and psychological evidence.
Particularly noteworthy is the willingness of courts to adapt the objective criminal mens rea standards to the individual circumstances of the juvenile. Although reported cases are infrequent, a number of opinions reflect a
sensitivity to the age issue, thus demonstrating the capacity of juvenile justice to creatively apply criminal law principles to achieve just results. The
relative paucity of reported decisions, however, qualifies these observations.
Diminished capacity represents a novel concept in delinquency adjudication. Only occasionally have courts reviewed the application of the technical mens rea doctrine to juveniles. *Moreover, partial responsibility has
been ignored. Nevertheless, the contemporary trend toward determinancy
in delinquency dispositions, replicating adult sentencing standards, may
stimulate interest in the doctrine.

V.
A.

TOWARD AN INTEGRATED THEORY

Preh'mtnar Observations

The writings of authorities in the juvenile justice field demonstrate that
questions ofjuvenile responsibility are not remote. Courts struggle to assimilate the adult principles of infancy, insanity, and diminished capacity into
the juvenile justice system. The task is complicated by the penal assumptions underlying the principles; each of the doctrines was established to fulfill
an exculpatory or mitigatory function relating to punishment. Occasionally
the doctrinal fit is neat, but more often the criminal law responsibility justifications are incompatible with juvenile court practices. Since major differences exist among penal aims and patterns of disposition, evidence supports
194
establishment of specialized juvenile justice responsibility principles.
An appropriate starting point to develop an integrated theory of delinquency responsibility is to identify the purposes of delinquency intervention.
194. Identical reasoning was employed by the IJA-ABA Standards project in its formulation
of delinquency sanctioning principles. Although disavowing traditional juvenile court dogma
and adopting criminal law proportionality values, the Standards insisted upon a sense of separation between juvenile justice and criminal justice jurisprudence. The sentiment is captured in a
footnote appearing in IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DisPosITIONS (Approved Draft
1980) at 19 n.5. (quoting Cohen, Position Paper (IuvenilJusttce Standards Project, No. 18, 1974)):
Juveniles may be viewed as incomplete adults, lacking in full moral and experimental
development, extended unique jural status in other contexts, and deserving of the social moratorium extended by this and all other societies of which I am aware. Thus,
removal of the treatment rationale does not destroy the rationale for a separate system
or for the utilization of an ameliorative approach; it does, however, require a different
rationale.
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The IJA-ABA Standards provide a valuable frame of reference. The Dispositions Standards decree:
The purpose of the juvenile correctional system is to reduce juvenile crime by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law proscribing certain behavior and by developing individual
responsibility for lawful behavior. This purpose should be pursued
through means that are fair and just, that recognize the unique
juveniles access
characteristics and needs of juveniles, and that give
95
to opportunities for personal and social growth.'
This statement of purpose proposes two fundamental principles: that the
characteristics of a juvenile demand individualized consideration and that
disposition is intended to maximize developmental capacities. According to
this scheme, personal culpability becomes an organizing principle of delinquency, determining the nature of the remedial consequences for the delinquent child.196 Although acknowledging the punitive effects of delinquency
sanctions, the IJA-ABA Standards do not abandon the forward-looking pur97
pose of juvenile justice intervention. 1
In addition to different emphases in penal values, juvenile and adult
courts implement responsibility principles dissimilarly. In the adult system,
culpability decisions are centralized in adjudication. 198 The responsibility
decision made at adjudication is subject to only partial amelioration at the
subsequent sentencing hearing. In effect, if the mentally disordered and immature offender is convicted in criminal court, he is likely to be punished by
the imposition of unambiguously punitive consequences. 199
In the juvenile justice system, on the other hand, culpability principles
195. IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING To DISPOSITIONS, supra note 194, Standard 1.1.

196. Ina significant departure from juvenile justice tradition, the IJA-ABA Standards urge
a proportionality standard. Sanctioning limits are fixed in relationship to culpability. See
STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, at 34-45. Compare the
traditional view espoused, supra note 5.
197. IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS, supra note 194, Standard 2.1,
states: "in choosing among statutorily permissible dispositions, the court should employ the
least restrictive category and duration of disposition that is appropriate to the seriousness of the
offense, as modified by the degree of culpability ......
198. In traditional penal models, adjudication is the fulcrum of responsibility determination. Infancy, insanity, and diminished capacity decisionmaking occur at this stage. The insurgence of determinate sentencing may accelerate this operation, since sentencing decisions focus
upon non-individualistic culpability factors. See Monahan & Ruggiero, Psychologtcaland Psychiatrc Aspects of Determinate CriminalSentencing, 3 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 143 (1980). But see
Weissman, Determinate Sentencing and Psychiatric Evidence.- Due Process Examination, 27 ST. LOUIS

U.L.J. 347 (1983).
199. But see the "guilty but mentally ill" concept authorizing a treatment disposition for
sane but mentally ill adult offenders. This provision provides that the duration of treatment
confinement cannot exceed the maximum penal term prescribed for the offense of conviction.
See generally, Note, Guilty But Mentally Ill.- A Retreat from the Insanity Defense, 7 AM. J.L. & MED.
237 (1981); Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill." A Reasonable Compromisefor Pennsylvania, 85 DICK.
L. REV. 289 (1981); Comment, Insanity-Guilty But Mentally Ill-Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate
Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 351 (1979); Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill."
An Historicaland ConstitutionalAnalysi , 53 U. DET. J. URB. L. 471 (1976); Comment, The Constitutionality ofMichigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 188 (1978). For comments on effect of "guilty but mentally ill" verdict, see Guilty But Insane Just Means Guilty,

NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 1983, at 78.
See also B. WOOTrON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW chs. 2 & 3 (1963) (Lady Wootton's
proposal that mens rea be abolished in favor of a behavioral remedial approach). Wootton's
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are usually applied at the dispositional phase. The basic task of delinquency
disposition is to fashion the remedy most suited to improving the juvenile's
ability to function in the community. Although questions of community
safety, retribution, and general deterrence are involved in the decisionmaking, these values are subordinated to the function of constructing an appropriate remedial "program. ' ' 2 00 Since the court systematically incorporates
assessment of personal culpability into its remedial evaluation, the juvenile
justice system is able to implement responsibility principles more efficiently
and delinquents are routinely accorded the benefits of responsibility theory.
Thus, the characteristics of the juvenile justice system encourage a fresh
examination of responsibility principles. Adult concepts and practices need
not be accepted blindly. If the objective is to establish doctrines that satisfy
constitutional mandates of fundamental fairness, promote the dictates of juvenile justice, and recognize the unique psychological and developmental
capacities of minors, mechanical adaptation to the adult dogma is
unnecessary.
B.

Recommenat/ions
1.

Diminished Capacity
a.

Technical Mens Rea

There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the juvenile is entitled to have each element of the offense, including the specified mens rea,
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship" requires nothing less. Whether
the incapacity is biological or psychological in origin, evidence of the inability to form the mens rea is a proper means of disputing guilt.2 01 Exulpatory
evidence probative of a mens rea state is only one category of defense evi20 2
dence and no valid theory can be proposed to restrict its introduction.
If as Morse contends, "most mens reas are rather simple states that require little intelligence or cognitive capacity," 20 3 then the relationship between intelligence and formation of mens rea is of minor practical
significance.2 0 4 The previously cited cases 20 5 belie that characterization
scheme has been discredited as too radical a departure from criminal law principles. See Kadish, supra note 63, at 285-90; Monahan, supra note 44, at 733-38.
Norval Morris has recently proposed a thoughtful paradigm for incorporating mental condition into sentencing. See N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 128-76 (1983).
200. Notwithstanding the infusion of proportionality and determinancy principles into its
jurisprudence, the Standards do not abrogate the forward-looking purposes of disposition; a
humanistic commitment to youth is maintained. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
201. Adopting this position, Morris, supra note 51, at 519, declares, "[elvidence of mental
illness would be admissible as to the mens tea issue to the same limited extent that deafness,
blindness, a heart condition, stomach cramps, illiteracy, stupidity, lack of education, 'foreignness,' drunkenness, and drug addiction are admissible." (footnote omitted).
202. The Model Penal Code subscribes to this position declaring: "Evidence that the defendant suffered from mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that
the defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense." MODEL
PENAL CODE, § 4.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
203. Morse, supra note 32, at 277.
204. Considerable disagreement exists among commentators examining the nexus between
psychological testimony and proof of mens rea states. Arenelia, supra note 61, states, "the only
type of mental abnormality that could establish such incapacity would be a severe mental disa-
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with respect to juveniles. Furthermore, examination of psychological investigations 20 6 indicates that some children may be unable to comprehend simple commands of the law and that, at a minimum, juveniles possess unequal
cognitive and reasoning skills. Immaturity and, to a lesser degree, mental
illness are valid factors in determining a juvenile's capacity to form mens rea
20 7

states.

Several significant issues require additional comment. The IJA-ABA
StandardsRelating to Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions ban delinquency liability
without fault. 20 8 The Standards emphatically reject the notion that delinquency liability can be imposed without demonstration of culpability. Strict
liability is construed to be offensive to values favoring individualized assessment of the juvenile's circumstances. 20 9 Although this decision is a policy
rather than a constitutional judgment, its logical foundation is solid and the
principle merits endorsement.
The remaining issue concerns the disposition of a juvenile acquitted as a
result of a psychological mens rea defense. In terms of strict criminal law
theory, the juvenile is entitled to unconditional exculpation and jurisdiction
is extinguished. If the juvenile court wishes to reinstitute jurisdiction to accomplish social welfare purposes, use of a non-delinquency jurisdictional authority, such as dependency, is permissible. 210
Use of an automatic
commitment procedure, similar to an adult insanity commitment, however,
21
violates the theory of a mens rea defense. "
bility that substantially interfered with the defendant's reality-testing functions." Id at 834-35
(footnote omitted).
Dix, supra note 61, at 324-27, is more sanguine. While skeptical concerning the ability of
psychological testimony to aid in the determination of mens rea, he admits that, "Is]ome states
of mind do lend themselves to the type of analysis that mental health personnel feel is appropriate." Id at 325.
Lewin, supra note 32, at 1064-65, is considerably more optimistic. He reasons,
[i]ndeed it would seem that if psychiatry offers anything of value in this area, itis in
describing the functional processes of the mind and, if trained in psychodynamic principles, in identifying the unconscious factors that motivated the defendant and prevented him from forming the requisite specific state of mind.
Id (footnote omitted). See Moore, Responsibiliy and the Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REx. 1563
(1980) (extended discussion of the unconscious and its function in criminal law).
205. See supra notes 177-193 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. See also Keaszy & Sales, An EmpericalInvestigation of Young Children's Awareness and Usage of Intentionalt'ty in CriminalSituations, I LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 45 (1977).

207. However, the proposed model rejects the California variant set forth in People v. Nichols, 88 Cal. App. 2d 221, 198 P.2d 538 (1948). See also supra note 182. That approach departs
from a technical mens rea analysis by interjecting notions of diminished responsibility. Under
the California doctrine, courts admit evidence portraying the defendant as less capable in a
moral sense to form the requisite mens rea. As observed by Arenella, supra note 61, at 831, "the
diminished capacity variant is, in essence, the diminished responsibility model in mens rea
clothing." Accord, Morse, supra note 32, at 288. See also Dix, supra note 61, at 328 (a creative
approach to enlargement of the mens rea inquiry).
208.

STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY , supra note 12, Standard 3.1.

209. Additionally, the Standards commentary posits that "[I]ts impact will be predictably
modest, since nearly all of the traditional offenses require proof of mens rea . . . . [B]ecause
strict liability is most commonly used in a regulatory context, juveniles are unlikely to be
charged with such offenses." Id at 28.
210. See supra note 159 indicating judicial approval of this concept in other responsibility
contexts.
211. By way of illustration, consider the example of an adult charged with the offense of
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b.

Partial Responsibility

Despite cogent arguments in support of a partial responsibility doctrine
in the adult justice system, 21 2 the rationale is inapposite to juvenile justice.
In the adult system, the doctrine mitigates punishment for the sane but impaired offender by reducing the grade of the offense. Without this type of
ameliorative mechanism, the less culpable but sane defendant is subject to
2 3
the identical punishment reserved for the fully responsible offender.
These premises are invalid in the juvenile system. Sanctions are individualized according to a number of social, psychological, and criminological factors; the grade of the offense, although influential, is not determinative
of the ultimate consequences. 21 4 Adherence to the IJA-ABA Standards' principle that culpability be included in the dispositional calculus will provide
adequate protection to the partially impaired juvenile. 21 5 Moreover, the expanded dispositional culpability doctrine, which is proposed in the following
section,2 1 6 offers superior ameliorative advantages to the impaired juvenile.
2.

Infancy and Insanity

For purposes of this analysis, the parallel responsibility doctrines of infancy and insanity are combined. These doctrines share the common purpose of exculpation based on specified incapacities.
Essentially, criminal law authorities propose two models of incorporating criminal law responsibility principles into delinquency adjudication.
The "adult-equivalency" model adopts intact the criminal law theory. The
applicable adult standard and accompanying practices are transferred to the
juvenile system. The alternative proposal, the "substituted protections"
model, repudiates the adult standards and recommends a substitute theory
with accompanying procedures recast for juvenile justice. The goal of this
model is to achieve constitutional fairness within the framework of juvenile
justice.
The "substituted protections" model is not only preferable in terms of
reckless burning or exploding as set forth by the MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(2) (Approved
Draft 1962). The prohibition requires that the defendant "purposely start[s] a fire or causes an
explosion." If purpose is not proven by the evidence and the defendant is shown to be merely
negligent, the defendant is acquitted. Surely, automatic commitment for social control purposes would be objectionable.
If the evidence adduced during the trial, however, indicated that the juvenile was dependent and neglected or mentally ill, the court should be authorized to order further observation
for purposes of considering alternative jurisdictional bases for treatment.
212. See generally Morse, supra note 32.
213. In adult criminal law, penal consequences are correlated with the grade of offense.
Although the sentencing tribunal is typically granted discretion to adjust the sanction within

the grade, its flexibility may be limited. This is particularly true in homicide prosecutions in
which the most serious grades offer little sentencing flexibility and bear serious consequences.
The development of partial responsibility as a homicide doctrine is partially due to this
restricted flexibility. See Dix, supra note 61, at 321-24.
214. See supra note 171.
215. STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DEUNQUENCY, supra note 12, Standard 1.1(D).
Although the Standards introduce the concept of determinancy into juvenile sanctions, the aim
is to limit disproportionate consequences based on treatment notions. The Standards encourage
the use of diminished culpability evidence in selecting an individualized disposition.
216. See infta notes 217-29 and accompanying text.
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policy, but also satisfies constitutional requirements. 2 17 The juvenile court,
notwithstanding the commendable achievements of due process reform, remains a unique social institution. The juvenile court's specialized task demands a discriminating jurisprudence because it is not dealing with
miniature adults but children experiencing distinct developmental phases.
Blindly engrafting criminal law doctrines on the juvenile system does not
ensure fulfillment of the interests of children or society.
Responsibility principles for juveniles should encompass a wide spectrum of incapacities. Restricting responsibility to orthodox expressions of
mental disorder and intellectual impairment subverts fundamental principles of juvenile law. Juvenile justice doctrine espouses a qualified free-choice
model of conduct 21 8 and recognizes the "unique physical, psychological, and
social features of young persons."'21 9 Therefore, proof of any incapacity diminishing the juvenile's ability to morally appreciate delinquency prohibitions 220 or to volitionally conform with the dictates of law 22 1 merits formal
attention.
Although responsibility principles affecting exculpation are generally
applied at adjudication, the practice is not sacrosanct. It is based on particular notions of the function of the criminal law, 2 2 2 concepts less compelling in
juvenile jurisprudence. 22 3 It is submitted that the transfer of responsibility
determinations to the dispositional phase of delinquency extends more effective protection to the juvenile. In this manner, incapacity due to infancy or
insanity may be introduced as evidence of lack of culpability to appropriately temper social control consequences.
The essence of this "substituted protections" model is routine consideration at disposition of proffered evidence indicating the presence or absence of
moral appreciation and volition. Moreover, to ensure a fair and cognizable
217. The Supreme Court is disinclined to include responsibility principles within its concept
of due process. Even the most optimistic advocates of a constitutional law of criminal responsibility are reserved in their judgment of Supreme Court willingness to entertain the argument.
See, e.g., Wales, supra note 122, at 702-04. Although state courts and the juvenile decisions
reported supra text accompanying notes 126-50 support the incorporation of responsibility into
due process, Supreme Court precedent does not encourage this view point.
218. Seegeneraly STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, Stan-

dards 1.1, 3.5.
219. Id Standard 1.1(D).
220. The source of the incapacity may be a mental disorder or a developmental disability.
The emphasis of the criterion should be upon the quality of the functional impairment; thus,
restriction to a particular origin is unwarranted.
221. Satisfaction of this criterion may be achieved by reference to social and cultural influences. See supra note 51. "Adverse social and subcultural background is statistically more criminogenic than is psychosis; like insanity, it also severely circumscribes the freedom of choice
...
(emphasis in original). Morris, supra note 51, at 520. Diamond, supra note 51, at 203,
emphasizes that "[t]he evidence would have to be specific to the defendant, directly related to
his thinking and decisional capacities in the context of the crime of which he is charged."
222. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,supra note 16, § 36, at 269-74. See also Monahan, supra
note 44 (expanded discussion of insanity rationale).
223.

See IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATION TO DIsPOSITIONS, supra note 194, at 15-20.

Al-

though delinquency jurisprudence has adopted criminal law concepts, notable distinctions remain. Retribution and deterrence, linchpins to the insanity doctrine, are accorded diminished
significance in delinquency jurisprudence. The theory ofjuvenile delinquency control, whether
defined by traditional notions or by the revised IJA-ABA Standards, lacks the punitive emphasis of the criminal law.
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result, the court should be required to incorporate the culpability determination into its dispositional order. After evaluating the culpability evidence, if
22 4
the court decides that responsibility was impaired to a substantial degree,
225
the court should be obligated to impose civil treatment sanctions.
Lesser
impairments evidencing a "diminished responsibility" should merit disposition within the ordinary range of delinquency sanctions but encumbered by
226
a social control discount proportionate to the reduction in culpability.
Although the "substituted protections" model is contrary to the general
weight of authority, particularly in the insanity defense context, its advantages are distinct. Its expanded scope avoids the artificial limits of the medical model and permits the introduction of any evidence probative of
incapacity. By authorizing a set of dispositional authorities correlated with
2 27
levels of impairment, the model provides flexibility to the juvenile court.
The substantially impaired juvenile is treated as a non-delinquent and receives appropriate care without reference to the preventive detention procedure used by the adult system. 228 Although continuing to be adjudicated as
a delinquent, the partially impaired juvenile receives a sanction adjusted to
22 9
his degree of culpability.
C.

Concluding Remarks

Just results may be attained by adoption of this integrated theory of
delinquency responsibility. Unless proof of mens rea and actus reus are established beyond a reasonable doubt, the impaired juvenile is not liable for
his misconduct. If, however, liability is imposed, additional safeguards provide protection for the juvenile. Culpability becomes an organizing principle of dispositional decisionmaking, and separate judicial treatment is
available to juveniles displaying a broad spectrum of incapacities.
The aim of this integrated theory is to establish balanced principles accommodating individual and societal interests in a manner responsive to
both constitutional and policy interests. The unification of these principles
224. In effect, this standard is the equivalent of the IJA-ABA Standards' measure of incapacity. See STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, Standard 3.5.

225. See the approach adopted in In re C.W.M., 407 A.2d 617 (D.C. 1979) discussed supra
notes 149-150 and accompanying text. Other civil remedies may also be utilized, such as the
substitution of non-delinquency jurisdictional authorities. Seesupra note 159 and accompanying
text.
226. To the degree that delinquency codes adopt the proportionality recommendations of
the IJA-ABA Standards and similar proposals, this concept gains increased importance. As in
the adult system, the grade of offense will regulate the range of penal consequences and the
notion of culpability will assume the pivotal role.
227. See supra note 84. The dilemma conceived by the IJA-ABA Standards approach is
disingenuous. The juvenile justice system is equipped with sufficient dispositional options to
avoid irrational outcomes.
228. STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, Standard 3.5, supra note 12,
adopts the Model Penal Code insanity test, it neglects to specify procedures for disposition of the
juvenile acquitted by this procedure. The drafters presumed that juvenile courts would resort
to procedures similar to those used for adult insanity acquittees. Interview with Standards Reporter, supra note 84.
229. Thus, the model responds to the query: "Do legally sane but mentally abnormal offenders deserve the same punishment as normal offenders whose behavior is essentially similar?"
Morse, supra note 32, at 273.
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with the fundamentals of delinquency jurisprudence is essential. Instead of
mechanically adopting adult responsibility doctrines, the proposed model
utilizes the principles founded in the juvenile justice system. Despite divergence from the principles of adult criminal law, the model fulfills the constitutional standard of fundamental fairness. Moreover, the model's
integrative quality offers the potential benefits of minimizing doctrinal distortion and avoiding ad hoc results.

KYSOR INDUSTRIAL CORP. V FRAZIER:
STRICT LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO WARN
INTRODUCTION

In March 1982, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict for
the plaintiff in a products liability action for personal injuries.' This decision halted a trend, favoring plaintiffs in failure to warn cases, 2 which had
begun in 1975 when the Colorado Supreme Court adopted section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts .3
The opinion in Krsor IndustrialCorp. v. Frazier4 is worthy of critical comment for two reasons. First, the supreme court majority's interpretation of
the facts appears to have been made in disregard of competent evidence; and
second, the opinion is likely to be cited inappropriately as precedent for failure to warn products liability actions in Colorado.
This comment will provide a brief discussion of the rationale and history of strict liability for products, a review of Colorado case law on failure
to warn in products liability actions, and an analysis of the relevance of the
foreseeability of harm and of the plaintiff's conduct in such actions in light of
the Kysor decision.
I.

FACTS OF THE CASE

On February 16, 1976, Jack Frazier was severely injured while moving a
four-ton traverse plate saw, 5 which was sixteen feet long and seven feet
high. 6 Frazier's employer, Duffy Moving & Storage Company (Duffy), had
been contacted by the distributor, Duboc-Lane and Moncton, Inc. (D.L.M.).
Duffy was to move the saw from the D.L.M. to the warehouse of Esco Corporation (Esco), the purchaser. 7 Usually this large piece of equipment, manufactured by Kysor Industrial Corporation (Kysor), was shipped directly to
the purchaser. In this case, however, D.L.M. agreed to store the saw until
Esco completed the warehouse where it was to be housed. 8
When the saw first arrived in Denver, a Duffy employee safely moved it
1. Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982).
2. The reported cases in strict liability for failure to warn, decided in Colorado between
1975 and the Kysor decision are: Anderson v. Heron Eng'g Co., 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674
(1979); Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978); Martinez v. Atlas Bolt &
Screw Co., 636 P.2d 1287 (Colo. App. 1981); Good v. A. B. Chance Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, 565
P.2d 217 (1977); Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976).
3. Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) (see tnfra note 37 for
full text) was expressly adopted in Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983
(1975). In Hzigtl the court held that failure to provide an adequate warning may render a
product, otherwise free of defect, defective for purposes of § 402A.
4. 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982).
5. Id. at 909.
6. Id. at 913 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting).
7. 642 P.2d at 909.

8. Id.
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into the D.L.M. warehouse using a hydrocrane. 9 Three weeks later, Frazier,
a foreman for Duffy, was sent to move the saw from D.L.M. to Esco's warehouse.' 0 At the D.L.M. warehouse, Frazier was shown how to rig the saw in
order to lift it with the hydrocrane, which had been ordered for the operation. He then loaded the saw onto a truck.II Knowing that a forklift was
available at Esco for unloading, Frazier sent the hydrocrane back to Duffy's
yard; neither Kysor nor D.L.M. knew what equipment was to be used to
2
unload the saw at the Esco warehouse.'
As an experienced mover of heavy equipment, Frazier looked for lift
marks on the saw and attempted to determine the center of gravity in preparation for unloading the saw at Esco.' 3 Most of the surface area above the
saw's center of gravity was covered with sheet metal, which made the calculation difficult.' 4 There were no lift marks and no warnings or instructions
for moving the saw.1 5 Frazier slipped the forklift under the lowest horizontal
member of the saw, unloaded it from the trailer, and moved it into Esco's
warehouse.' 6 This maneuver was executed without incident; the saw was
put in position in the warehouse and Frazier prepared to remove its 600-700
17
pound skid plate.
Believing the saw had been lowered all the way to the ground, Frazier
directed his co-workers to remove the lag screws from the skid.' 8 He then
bent over to cut the steel bands which held the unassembled parts of the saw
to the skid. The saw in fact was slightly above the ground, and removal of
the skid caused the center of gravity to shift.' 9 The saw became unstable; it
rocked back and forth on the forklift and then turned over onto Frazier,
causing a severe hemorrhage in his back and a sprain in the cervical region
20
of his neck.
Justice Dubofsky noted evidence in her dissent which was not mentioned in the majority opinion. 2 ' According to one expert witness, the center
22
of gravity was probably below the lift point while the skid was attached.
The skid could not have been removed, according to this expert, unless the
saw was slightly above ground, and the saw by itself could not have been
23
lifted in a stable manner with a forklift positioned under the lower beam.
A long-time superintendent of Duffy's testified that it was customary for
9. Id.
10. Id.
ll. Id.

12. Id. at 909-10.
13. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Kysor Indus.
Corp. v. Frazier, 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982).
14. Id.

15. Id.
16.
17.
base of
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

642 P.2d at 910.
Id. The skid plate was a wooden apparatus with rollers, temporarily attached to the
the saw during shipment. Id. at 913 (Duboskfy, J., dissenting).
642 P.2d at 910, 912.
Id. at 910.
Id.
Id. at 913-15 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting).
Id. at 914.
Id.
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large uncrated machines to be accompanied with instructions or warnings
for hoisting, moving, slinging, or lifting. 24 In the absence of instructions to
the contrary, the superintendent testified, he would have used a forklift to
move the saw, as the plaintiff had, since the saw appeared to be stable. 25
In addition, the general foreman at Kysor's own plant testified that during the manufacturing process the saw was moved around the plant by using
an overhead crane with chains attached to particular points on the saw, one
chain being used especially for steadying. 26 Based on his familiarity with the
saw, this witness further stated that the crane was the only proper way to lift
the saw.

27

Frazier sought relief against Kysor and D.L.M., alleging strict liability
in tort for failure to provide warnings or instructions for the proper lifting
and moving of the saw and removal of the skid. 28 The jury returned a ver29
dict for Frazier which was affirmed by the Colorado Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari but reversed the decision,
declaring there was no factual basis for submitting the strict liability claim to
30
the jury.
II.
A.

STRICT LIABILITY FOR PRODUCTS

Rationale and Lbmts

Strict liability originally emerged in response to societal concerns over
the changing relationship between the individual consumer and the manufacturer and sellers of a product. 31 Prior to 1960, recovery by a plaintiff24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 642 P.2d at 910. Frazier originally sought recovery on three theories: I) negligence,
2) breach of implied warranty, and 3) strict liability for failure to provide warnings for the
proper method of lifting and moving the saw and removing the skid plate. Frazier later withdrew the negligence and breach of warranty claims. Id.
29. Frazier v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 43 Colo. App. 287, 607 P.2d 1296 (1979), rev'd, 642 P.2d
908 (Colo. 1982). The Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that: 1) there was sufficient evidence for
the jury to find a failure of adequate instruction thereby creating a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; 2) plaintiffs expertise in moving heavy equipment
did not preclude the finding of a defectively dangerous product due to the lack of instructions
for safely and properly moving the saw; and 3) by placing a product which is unreasonably
dangerous without a warning into the stream of commerce, the manufacturer bears the risk of
liability to those who foreseeably may be injured along the path of delivery. Therefore, a professional mover is a protected "consumer" within the meaning of section 402A. 43 Colo. App.
at 290-92, 607 P.2d at 1300-01.
30. 642 P.2d at 913. The majority held that since the product's dangerous condition was
created solely by Frazier's mishandling there was no duty to warn or instruct. Id. at 911-12. For
a discussion of the factual issues reported in the majority and minority opinions, see infra notes
137-49 and accompanying text.
31. See generally Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in Califoma, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9
(1966). Increased public awareness of the hazards associated with the manufacture and design
of products has spurred the growth of strict products liability. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 651
(4th ed. 1971). Imposition of liability on the manufacturer for harm caused by use of a defective
product has been justified by several arguments: a manufacturer is encouraged to produce safer
products if it believes it may be subject to liability for defective products; the loss can be borne
without hardship since the manufacturer can spread costs equally among consumers by adjusting prices; the manufacturer is the entity that can easily obtain liability insurance, and this
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consumer who had suffered injury to his person or property from a product
was sometimes obtainable from a manufacturer or seller on theories of warranty or negligence. 32 Serious obstacles to recovery existed with both approaches. An injured individual seeking relief under a contract-warranty
theory was often denied recovery because of disclaimer clauses or a lack of
privity of contract. 33 Recovery under a tort-negligence theory was limited
by the difficulty of proving the defendant failed to use reasonable care or
was somehow at fault in the manufacture or sale of the product. 34 The plaintiff in a strict liability action is in a better position to overcome the burdens
imposed by the increasing complexity of the manufacturing and distributional process;3 5 recovery is possible without proving the defendant's negligence or the existence of a privity relationship between the plaintiff and
36
defendant.
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 3 7 provides that a manufacturer or supplier who allows a product to be distributed in a "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user" may be liable,
even to remote users, although "all possible care" has been used in the preparation and sale of the product. 38 A product may be defective as marketed if
any of the following exists: a flaw in the product such as a manufacturing
abnormality which makes the product more dangerous than intended, 39 a
failure to warn or provide adequate instructions as where the product is in its
intended condition but is defective because of the failure to present it properly to users, 4° or a defective design where the product is in its intended
41
condition but is not sufficiently safe.
expense can be built into production costs. See generally Keeton, Manufacturer's Ltabihty. The
Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 561
(1969); Keeton, Products Liabilt--DesignHazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUM. L. REV. 293,
293-98 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Products Liability]; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor

Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973).
32. Keeton, Products Liability, supra note 31, at 295-96.

33. Id. at 296.
34. Id

See also Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REX'.

551 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Design Defects]; Wade, supra note 31.
35. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 93, 337 A.2d 893, 898 (1975).
36. Wade, supra note 31, at 825.
37. Section 402A states:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to hisproperty, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1)applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
38. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 256

(1969).
39. Products Liability, supra note 31, at 297.
40. Id. at 297-98; Design Defects, supra note 34, at 551.
41. Products Liability, supra note 31, at 298; Design Defects, supra note 34, at 551.
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Strict liability is not the equivalent of insurance; 42 otherwise, the manufacturer would be absolutely liable for any injury sustained by any person
however remotely connected with the product. Although the Restatement dispenses with requirements of privity and proof of negligence, a plaintiff in
most jurisdictions must still prove that the product was "unreasonably dangerous" as well as defective. 43 A finding that the product was "unreasonably
44
dangerous" will likely be affected by consideration of negligence rules.
Appropriate limits both as to the original existence of liability and as to
its scope and extent are currently being defined. 45 Limits set by the courts in
terms of scope and extent have usually been controlled by the concepts of
proximate cause or risk, including abnormal use, and plaintiffs fault, including contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and misuse. 4 6 On the other
hand, analysis of the nature of the product itself governs original existence of
liability; 4 7 actionability exists when there is something wrong with the product that makes it dangerous. 48 It is then usually referred to as a defective
product. This adjective presents little problem when something has gone
wrong in the manufacturing process, and the product is not in its intended
condition. 49 A cause of action, however, may also exist when a product has
been manufactured exactly as intended and the design is not sufficiently
safe, or warnings or adequate instructions are not provided. 50 The adjective
"defective" is then an expression for a legal conclusion rather than a test for
reaching that conclusion. 51 The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
anticipated potential problems in determining actionability. They decided
that by using terms which might appear redundant, "defective condition"
and "unreasonably dangerous," it would be clear that the product must
52
have something wrong with it, and that it must be harmful as a result.
B.

Development of Current Law

The first test for strict liability in tort was articulated in 1962 by Justice
Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba Products Co. 53 After the publication of the final
draft of the Restatement in 1965, jurisdiction after jurisdiction cited both sec42. Wade, supra note 31, at 828.
43. Noel, supra note 38, at 257. For discussion of the elimination of the "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement, see ifra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
44. Noel, supra note 38, at 257.
45. Wade, supra note 31, at 828.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Design Defects, supra note 34, at 551.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 552.
52. Wade, supra note 31, at 830-33. Wade briefly discusses the "legislative history" of the
language of § 402A and alternatives to the term "unreasonably dangerous," and then presents a
seven-factor test as a standard for application. Id. at 830-38.
53. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). Justice Traynor, writing for a
unanimous court, held that a plaintiff need only prove that while using a product as it was
intended to be used, he was injured because of a defect in design or manufacture of which he
was not aware and which made the product unsafe for its intended use. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at
910, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. Two elements emerged as tests for recovery: defective in design or
manufacture and unsafe for intended use. Deszgn Defects, supra note 34, at 554.
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tion 402A and Greenman as authoritative legal bases for strict liability. 54 A
consensus was reached in the common law that the product must be unrea55
sonably dangerous to be actionable.
What appeared to be smooth development for strict liability in tort became complicated by the intermingling of negligence concepts. In Cronin v.
JB.E Olson Corp.,56 the California Supreme Court re-examined its Greenman
opinion. The court concluded that a different test had been articulated in
Greenman than was expressed by the authors of the Restatement. 57 The "unreasonably dangerous" qualification, added to section 402A as a limiting
mechanism on liability for harm from a product with an inherently dangerous nature, was considered a step backward into the realms of negligence.
The court concluded that requiring proof that a defect in a product made it
"unreasonably dangerous" significantly burdened the plaintiff. Furthermore, the court feared this would lead to results in strict liability actions no
different from those reached under the laws of negligence. 58 The Cronin
court held that in order to recover in strict liability a plaintiff need only
show that the product was defective. 59
The Cronbi decision is important because it demonstrates a concern that
strict liability has not been applied as a cause of action separate from negligence concepts of unreasonableness or culpability. Cronin, however, has been
followed by only a few courts outside California 6° and has been criticized by
several commentators. 6 1 It is argued that the term "defective", by itself, can
provide no real guidance in deciding a case involving an insufficiently safe
design or a failure to provide an adequate warning. 62 Courts which have
54. Id. at 555. An informative history of the development of the final draft of § 402A is
presented in Wade, supra note 31, at 830-31, and Design Defects, supra note 34, at 554-55.
55. Design Defects, supra note 34, at 556.
56. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
57. Id. at 131-35, 501 P.2d at 1161-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441-43.
58. Id. at 132-33, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
59. Id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
60. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209, 213 (Alaska
1975); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 601-03, 304 A.2d 562, 564 (1973);
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 93-97, 337 A.2d 893, 899-900 (1975).
61. See Keeton, froduct Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 30-31
(1973); Wade, supra note 31, 829-34.
62. Design Defects, supra note 34, at 557.
It is evident that the developing law in strict products liability remains in turmoil even in
California. In Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978), the court recognized the inadequacy of the Cronin rule, which simply requires the product to be shown defective in a design defect case. A new test was proposed which reflects a
substantial modification of the Cronin court's position; although in Barker, the court was careful
to retain the focus on the condition of the product as opposed to the conduct of the manufacturer. Under Barker a product is defective in design if: 1) the product failed to perform as safely
as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner, or 2) the benefits of the design do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the
design. Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40. A striking departure from the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement of the Restatement is not apparent except that, with regard to the risk-benefit standard, the court held the burden of proof would shift to the defendant once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the design proximately caused the
injury. See id. at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 446-47, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29, 237; Design Defects,
supra note 34, at 558.
A California Court of Appeals case construing Barker held that in a warning case, the jury
must be instructed that the standard is whether the "absence of an adequate warning renders
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considered the problem have adhered to the Restatement's "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement, being unwilling to risk the consequences of unburdening the plaintiff to the extent allowed by the Cronin rule. 63 Jurics have
been instructed to consider "defect" in terms such as "reasonable expectations" or "reasonableness of putting the product on the market," 64 phrases
reminiscent of negligence principles.
C.

The Law tn Colorado

Colorado court decisions during the last ten years in strict products liability cases have reflected a turmoil in the law. The basic premises for strict
liability were introduced in Bradford v. Bendi - Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake
Co.,65 where the Colorado Court of Appeals recognized section 402A as a
basis for recovery for a plaintiff injured by a product in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." 6 6 Privity was held not to be a prerequisite to
recovery, and an attempt to inject an element of foreseeability into the definition of "unreasonably dangerous" was rejected by the court as a negligence
67
concept, inapplicable in a strict liability claim.
In 1975, the Colorado Supreme Court expressly adopted section 402A
in Hikgel v.General Motors Corp.6 ' A failure to provide an adequate warning
was held to render a product defective under section 402A, although the
product was otherwise free of defect. 69 While emphasizing that the focus
must be the condition of the product, the court held that the duty to warn
rested on considerations of the likelihood of accident and the seriousness of
consequences for failure to warn. 70 The court attempted to apply strict products liability theory, but the requirement of determining the existence of a
duty by foreseeability and risk considerations actually kept the possibility of
recovery within traditional negligence bounds.
A comprehensive opinion by the Colorado Court of Appeals was issued
7
in 1976 in a strict liability action for failure to warn. In Hamilton v.Hardy, '
the court clarified the difference between negligence and strict liability theories. In a negligence action, a manufacturer would be subject to liability for
the article substanttlly dangerous to the user." Cavers v. Cushman Mctor Sales, Inc., 95 Cal.
App. 3d 338, 349, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142, 149 (1979) (emphasis in original). Although the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement has been removed, the modifier indicates a weighing of degrees of danger. Id. See Design Defects, supra note 34, at 565.

63. Eg., Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978); Aller v. Rodgers
Mach. Mfg., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g, 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d
816 (1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975). See Design Defects, supra note 34, at

557.
64. Destgn Defects, supra note 34, at 557.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

33 Colo. App. 99, 517 P.2d 406 (1973).
Id. at 107, 517 P.2d at 411.
Id. at 107-10, 517 P.2d at 411-13.
190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975).
Id. at 63, 544 P.2d at 987. The court adopted comment j to § 402A of the RESTATE-

MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965), which states in part: "In order to prevent the product from

being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the
container, as to its use."
70. 190 Colo. at 64, 544 P.2d at 988.
71. 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976).
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injuries caused by its failure to use reasonable care to warn of possible dangers. 72 In strict liability, "a manufacturer who sells a product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused, even though the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product. ' 73 Citing an Oregon
Supreme Court opinion, 74 the Colorado court emphasized that in strict liability, the issue is the condition of the product sold without warning, while in
negligence, the issue is the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct in
75
selling the product without a warning.
The court of appeals concluded that the dangerousness of the product,
as distinguished from the seller's culpability, should be determined by assuming the seller knew of the product's propensity to injure and then asking
76
whether the seller acted unreasonably in selling it without a warning.
Such an assumption would not be made in a negligence action where the
plaintiff is required to prove the fault of the defendant. This opinion reflects
an effort to resist application of negligence principles in strict liability failure
to warn actions.

Two years later in Union Supply Co.

v. AS.,

77

the Colorado Supreme

Court expressly adopted section 402A as a theory of recovery for injuries
caused by a product unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in its design. The plaintiff was involved in an industrial accident when his arm was
caught in the "nip point" of a conveyor belt. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the conveyor, alleging design defects in the conveyor and failure to
warn adequately of the dangers of working at the "nip point."'7 8 The court
confirmed its holding in Hitgel that a failure to provide adequate warning
can render a product otherwise free of defect, defective under section 402A,
and quoted Hamilton in recognizing the distinction between the focus of strict
79
liability and negligence actions.
In a footnote to the opinion, the court indicated its awareness of the
split of authority on the definition of strict liability-the followers of the
Restatement versus the jurisdictions eliminating the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement. 80 Although the supreme court recognized that other
72. Id. at 383, 549 P.2d at 1106.
73. Id., 549 P.2d at 1106-07.

74. Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
75. 37 Colo. App. at 384, 549 P.2d at 1107.
76. Id. at 385, 549 P.2d at 1108.
77. 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978).
78. Id. at 166-68, 583 P.2d at 278-80.
The absence of appropriate warnings or instructions is sometimes classified as a "design
defect." Wade, supra note 31, at 842. The court in Union Supply did not refer to absence of
warning or instruction as a design defect per se but did find that the elements in a failure to
warn case were the same as those in a design defect case, except for the need to find creation of
the defective condition due to lack of adequate warning. Union Supply, 196 Colo. at 173, 583
P.2d at 283-84. Those elements are: 1) the product is in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer; 2) the product is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change; 3) the defect must be the cause of the plaintiff's injury;
4) the defendant sold the product and is engaged in the business of selling such products; and
5) the plaintiff has been injured as a result. Id. at 171-73, 583 P.2d at 282-83.
79. Id. at 173, 583 P.2d at 283 (quoting Hamilton, 37 Colo. App. at 383, 549 P.2d at 1107).
80. Id. at 171 n.5, 583 P.2d at 282 n.5.
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courts had removed the "unreasonably dangerous" portion because of its
negligence implications, the court expressed its intention to retain that requirement as a mechanism for limiting the liability of a manufacturer or
8
seller.
The court remanded the case, concluding that a jury question had been
presented on whether the failure to attach warnings had created a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff.8 2 A clear test for determining liability, however, was not defined. No mention was made of the
Hamilton provision that in strict liability for failure to warn it is assumed the
defendant knew of a product's propensity to injure.
In the 1979 case of Anderson v. Heron Engineering Co.,83 the Colorado
Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals decision which had affirmed a
verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff's claims were based on breach of
express warranty and strict liability under section 402A for failure to provide
more complete maintenance instructions or for failure to warn of the consequences of improper maintenance. 84 On the issue of failure to warn, the
court held that a product otherwise free of defect may be defective and unreasonably dangerous if not accompanied by adequate instructions and
warnings. 8 5 Such a defect, the court emphasized, may impose the same liability on a manufacturer as if the defect were a manufacturing or design
86
defect.
The court also held that a manufacturer is obligated to warn of dangers
that may arise from improper use and handling, and that a defense of no
knowledge of prior problems is inapplicable in a strict liability action.8 7 The
argument that liability should be imposed only if the defendant knew or
should have known of a latent defect "mixes 'reasonableness' and 'foreseeability' concepts of negligence law with precepts of strict liability."8 8 Attention to the manufacturer's knowledge or what he could reasonably be
assumed to have known, the court continued, directs the focus away from
the condition of the product back to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct, a result inappropriate in strict liability.8 9
The court further noted that a defendant's knowledge of a defect that
renders a product unreasonably dangerous is, in effect, assumed in strict liability cases.90 Thus, the Anderson court concluded, the jury issue was whether
the manufacturer's failure to provide adequate instructions or warning rendered the product unreasonably dangerous, without regard to the reasona81. Id.
82. Id. at 173, 583 P.2d at 283.
83. 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674 (1979).
84. Id. at 394, 604 P.2d at 675-76.
85. Id. at 395, 604 P.2d at 676 (citing Unzon Supply, 196 Colo. at 168 n.1, 583 P.2d at 280
n.1;Hiigel, 190 Colo. at 63, 544 P.2d at 988).
86. 198 Colo. at 395, 604 P.2d at 676.
87. Id. at 397-98, 604 P.2d at 678.
88. Id. at 398, 604 P.2d at 678.
89. Id., 604 P.2d at 679.
90. Id Accord Hamtfon, 37 Colo. App. at 385, 549 P.2d at 1108. The Anderson court cited
Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974), the same case relied upon
in Hamiton.
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bleness of the manufacturer's conduct in failing to warn. 9 1
III.

KYSOR INDUSTRIAL CORPORA TION V FRAZIER

In a split decision, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict
awarding damages to the plaintiff in Kysor Industrial Corp. v. Frazier.92 The
plaintiff, Jack Frazier, had filed an action against the manufacturer, Kysor,
and distributor, D.L.M., of an industrial saw seeking recovery based on strict
liability under section 402A for failure to warn or provide instructions for
93
the proper method of lifting and moving the saw and removing the skid.
The jury awarded Frazier $75,000 for injuries he suffered while moving the
saw. 94 The court of appeals affirmed the decision against Kysor and
D.L.M., concluding that: 1) section 402A was an appropriate theory of recovery; 2) sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find a failure of adequate
instruction which created an unreasonably dangerous defective condition;
3) the plaintiff was a user or consumer within the protection of section 402A;
and 4) reversible error did not exist in the trial court's rulings on admissibil95
ity of certain evidence.
The supreme court majority addressed the first two issues, deciding
there was no evidence that the saw or skid was defective in the absence of a
warning. Therefore, Frazier's claim for recovery under section 402A was erroneously submitted to the jury. 96 The remaining issues were not addressed;
the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in
97
favor of Kysor and D.L.M.
91. 198 Colo. at 398, 604 P.2d at 679 (citing Hamilton, 37 Colo. App. at 385, 549 P.2d at
1108).
Only two other cases were reported in Colorado based on strict liability for failure to warn
or provide adequate instruction after Hitgl and prior to Kysor. In Good v. A. B. Chance, 39
Colo. App. 70, 565 P.2d 217 (1977), the court of appeals ruled that, although negligence principles are not applicable in a strict liability case, evidence demonstrating pre-existing knowledge
of inherent danger and feasibility of providing a warning should have been admitted as establishing a duty to warn users or consumers. Id. at 78-79, 565 P.2d at 223-24. This opinion
reflects some intermingling of the two causes of action.
In another court of appeals case, Martinez v. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co., 636 P.2d 1287 (Colo.
App. 1981), the court found reversible error in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the
issue of failure to warn. The fact that persons using the equipment were aware of the defect did
not relieve the manufacturer of its duty to warn, if the duty existed at the time the equipment
was sold. Since no warnings had been given, there was a factual basis for submitting the failure
to warn question to the jury. Id. at 1290.
92. 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982). Justice Erickson wrote for the majority, Justice Rovira
concurred specially, and Justices Lohr and Quinn joined Justice Dubofsky in the dissent.
93. Id. at 910.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 911.
97. Id. at 913. The third issue presented to the supreme court on appeal, whether the
plaintiff, an expert mover, was a user or consumer within the contemplation of § 402A, remains
unanswered. The majority stated that it agreed with the court of appeals that plaintiff's experience in moving heavy equipment did not preclude a finding of a defective and unreasonably
dangerous product. Id. at 911. The statement, however, appears to be dictum. In holding that
the cause was erroneously submitted to the jury under § 402A, the court concluded that it need
not address the remaining issues. Id. at 913.
The court of appeals had found Frazier to be a protected consumer under the rule that a
manufacturer who places a product into the stream of commerce must bear the risk of liability
to anyone who foreseeably may be injured along the path of delivery. Frazier v. Kysor Indus.
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In reaching its decision, the court noted that section 402A had been
adopted in the 1975 Colorado case of Hizel v. General Motors Corp.98 The
court further stated that under section 402A a product may be found defective and unreasonably dangerous to the user even though faultlessly made, if
placed on the market without adequate warnings or instructions concerning
safe and proper use. 99 A manufacturer's strict liability rests upon the concept of enterprise liability for casting a defective product into the stream of
commerce rather than on traditional negligence principles. o Nevertheless,
the court indicated that determination of the existence of a duty to warn
turns upon consideration of the likelihood of accident and the seriousness of
the consequences of failing to warn. 10 1 The focus for determining liability,
however, is to be the condition of the product rather than the conduct of the
manufacturer. 10 2 In Colorado, the court noted, a plaintiff must prove that a
product is both "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" to sustain an ac03
tion under section 402A.1
The court emphasized that strict liability is not the equivalent of absolute liability, and therefore, the fact that an accident occurs through use of a
product does not necessarily render the product defective and unreasonably
dangerous without a warning. 10 4 According to the majority, the plaintiff in
this case was the sole cause of the accident. 10 5 There was no evidence in the
record to show the saw or skid was defective and unreasonably dangerous in
the absence of warnings or instructions; rather, Frazier created the danger by
his own mishandling.' 0 6 The court read the record as supporting a finding
that Frazier's misjudgment in failing to lower the saw to the ground and
subsequent attempt to remove the skid plate amounted to mishandling,
which was the sole cause of the danger. The plaintiff, therefore, had not
sustained his burden of proof. 107
The majority recognized that the question of whether a product is in a
Corp., 43 Colo. App. 287, 292, 607 P.2d 1296, 1301 (1979), rev'don other grounds, 642 P.2d 908
(Colo. 1982).
98. 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975). See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
99. 642 P.2d at 910-11 (citing Anderson v. Heron Eng'g Co., 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674
(1979); Union Supply v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978); Hiigel v. General Motors, 190
Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965)).
100. 642 P.2d at 911.

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Union Supply v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978)). The majority
noted that some courts had eliminated the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement because of
its negligence implications, but made no further comment on the issue. 642 P.2d at 911 n.l.

104. Id.
105. Id. at 912.
106. Id. at 911-12.
107. Id. The majority relied on comment g of§ 402A of the Restatement in concluding that a
duty to warn does not exist "where a product's dangerous condition is created so/ely by the
plaintiff's own mishandling or misuse." Id. at 912 (emphasis added). Comment g provides in
part:
The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling . . . [makes] it harmful. . . . The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time it left the hands of the particular seller is
upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced which will support the
conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965), quoted in Kysor, 642 P.2d at 911.
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"defective condition unreasonably dangerous" because of a failure to warn is
normally for the jury to decide. 10 8 Nevertheless, "after a view to all the
evidence" the supreme court concluded that the question was erroneously
submitted to the jury.10 9 The court found no evidence to show the saw or
skid was defective without a warning; on the contrary, the court found that
0
Frazier himself created the dangerous condition resulting in his injury."
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION

Foreseeabi/lty

It is well settled that a product may be defective and unreasonably dangerous because of the absence of warnings or adequate instructions for
proper use, and that such a condition may give rise to a cause of action in
strict liability under section 402A.II' The test for determining when an unlabeled product is defective and unreasonably dangerous, however, is not
clear. The decision is normally one for the jury. " 2 In Colorado, two different tests have been articulated by the supreme court.
The first, applied in Higel, provides that a duty to warn must exist, and
that the duty is determined by considering the likelihood of accident and the
seriousness of consequences from a failure to warn.' 13 In Anderson a second
test was applied. The Colorado Supreme Court did not talk of a manufacturer's duty, but rather focused entirely on the condition of the product
4
without a warning." 1
The difference in these tests is significant. Although the fhigel court
expressed an intent to stay outside the realm of negligence and to focus on
the nature of the product, its test requires a finding of breach of a duty.
Determination of the existence of the duty requires an evaluation of what
the manufacturer could or should have foreseen. The court's focus was not
on the condition of the product, but on the conduct of the manufacturer.
The analysis was based not on the concepts associated with strict liability
but on negligence principles.
In Anderson, the court asserted that the manufacturer's knowledge of a
5
product's propensity for harm must be assumed in a strict liability action."
The reasonableness of the manufacturer's failure to warn is not to be considered.1' 6 The existence of liability is determined by considering whether the
failure to warn rendered the product unreasonably dangerous. In Ksor, the
108. 642 P.2d at 912-13 (citing Anderson v. Heron Eng'g Co., 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674
(1979); Union Supply v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978)).
109. Id. at 913.
110. Id.
111. See Keeton, Produt Liabiity---Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 398-99
(1970); Noel, supra note 38 at 256; Design Defects, supra note 34 at 551; Wade, supra note 31 at
830; Note, Products Liability in Texas: Foreseeability and Warnings, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1323, 1323

(1980).
112.
P.2d at
113.
114.
115.
116.

See Anderson 198 Colo. at 398, 604 P.2d at 679 (1979); Union Supply, 196 Colo. at 173, 583
283.
190 Colo. 57, 63, 544 P.2d 983, 987-88 (1975).
198 Colo. at 398, 604 P.2d at 679.
Id.
Id.
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Colorado Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve this disparity by
unambiguously deciding whether a manufacturer's foreseeability is an issue
in a strict liability action for failure to warn. The majority, however, based
its decision on the conduct of the plaintiff, and the court's comments regarding a test for determining liability do little but perpetuate the confusion.
Writing for the majority, Justice Erickson demonstrated the court's support for the Hi'tgel test by stating that a consideration of the likelihood of
accident and the seriousness of the consequences determines whether warnings or instructions are required. i i I Justice Erickson did not, however, actually consider these factors in the opinion. He merely concluded there was no
evidence in the record showing the saw or skid to have been in a defective
condition because of lack of warning.1 18
The court stated that normal negligence rules were not applicable, but
that the manufacturer's liability was based on the theory of enterprise liability for placing a defective product on the market.1 9 The critical issue, ac120
cording to the court, was the condition of the product without a warning.
Justice Erickson was careful, however, to mention that the occurrence of an
accident would not necessarily render a product defective and unreasonably
dangerous because a manufacturer is not required to be an insurer of its

products. 121
The court then asserted that Frazier's claim could not be sustained
under section 402A because it was Frazier's own contact with the saw which
caused the injury. 122 Justice Erickson rendered a holding which is confusing
on its face and likely to be interpreted inconsistently: "[W]e hold that a duty
to warn or instruct does not occur where a product's dangerous condition is
' 123
created solely by the plaintiffs own mishandling or misuse."
The mention of duty brings into play the foreseeability issue. Justice
Erickson, however, did not immediately discuss the likelihood or seriousness
of potential injury, factors which he had indicated must be considered to
determine whether a duty exists. Instead he again shifted the focus to the
plaintiff's conduct. 12 4 The language of the holding quoted above may be
interpreted as meaning that a duty to warn of potential risks or to provide
instructions for safe and proper use may be determined after the harm has
occurred. This interpretation illustrates the failure in logic of the court's
holding. A duty to warn is based on foreseeability and cannot be determined by the intervening conduct of the user or on an adhoc basis. The duty
either exists or does not exist at the time the manufacturer releases the product into the stream of commerce. It is not related to later use of the prod117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

642 P.2d at 911.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

122. Id.
123. Id. at 911-12.
124. Immediately following the statement quoted in the text, the majority declared: "The
record establishes that Frazier created the dangerous condition which resulted in his injury by
his own inadvertence and mishandling."

I.

at 912.
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uct. 1 25 The court's only application of foreseeability factors was somewhat
later in the opinion where it stated that since the saw could be moved by a
variety of methods no specific warnings or instructions could have been

issued. 126
B.

Patt~"nf' Conduct and the Condition of the Product

In Hiigel and Anderson the Colorado Supreme Court held that a manufacturer is obligated to warn of dangers that may arise from improper use
and handling.' 27 Justice Erickson did not mention that rule nor did he distinguish the facts in Kysor. Instead he cited section 402A comment g, as
pertinent to the issue of plaintiff's misuse. 1 28 That comment absolves the
manufacturer of liability when the user mishandles an otherwise safe product in such a way that it becomes harmful.' 2 9 This analysis leaves unanswered the question of whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn of
dangers that may arise from improper use and handling and the reciprocal
issue of whether a plaintiff is barred from recovery where he has misused a
product lacking instructions.
Justice Erickson was careful to note that contributory negligence, which
consists merely of failure to discover a defect in the product or to guard
against the possibility of its existence, is not applicable in a strict liability
action. 1 30 By applying comment g, the court in Kysor attempted to show that
the decision to deny recovery was reached on causation theories rather than
contributory negligence principles.' 3 ' According to the court, the record
supported a finding that Frazier's injury resulted from the unstable condition created by his mishandling of the forklift and saw, and not from Kysor's
132
failure to warn. Therefore, the issue was not contributory negligence.
The majority declared that the sole cause of Frazier's accident was his own
33
conduct. 1
The justifiability of the result reached by the court's application of comment g must be questioned. Kysor manufactured the four-ton saw for industrial use. In order for the saw to be used, it had to be moved to the buyer's
location, unloaded and placed in position-a process for which Jack Frazier
125. Trine, Duty to Warn in Product Liability Cases, 31 TRIAL TALK 7 (June 1982).
126. 642 P.2d at 912.
127. To comply with this duty [to warn] the manufacturer . . . must appropriately
label the product, giving due consideration to the likelihood of accident and the seriousness of consequences. . . so. . . as to warn of any dangers that are inherent in it
and its use or that may arise from the improper handling or use of the product.
Ht'gel, 190 Colo. at 63, 544 P.2d at 988 (quoting Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App.
855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757 (1963)). "[A] manufacturer is obligated to warn of dangers that may
arise from improper use and handling." Anderson, 198 Colo. at 395, 604 P.2d at 678 (citing
Hit gel, 190 Colo. at 63, 544 P.2d at 988).
128. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
129. Id.
130. "[O]rdinary contributory negligence consisting of a failure to exercise due care to discover a defect or to guard against its possible existence, is not a defense to strict liability." 642
P.2d at 912 n.3 (citing Union Supply, 196 Colo. at 174, 583 P.2d at 284). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
131. 642 P.2d at 912 n.3. See Trine, supra note 125, at 7.
132. 642 P.2d at 912 n.3.
133. Id. at 913.
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was responsible. When the saw left the manufacturer, there were no warnings or instructions for moving.' 34 Comment g of the Restatement provides
that the seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition
and subsequent mishandling makes it harmful. 135 The suggestion that
someone must do something to the product, change it in some way so that it
becomes dangerous, is clear. Jack Frazier attempted to unload the saw, a
task which Kysor obviously intended. He did not transform or change it, yet
the majority denied him compensation on the basis that he created the dangerous condition that caused his injuries.' 36 Even if the court intended to
overrule its prior holdings requiring warnings for foreseeable misuse, application of comment g to the facts of Kysor seems inappropriate.
C.

The FactualDzspute

The majority emphasized that the question of whether a product was in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous because of a failure to warn is
normally an issue for the jury. Yet the majority concluded there was not,
after a "view to all the evidence," sufficient factual basis for submitting the
case to the jury. 137 The dissenting opinion written by Justice Dubofsky and
joined by Justices Lohr and Quinn suggests that there was sufficient conflicting evidence to take the matter to the jury, and that the jury's determinations should not have been disturbed unless so clearly erroneous as to find no
138
support in the record.
Evidence which could have aided the jury in reaching its finding that
without a warning the saw was in an unreasonably dangerous defective condition included: 1) sheet metal covered the saw's surface above its center of
gravity, making the appearance of stability deceiving; 139 2) the only method
used by Kysor to move the saw around its plant was by overhead crane with
chains attached at certain lift points; 14° 3) Kysor also used the crane to load
the saw onto a truck for shipment; 14 i and 4) even if the plaintiff had lowered
the saw and skid to the floor before attempting to remove the skid, the skid
could not have been removed without lifting the saw alone, and the saw
142
alone could not have been lifted in a stable manner with the forklift.
Information presented to the supreme court indicated the feasibility of
attaching a label to the saw with instructions and warnings for moving and
unloading. Kysor had consistently used a hydrocrane to move the saw
around the plant and to load the saw for shipment; the lifting points were
always the same and could have been marked. 143 A clear warning label
concerning operation was already being attached to each saw in a minimal
134. Id.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965).

See supra note 107.

136. 642 P.2d at 912.
137. d. at 912-13.
138. Id. at 914 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting) (quoting Peterson v. Ground Water Comm'n, 195
Colo. 508, 579 P.2d 629 (1978)).
139. 642 P.2d at 914 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting).
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id See also supra text accompanying notes 21-27.
Respondent's Brief at 4, Kysor.
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amount of time.' 4 4 Yet the majority in Kysor concluded that "no specific
warnings or instructions regarding the lifting or moving could logically have
145
been given."'
The dissent focused on facts surrounding the condition of the saw. 146
The majority based its finding on the conduct of the plaintiff.147 Regardless
of the basis for the decision, Colorado law requires that appellate courts be
bound by the jury's findings: where there is evidence in the record to support the result, where the decision is based on conflicting evidence, and
where the jury has been correctly instructed by the trial court. 148 A reading
of the majority and minority opinions reveals factual issues which a jury
should have been allowed to decide. The evidence reported in the minority
opinion refutes the majority's repeated assertions that the plaintiff was solely
49
responsible for the accident. 1
CONCLUSION

The decision to deny the plaintiff recovery in Ksor v. Frazier is noteworthy for several reasons but probably not for the reasons that initially come to
mind. This decision has broken a Colorado trend of plaintiff recoveries in
strict liability for failure to warn cases. The majority reached its conclusion
in apparent disregard of key evidence, and in so doing, overturned a jury
finding which according to precedent should not have been disturbed.
The court seemed to hold that a plaintiffs misuse affects a manufacturer's duty to provide adequate warnings or instructions, thus barring recovery in a strict liability action. The court interpreted the record as
supporting a finding that Frazier was the sole cause of the accident, yet the
opinion was filled with a confusing discussion of negligence and strict liability principles. If, as the majority held, Frazier alone was responsible and it
was not the absence of adequate warning or instruction which resulted in his
injuries, then nothing was to be gained by commenting on the manufacturer's duty to warn or the condition of the product without a warning. By
discussing the negligence concepts of foreseeability and degree of injury (tests
for determining a duty to warn), but also asserting that strict liability for
failure to warn is an action based on the condition of the product, the majority has perpetuated confusion of the two actions. This result is particularly
ironic since the discussion was unnecessary under the majority's own interpretation of the evidence.
It is unfortunate that the Colorado Supreme Court, in its discussion of
144. Id.

145. 642 P.2d at 912.
146. Id. at 913-14 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting).
147. 642 P.2d at 911-12.
148. Id. at 914 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting) (quoting Vigil v. Pine, 176 Colo. 384, 490 P.2d 934
(1971)). Sealso Gebhardt v. Gebhardt, 198 Colo. 28, 595 P.2d 1048 (1979); Page v. Clark, 197
Colo. 306, 592 P.2d 792 (1979).
149. "[W]e can find no evidence in the record showing that . . . the saw and attached skid
were in a defective condition because of a lack of warning ..
" 642 P.2d at 911. "The record
establishes that Frazier created the dangerous condition which resulted in his injury by his own
inadvertence and mishandling. . . . [T]he accident happened solely because Frazier created an
unstable condition ..
" Id. at 912.
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strict liability, failed to clarify a test for determining liability for failure to
warn cases. Negligence analysis focusing on a seller's duty will continue to
be confused with purer strict liability analysis focusing on the condition of
the product, and the possibility exists that a plaintiff's misuse will be successfully asserted as a bar to recovery.
juh"E Lapin

TEXACo, INC. V SHORT: DORMANT MINERALS AND DUE
PROCESS-A CASE FOR THE IRREBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE?
INTRODUCTION

Much criticism has been leveled against the complex system employed
in the United States for conveying real property.' Land titles are often encumbered by a myriad of outstanding present and future interests, rendering
a single tract of property subject to rights held by diverse, often conflicting
parties. As a result, the conveyance of land titles has become difficult and
costly. 2 Attempts to streamline such systems with retroactive legislation
have commonly been met with constitutional objections from persons whose
3
property has been adversely affected.
I. BACKGROUND

A.

The Problem of Dormant Minerals

One of the most intractable complications in land titles and transfers
occurs when the mineral estate is severed from that of the surface, creating
two wholly separate fee simple estates. 4 In the United States, based on English custom,5 the owner of land can create a fee simple estate in the minerals
by reservation, exception, or grant. 6 After severance each owner has an indefeasible title in a separate corporeal hereditament, with all the incidents of
7
distinct ownership.
Under common law because the mineral estate is corporeal in nature it
cannot be lost by abandonment. 8 Title to the mineral interest must gener1. "The basic system of real estate titles and transfers.., cries out for reexamination and
simplification." Chief Justice Burger, Remarks to the Opening Session of the American Law
Institute (May 21, 1974), reprinted in Presbytery of Southeast Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232,
237 (Iowa 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975).
2. See, e.g., P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES (2d ed. 1970); L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, THE
IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION (1960).
3. See generally J. SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AFFECTING INTERESTS IN
LAND (1953) (examines retroactive legislation with reference to constitutional guarantees).
4. See, e.g., Mayberry, Construction of Mineral Exceptions and Reservations, 14 OKLA. L. REV.
457 (1961); Note, Severed Mineral Interests, A Problem Without a Solution?, 46 N.D.L. REV. 451
(1970).
5. Under the common law, the English sovereign owned all mines in which gold or silver
might be found, regardless of the ownership of the surface estate. See 2 H. TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 586, at 507 (3d ed. 1939).

6. As stated in Smith v. Jones, 21 Utah 270, 272, 60 P. 1104, 1106 (1900): As to mineral
lands, the surface may be owned by one person and the mineral underneath by another, and
...each owner shall have an indefeasible title. When the surface and the underlying mineral
strata are separately owned, they constitute separate corporeal hereditaments, with all the incidents of separate ownership. See also Chicago, Wilmington and Franklin Coal Co. v. Jilek, 42 F.
Supp. 200 (E.D. Ill. 1942); Hummel v. McFadden, 395 Pa. 543, 150 A.2d 856 (1959); 2 H.
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 585 (3d ed. 1939).
7. 2 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 585-87 (3d ed. 1939).

8. Generally all solid mineral estates are corporeal. See supra note 5. Severed interests in
oil and gas, due to theirferae naturae character, cannot be owned until reduced to actual posses-
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ally be recorded, and is subject to the laws of descent, devise, and conveyance. 9 Once severance has occurred, adverse possession of the surface will
not constitute adverse possession of the underlying mineral estate. 10 With all
the incidents of separate ownership, the mineral estate may be held in
perpetuity with or without subsequent development of the underlying natural resources.
The severed mineral estate is not only relatively indestructible, but also
has assumed a traditional dominance in relation to the surface estate. The
mineral owner continues to have the right to the mineral estate as long as his
activities do not unreasonably interfere with the rights of the surface owner."1 When not specified in the deed, this dominance includes rights of ingress and egress as well as the right to use as much of the surface as is
reasonably necessary to explore for, develop, or produce the minerals. 12 The
uniquely durable nature of the mineral estate, and its dominant position
relative to the surface estate, constitute significant impediments to the development or conveyance of the surface interest. 13
Exacerbating these difficulties are the situations in which record title to
a mineral interest is vested in owners who cannot be located. Typically,
after these estates can no longer be associated with a known record title
holder they are referred to as "dormant mineral interests."', 4 Attempts by
the surface owner to remerge the surface with the mineral interest can be
frustrated further when these dormant mineral interests are owned by a defunct corporation, 15 or when through the laws of devise and descent the minsion, and are therefore usually considered incorporeal. See, e.g., Halbert v. Hendrix, 121 Ind.
App. 43, 95 N.E.2d 221 (1950); Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs, 115 Ind. App. 236, 56 N.E.2d 672
(1944).
9. See, e.g., Pickens v. Adams, 7 Ill.2d 283, 131 N.E.2d 38 (1955).
10. Witness v. Paniman, 120 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 1963); see generally Kuntz, Adverse Possession
of Severed Mineral Interests, 5 ROCKY. MTN. MIN. L. INST. 409, 420 (1960) (a severed mineral
interest may be adversely possessed by working of the minerals).
11. Recent cases reaffirm the mineral owner's right to use reasonably the surface to work
the mineral estate. See Yaquina Bay Timber & Logging Co. v. Shiny Rock Mining Corp., 276
Or. 779, 784, 556 P.2d 672, 675 (1976); Lomax v. Henderson, 559 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977). But see Southern Title Insurance Co. v. Oiler, 268 Ark. 300, 595 S.W.2d 681 (1980);
Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Comment, The
Surface Owner's Estate Becomes Dominant Wyoming's Surface Owner Consent Statute, 16 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 541 (1981).
12. Often the mineral owner has even greater prerogatives based on provisions in the deed
conveying the mineral estate. See generaly Comment, BroadForm Deed-Obstacle to Peacelid Coexistence Between Mineral & Surface Owners, 60 Ky. L.J. 742 (1972) ("broad-form deed" is a typical
name for deeds conveying minerals and giving the new mineral owner a large number of specified rights in using the surface estate to recover the minerals).
13. It is generally more difficult to obtain a bank loan to build on property with a severed
mineral estate. See Brief for Amicus Curiae at 34, Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). See
generally Lopez, Upstairs/Downstairs. Conficts Between Surface and Mtneral Owners, 26 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 995 (1980).
14. See, e.g., Outerbridge, Missing and Unknown Mineral Owners, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 20-21 (1979); Polston, Legislation, Existing and Proposed, Concerning Marketability of Mineral
Titles, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 73 (1972) (concerned primarily with the Indiana Dormant
Mineral Lapse Act); Street, Needfor Legislation to Eliminate DormantRoyalty Interests, 42 MICH. ST.
B.J. 49 (March 1963); see generally Note, supra note 4.
15. See Knutson, Defunct Companies that Hold Record Ttle to Mining Properties Problems and
Solutions, 24 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 377" (1978).
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eral estate becomes fragmented.

6

B. Indiana's Response
In 1971, addressing the problem of dormant mineral interests inhibiting
the development and conveyance of surface estates, the Indiana Legislature
passed the Indiana Dormant Mineral Interests Act 17 (Mineral Lapse Act or
Act). This Act provides that a severed mineral interest not used for a period
of twenty years automatically lapses and reverts to the current surface owner
of the property, unless the mineral owner files a statement of claim 8 in the
local county recorder's office within a specified time period.' 9 The "use" of
a mineral interest sufficient to preclude its extinction includes actual or attempted production of the minerals, payment of rent or royalties to the min20
eral owner, or payment of taxes.
The statute does not require that any specific notice be given to a mineral owner prior to a statutory lapse of the mineral estate. The Act does set
forth a procedure, however, by which a surface owner who has succeeded to
the ownership of an underlying mineral estate pursuant to the statute may
give notice that the mineral interest has lapsed and quiet title to the mineral
estate by virtue of a judicially recognized remerger with the surface
2
interest. '

C.

The Case

On April 23, 1977, the surface owner of a 132-acre Indiana tract gave
notice by both publication and mail that the underlying mineral estate, severed in 1942 and 1944, had lapsed. Texaco, Inc., with ten other parties,
responded by filing statements of claim. Thereafter, the surface owner filed
16. According to Kuntz, Old and New Solutions to the Problem of the Outstanding Undeveloped
Mineral Interest, 28 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 81, 82 (1971): "Once severed, even though
the mineral interest was not fragmented when originally granted, the passage of time serves to
do so. Family settlements are made and wills are drafted with an understandable lack of concern over the effect upon a mineral interest that is not productive."
17. INn. CODE §§ 32-5-11-1 to -8 (1976). This Act, like similar ones passed in several other
states, is based loosely on the Louisiana Act providing for "liberative prescription" of mineral
interests. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:5 to -:34 (West 1975). In Louisiana neither solid minerals nor oil and gas are deemed susceptible of ownership apart from the lands until reduced to
possession. A conveyance purporting to sell minerals in place merely creates a right in the
nature of a servitude, defined as the right of another to explore for the produce minerals. Id
§ 31:21. The Louisiana Mineral Code expressly provides that a mineral servitude is extinguished by prescription resulting from non-use for 10 years. Id. § 31:27. Such prescription may,
however, be interrupted by actual production of minerals or by good faith operations for the
discovery and production of minerals. Id. § 31:36. See Hardy, Public Policy and Temtinablity of
Mineral Rights in Louisiana, 26 LA. L. REV. 731 (1966). For an indication of how this Act functions in practice, see Nabors, The Lousiana Mineral Servitude and Royalty Doctrines. A Report to the
Mineral Law Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute, 25 TUL. L. REV. 30 (1950).
18. The notice must be filed prior to the end of the 20 year period or within a two year
grace period after the effective date of the Act (September 2, 1971).
19. IND. CODE § 32-5-11-1 (1976). One exception is provided to this rule; if an owner of 10
or more interests in the same county files a statement of claim that inadvertently omits some of
those interests, the omitted interests may be preserved by a supplemental filing made within 60
days of receiving actual notice of the lapse. Id. § 32-5- I1-5.

20. Id § 32-5-11-3.
21.

Id § 32-5-11-6.
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an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the rights of the mineral own22
ers had lapsed.
Stipulating to the facts, and alleging the unconstitutionality of the law,
Texaco claimed that the lack of prior notice of the lapse deprived them of
property without due process of law. 23 Texaco further argued that the stat2 4
ute effected a taking of property for public use without just compensation.
The trial court declared the statute unconstitutional, but the Indiana
Supreme Court reversed. 25 In a five-to-four ruling, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Indiana's highest court upholding
26
that statute's constitutionality.
Citing the common law doctrine that everyone is presumed to know the
law, the Court held that the Mineral Lapse Act did not violate procedural
due process. Because notice was actually contained in the Indiana Act, the
Court held that passage of the statute was, in and of itself, sufficient notice of
all the provisions contained therein. 27 Answering a major contention of the
appellants that the Mineral Lapse Act deprived them of the opportunity to
respond to the assertion of abandonment, the Court distinguished the facts
of Texaco v. Short from those in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 28
Mullane requires that notice be "reasonably calculated" to apprise parties of
a judicial proceeding affecting their interests. 29 The Court noted that the
Mineral Lapse Act was self-executing upon the passage of time, not providing for any adjudicatory hearing prior to termination, and thus the Mullane
standard did not apply. 30 The Court also held that because the property
31
was deemed abandoned, no compensation was due to the appellants.
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions examined the aggregate
reasonability of the Mineral Lapse Act. The majority employed a minimal
substantive due process review and found the statute constitutional, based
on the examples of similar statutes. 32 The dissent employed a stricter standard, which it reasoned was applicable due to the retroactive nature of the
statute. Based on this stricter standard, the dissent found the statute to be
22. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 521 (1982).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Id amend. V. The fifth amendment prohibition against the federal government taking
private property for public use is equally applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Webbs Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980). The appellants
also contended that the Act violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
and that it constituted an impairment of contracts in violation of article 1, § 10 of the United
States Constitution. These contentions, however, are beyond the scope of this comment.
25. Short v. Texaco, Inc., 406 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 1980).
26. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). Justice Stevens, wrote the opinion and was
joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice
Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Powell.
27. Id at 531.
28. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Seealso Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
29. 339 U.S. at 319.
30. 454 U.S. at 534.
31. Id at 530. For an interesting, related review of possible due process violations regarding a similar extinguishment of unpatented mining claims, see generally Note, New Federal Min•
ng Law Abandonment rovwosus. A Violaton of Du Process of Law?, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 647

(1981).
32. 454 U.S. at 529.
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33
an unreasonable abridgment of due process.

This comment examines the Texaco decision in view of other statutes
that function to extinguish a vested interest in land without notice or compensation. The assertion is made that such statutes are constitutional when
the government is acting as an arbiter between competing interests in the
same property, a situation not presented by the Mineral Lapse Act.
It is further asserted that the retroactive nature of the statute called for
an intermediate level of substantive due process review, which would have
resulted in the statute being declared unconstitutional. Instead, the Court
simply conducted a minimal substantive due process review consistent with
prospective economic and social legislation, and upheld the statute.
The analysis closes by introducing a doctrine previously used by the
Court to provide an intermediate level of substantive due process review.
The argument is made that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine should
have been used in Texaco to force Indiana to adopt a more constitutionally
acceptable solution to the problem of severed mineral interests.
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Government as Arbiter

The United States Constitution provides that property shall not be
taken without due process of law, 34 nor taken for a public purpose without
just compensation. 35 Notwithstanding these provisions, the states are
charged with the responsibility of defining the general nature of property
and establishing criteria for the resolution of competing claims. 36 An essential problem that the Texaco Court faced was determining the extent to
which, and under what circumstances, a state may redefine vested property
interests without violating these constitutional protections.
The Mineral Lapse Act functions retroactively to define those mineral
estates requiring periodic reaffirmation of ownership. 37 As the majority
opinion stated, there are statutory precedents for altering the character of
property interests. Such relevant precedents include state enactments of adverse possession, recording, and marketable title statutes, each requiring
some affirmative act by the owner to preserve the property interest.
In Hawktis v. Barney's Lessee, 38 the Court upheld a Kentucky statute
33. Id. at 540.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. Id. amend. V.
36. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1971) the Court stated: "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as State law .... " Id at 577.
37. As stated by the Court in Texaco:
The State of Indiana has defined a severed mineral estate as a "vested property interest," entitled to "the same protection as are fee simple titles." Through its Dormant
Minerals Act, however, the State has declared that this property interest is of less than
absolute duration; retention is conditioned on the performance of at least one of the
actions required by the Act. (footnotes omitted).
454 U.S. at 525.
38. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457 (1831); see alsoMontoya v. Gonzales, 232 U.S. 375 (1914).
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which allowed a defendant, who had resided for more than seven years on
property with a claim of right, to assert superior title over the record landowner. Initially such adverse possession statutes were deemed constitutional
based on their close analogy to statutes of limitation; when the state acts to
withdraw a remedy (ejectment of a trespasser) it is not acting to destroy a
right. 39 This analogy was flawed because the effect of such adverse possession statutes, however, was not merely to withdraw the remedy of ejectment,
but also to divest the former title holder of property without due process or
compensation, and to vest title in the trespasser who
had developed an inter40
est in the property through continued possession.
Incorporating and broadening the equitable doctrine of bond fide purchaser, many land title recording statutes provide that an otherwise valid
transfer of property that is not recorded may be defeated by a subsequent
transfer.4 1 The Court inJackson v. Lampht're42 approved the constitutionality
of such recording statutes, even when applied retroactively.
A third type of statute that may act to divest a property owner of an
interest in land upon failure to re-register that interest periodically, is a marketable title act. Although such acts have not been specifically considered by
the United States Supreme Court, they have met with wide approval in vari43
ous state courts.
Marketable title acts facilitate land transactions by permitting a buyer
to rely on a record title search covering a limited period to determine outstanding interests in property. 44 The interest is generally void if not noted in
39. See, e.g., Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 61 (1902); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628,
634 (1877).
40. The Court in Texaco, acknowledging this defect in reasoning, stated that if the practical
consequence of eliminating a remedy is identical to the consequence of extinguishing a right,
the contemporary constitutional analysis is the same. 454 U.S. at 528. Curiously, although the
Court acknowledged the invalidity of this differentiation between right and remedy, it used the
elimination of remedy concept in analogizing between adverse possession and the Mineral
Lapse Act. The Court's analysis seems to imply that although the constitutional justification for
adverse possession provisions is no longer cognizable, the cases decided upon the discredited
concept remain as legitimate precedents for the decision in Texaco. Id. at 528. See, e.g., El Paso
v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 506-07 (1965); Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 430 (1933).
41. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 787 (1981).
42. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280 (1830). The Court stated that:
It is within the undoubted power of state legislatures to pass recording acts, by which
the elder grantee shall be postponed to a younger, if the prior deed is not recorded
within the limited time; and the power is the same whether the deed is dated before or
after the passage of the recording act.
Id at 289.
43. See, e.g., City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1978); Presbytery of
Southeast Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975) (possibility of reverter can be constitutionally extinguished due to the failure to comply with rerecording provision of marketable title statute). See generally P. BASYE, supra note 2, at §§ 17189; L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 3-16; Aigler, A Supplement to "Constitutionality of
Marketable Title Acts-1951-1957," 56 MICH. L. REv. 225 (1957); Barnett, Marketable Title
ActsPanaceaor Pandemonim?, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 72-76 (1967) (effect of marketable title acts on
mineral interests); Basye, Trends & Progress-The Marketable Title Acts, 47 IOWA L. REV. 261

(1962).

For a detailed analysis of the current functioning of a marketable title provision, see

Conine & Morgan, The Wyoming Marketable Title
Act-A Re, ion of Real Property Law, 16 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 181 (1981).

44. Marketable title acts are "designed to shorten the period of search required to establish
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the record chain of title during the statutorily designated limiting period. As
a practical matter, such interests are commonly noted by the grantor of land
in the deed of conveyance, thus preserving the encumbrance. Nevertheless,
the holder of an incorporeal hereditament in land may re-record before the
expiration of the limiting period, and thereby secure the interest from lapsing by giving this constructive notice to interested parties.
Despite theJackson Court's approval of retroactive recording statutes in
that case, the Court cautioned that similar provisions may be unconstitutional as an unreasonable denial of right. 4 5 The mechanism employed in the
Mineral Lapse Act is similar to that used in adverse possession, recording,
and marketable title statutes. Each of these four statutes is or can be a retroactive measure compelling an owner of real property to perform some affirmative act to preserve his or her property interest. Failure to perform the
act, in all four situations, can result in the extinguishment of a fee simple
absolute without notice or compensation.
Although the mechanism employed in the Mineral Lapse Act and adverse possession, recording, and marketable title statutes is similar, and
therefore arguably reasonable, the justification for state action under the
Mineral Lapse Act is less clear. In the adverse possession, recording, and
marketable title statutes, the government is acting as an arbiter between parties who have a "colorable" claim to the same property, adjusting the legal
rights between competing interests. The Mineral Lapse Act, however, functions to transfer property to a vertically adjacent landowner who may previously have received compensation as the grantor of the property.
Recording acts and marketable title acts both protect a bona fide purchaser of property who has no constructive knowledge of an outstanding
interest prior to conveyance. In either situation, the grantee must take reasonable steps, as defined by statute, to ascertain ownership of property before
conveyance. After taking these steps the state, as arbiter, favors the bona
fide purchaser who has a colorable claim to the property, over the former
46
owner who failed to record properly the property title.
Adverse possession is usually viewed as a record title owner losing property through his own laches. The record title owner's property interest, however, is lost to an individual who has achieved an equitable interest after
using the property, under a claim of right, for the statutory period. 47 The
state, again acting as arbiter, favors the latter equitable interest over the
claim of the negligent title holder.
In the examples of adverse possession, recording, and marketable title
acts, the state is performing the reasonable and necessary function of-declaring rights between differing colorable claims to real property. 48 Under the
Mineral Lapse Act, however, the state is not acting as an arbiter to protect a
title in real estate and given effect and stability to record titles by rendering them marketable
and alienable .
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of Osage, 176 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Iowa
1970).
45. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 289.
46.

See generally P. BASYE, supra note 2.

47.
48.

See, e.g., O'Bryan v. Dr. P. Phillips & Sons, 123 Fla. 302, 166 So. 820 (1936).
For a discussion of criteria used to determine when the state effectuates a taking requir-
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bona fide purchaser, or to favor one who over time has developed an equitable interest in the property. Under the Act the government, in an attempt to
promote the convenience of the surface owner in developing or conveying his
estate, intrudes on the relationship between adjoining land owners, whose
only link after severance is vertical proximity. The Act could, therefore, be
viewed as arbitrary state action benefitting one landowner by divesting an49
other with an equally valid claim.
B.

Substantive Due Process and Retroactive Legislation

To state that the Mineral Lapse Act is a less justifiable and more arbitrary use of state power than adverse possession, recording, and marketable
title statutes does not necessarily mean that the Act is unconstitutional.
Starting with Nebbia v. New York 5° , the Court has ostensibly given wide latitude to state governments to fashion prospective economic and social policy
not violative of fundamental rights. 5 ' Statutes that have a "reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminadue process guidelines for
tory, ' ' 52 meet the Court's modern substantive
53
prospective economic and social legislation.
In defining the nature of a severed mineral interest, it is undisputed that
Indiana can prospectively legislate the nature, character, and duration of
54
The Mineral Lapse
any property interest before that interest is created.
Act, however, functions retroactively, imposing a condition on the retention
55
of vested fee simple estates, which when created were of absolute duration.
ing just compensation, see Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971). But see Berger, A Policy Analysis ofthe Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165 (1974).
49. A sufficiently arbitrary statute may constitute a violation of substantive due process.
See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). But see Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1927) (the Court upheld the power of the State of Virginia to destroy ornamental cedar trees
on private property that were a perceived threat to the apple industry).
50. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The Court in Nebbia stated that:
[A] State is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose . . . . If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are satisfied ....
Id. at 537.
51. According to the Court, property is not a protected liberty interest. See, e.g., West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
52. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537.
53. The Court stated in Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955): "[Tlhe
law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." For further examples of the
Court's post-Nebbia substantive due process reasoning, see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730
(1963); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
54. A prospective law incorporates its provisions and limitations into all future transactions. Thus, there is no question concerning the constitutionality of the Mineral Lapse Act
regarding mineral estates created after the passage of the Act. See Texaco, 454 U.S. at 542.
55. At a minimum, the Court has required a statutory grace period provided within retroactive legislation to allow affected persons a reasonable time to bring their actions into conformity with the law. In Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902) the Court stated:
It may be properly conceded that all statutes of limitation must proceed on the idea
that the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the courts. A stat-
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The United States Supreme Court has considered such retroactive laws
56
affecting vested rights to be suspect violations of substantive due process.
Although mandating higher scrutiny than prospective legislation, not all retroactive statutes are unconstitutional. 57 The Court generally employs an
implicit weighing, rejecting only retroactive statutes that are considered
58
unreasonable.
In utilizing this higher standard, the Texaco Court determined whether
the Act was irrational or arbitrary to such an extent as to be a violation of
substantive due process. 5 9 The critical question was whether this retroactive
measure under theJackson standard was unconstitutional as an unreasonable
60
denial of right.
In reviewing the Supreme Court's evaluation of retroactive legislation,
one commentator has identified three criteria for assessing the reasonableness of such enactments. According to this analysis, the Court balances the
following three factors: the nature and strength of the public interest served
by the statute, the extent to which the statute modifies or abrogates the asserted pre-enactment right, and the nature of the right that the statute
6
alters. t
The first criterion, the strength of the public interest served by the statute could not bar the existing right of claimants without affording this opportunity; if
it should attempt to do so, it would not be a statute of limitations, but an unlawful
attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its provisions. It is essential that such statutes allow a reasonable time after they take effect for
the commencement of suits upon existing causes of action.
Id at 62. See also Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 632-33 (1877); Kolker v. Biggs, 203 Md. 137,
99 A.2d 743 (1953).
56. See generaly Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Consttutionahty of .Retroactive Legislation,
73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960).

57. Id at 694.
58. Compare Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) with Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). Useoy and RailroadRetirement Board are similar
cases concerning the constitutionality of legislation retroactively requiring employers to give
retired employees specified benefits. The Court overturned the statute in RailroadRetirement Bd.
but let it stand in Use7y. See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)
(description of constitutional limitations placed on retroactive laws); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (land use statute invalidated as a retroactive taking of property
without compensation). See generally Hochman, supra note 56; Orland & Stebing, Retroactwity in
Review. The Federal and Washington Approaches, 16 GONZ. L. REV. 855 (1981); Slawson, Consttutional and Legislative Considerationsin Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 216 (1960); Smead,
The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation. A Basic Principle of Jursprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775
(1936); Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6 TEX. L. REV. 409 (1928); Stimson, Retroactive
Apphcation of Law--A Problem in Constitutional Law, 38 MIcH. L. REV. 30 (1939). For specific
commentary on Indiana's Mineral Lapse Act as retroactive legislation, see Polston,supra note 14
(suggests a model statute upon which the Indiana Act is based); Note, Constitutionality of Retroactive Land Statutes-Indiana'sModel Dormant Mineral Act, 12 IND. L. REv. 455, 480-86 (1979).
59. Many attempts have been made to define precisely a "retroactive" law. See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 58. For purposes of simplicity, it will be assumed in this article that "[a]
retroactive statute is one which gives to pre-enactment conduct a different legal effect from that
which it would have had without the statute." Hochman, supra note 56, at 692.
60. Jackson, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 290.
61. Hochman, supra note 56, at 697. Generally retroactive legislation is considered in four
distinct types of cases: 1) cases that involved emergency retroactive legislation; 2) cases that
challenge the constitutionality of curative statutes; 3) cases that involve the constitutional merits
of retrospective taxing legislation; and 4) cases that contest the constitutionality of retrospective
general legislation. Id at 698, 703, 706. The Court has been most amenable to legislation in the
first two categories, and somewhat less so to the third. Id The Court has been most suspect of
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ute, is difficult to determine. The public is served when land titles are rendered marketable and a valuable resource such as land is employed in an
efficient manner. The benefit rendered by the statute to the private interests
of the surface landowners is not a factor under this criterion. The only legitimate consideration is the general public interest served by the promotion of
an efficient, unrestricted market for land transfers.
The second criterion, the extent to which the statute modifies or abrogates the asserted pre-enactment right, can also be misleading. On its face,
the Act does little more than require a simple reaffirmation of ownership
where affirmation was not previously required. The Mineral Lapse Act operates, however, to essentially change a fee simple absolute in land to a terminable estate with a means to retain ownership. Therefore, the
preenactment right of ownership in perpetuity can be extinguished under
the Act. In practice the statute may function as a taking of property without
notice of the new reaffirmation requirement.
The nature of the right that the statute alters is the third criterion. The
Mineral Lapse Act can destroy an ownership right to an estate in minerals,
without any provision for compensation. On balance the three criteria
62
would mandate a more thorough analysis than that provided by the Court.
The implication of the Court's cursory treatment is that retroactive statutes
are being evaluated with greater deference.
Another test of the reasonableness of retroactive legislation is the degree
to which the statutes disrupt "reasonable expectations" of property owners.
The test has been used to determine whether state action constitues a taking
of property requiring compensation, 6 3 and whether a retroactive law violates
substantive due process. 64 Under this test, a change in zoning or an increase
in property tax is not violative of due process because such actions do not
disrupt the reasonable expectations that property owners have upon acquiring land. A state using the land for a public purpose without compensation
would, however, violate this criterion. The fundamental justification of this
approach is that efficiency is fostered when individuals are allowed to plan
economic activities with reasonable certainty.
The owners of mineral interests could reasonably expect a greater degree of state regulation of their property than that which existed when such
rights were acquired. Given the common law rule that a corporeal property
interest cannot be abandoned, however, a statutory presumption of abanthose cases in the fourth category into which the Texaco decision falls. Id See also, J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 419-37 (1978).
62. By returning a previously conveyed property interest, in some instances to the seller, an
argument could be made that the Mineral Lapse Act works as an impairment of contract in
violation of U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. Since the 1930's, however, the Court has taken a deferential approach to statutes that potentially violate this constitutional provision. It can be argued
that this constitutional infirmity has merely become an element of the permissive substantive
due process balancing. Set, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57
HARV. L. REv. 512 (1944). But see United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977);
Note, Revival of the Contract Clause, 39 IOWA ST. L.J. 195 (1978) (contract clause is apparently
applied more directly when a state is a party to the contract).
63. Berger, supra note 48.
64. Smith, supra note 58. See also Hochman, supra note 56, at 727.
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donment absent formal reaffirmation of the intent to own would not be a
reasonable expectation of these property owners.
Both the majority and dissent in Texaco examined the reasonableness of
the Mineral Lapse Act, but neither employed the previously suggested criteria for considering retroactive legislation. With the dearth of modern precedent, and the consequent lack of a strong analytical framework for
considering retroactive legislation, the majority made only brief references to
the substantive due process aspects of the Act. The Court noted that "the
State has not exercised . . . power in an abitrary manner," 6 5 and that the
statute "furthers a legitimate state goal." 66 This terse discussion implies that
the Court has adopted a permissive view of state enactment of retroactive
statutes, similar to the minimal scrutiny currently applied to prospective legislation. 67 In essence, the Court, by failing to consider the retroactive effect,
seems to adopt a deferential stance to formerly suspect retroactive legislation. This approach gives the states greater latitude to fashion laws that will
solve a perceived problem, even at the expense of disturbing vested property
rights.
The Texaco decision can, however, be better understood by examining
the implicit substantive due process analysis actually employed. Contrary to
the standard analysis of viewing specific constitutional objections to the statute, the Court initially found the overall Mineral Lapse Act reasonable, and
only then proceeded to dismiss specific constitutional objections. Essentially
the Court balanced the total effect of the Mineral Lapse Act, weighing the
constitutional rights at issue against the state's prerogative to impinge on
these rights in furtherance of a governmental objective. The dissent used a
similar methodology. After finding the total statute unreasonable as suspect
retroactive legislation, the dissent sympathetically examined the specific constitutional objections. 68 Although Texaco represents the Court's current analytical framework for evaluating retroactive statutes, neither the majority
nor the dissent explicitly admitted their adoption of this substantive due process approach.
III.

SUBSTANTIVE

DUE PROCESS REVIEW

AND THE IRREBUTTABLE

PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE

The constitutional deficiency of the Mineral Lapse Act is illustrated by
examining two presumptions on which it is based; one a legal maxim, the
other a statutory determination. The first is the common law maxim that
everyone is presumed to know the law. Despite the well-reasoned dissent65. 454 U.S. at 529.
66. Id.
67. The Court has expressed a stricter view towards retroactive general legislation as recently as 1976. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). Although upholding the statute in question, the Usety Court cautioned that: "It does not follow ... that what [a
state] can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively. The retrospective aspects of
legislation, as well as the prospective, must meet the test of due process, and the justification for
the latter may not suffice for the former." Id at 16-17.
68. 454 U.S. at 540.
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ing opinion to the contrary, 69 the majority states that by the end of the twoyear grace period all mineral owners are deemed to have constructive notice
of the statutory requirements for retaining their interests. 7 ° The second presumption is statutory, providing that after a specified period of non-use the
mineral interest is deemed abandoned, absent the filing of a notice of
71
retention.
Both the assumed knowledge, and the deemed abandonment are conclusive, irrebuttable presumptions, which cannot be disputed once the time
period has elapsed. 72 The harsh consequence of the two presumptions, forfeiture of a vested property interest gives rise to the objection that such legislation is unreasonable, and thus is an unconstitutional violation of
substantive due process.
In examining similar statutes, the Court has said that the Constitution
disfavors statutory irrebuttable presumptions such as that providing for
abandonment in the Mineral Lapse Act. 73 Illustrating this doctrine is the
Court's decision in Slanley v. Illinois.74 In this case the Court held that an
69. Given the unusual retroactive character of the Mineral Lapse Act, the dissent implies
there is a "good faith" notice requirement on the state to inform those directly affected. The
dissent indicates that the "reasonably calculated" standard introduced in Mullane is applicable
to the non-adjudicatory state action in Texaco. The Texaco situation, according to the dissent,
"highlights the limited circumstances in which the State's reliance on a presumption of knowledge strains the constitutional requirement that the liberty and property of persons be dealt
with fairly and rationally by the State." Id. at 546 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Utilizing substantive due process analysis, the dissent questions what rational state objective is served by not
affording the mineral estate owner greater notice of his imminent abandonment. Id. at 552.
70. The Court relies upon North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1924)
to support the statement that: "(P]ersons owning property within a State are charged with
knowledge of relevant statutory provisions affecting the control or disposition of such property."
454 U.S. at 532 (footnote omitted). See generally Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233
(1944); Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1972); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S.
241 (1907); Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559 (1889).
71. An interesting comparison can be drawn between the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act and
the Virginia Statute having essentially the same function, but relying on a wholly different
rebuttable presumption. VA. CODE §§ 55-153 to -155 (1981). The Virginia statute provides that
when a mineral interest has not been transferred or separately taxed, or when exploration has
not been conducted for a period of 35 years, the land covering such interest is deemed to contain
no minerals. Id § 55-154. The surface owner is then entitled to bring a suit to quiet title to
such mineral interest in himself. If the mineral owner defends, he is given six months from the
date of the hearing in which to explore for minerals. Within that six month period, if he can
establish that there are minerals, the court will order the mineral interest to be separately taxed.
If he fails to establish the existence of minerals, the interest is extinguished. Id § 55-155. See
generally Polston, supra note 14, at 89.
72. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970). But see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-32, at 898 (1978); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions as an Alternative to
Strict Scrutiny. From Rodriguez to La Fleur, 62 GEO. L. J. 1173 (1974); Note, The Irnebuttable
Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note, The Conclusive
Presumption Doctrine.. Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 800 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions. An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975); Comment, Some Thoughts on
the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 7 IND. L. REV. 644 (1974).
73. In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973), the Court stated that "permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments."
74. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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unwed father must be given a chance in a custody proceeding to prove his
fitness to be a parent. The Court stated that the administrative convenience
of an irrebuttable presumption cannot preclude an individual's right to be
heard. 75 In Vlandis v. Klhne, 76 the Court cast doubt on the factual basis for a
state's restrictive statutory determination of in-state residency for tuition
purposes, and held that "when the State has reasonable alternative means of
making the crucial determination," the Court should declare the conclusive
presumption unconstitutional. 77 In Bell v. Burson, 78 the Court determined
that use of a motor vehicle is a property interest. Furthermore, a self-executing statute that suspends the drivers license of an individual involved in an
auto accident, without any determination of fault or liability, is unconstitutional. 79 The Court has used the irrebuttable presumption doctrine in cases
of statutory deprivation of protected rights when it determined there was the
likelihood that a hearing procedure could be developed by the government,
favoring individualized determination over the administrative convenience
of a conclusive presumption. 8°
In effect, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine provides a higher level
of scrutiny for economic and social legislation than that available under the
Court's substantive due process criteria.8 ' The future scope of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine was limited by the Court's decision in Weinberger
v. Sa66/,8 2 in which the Court stated this doctrine would only be used to guarantee a constitutionally protected right or status. The doctrine, has not been
specifically overruled, although it is no longer being utilized as aggressive
enforcement mechanism of due process rights.
75. Id at 656-58. The Court stated:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is
a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular,
that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy.
id at 656.
76. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
77. Id at 452.
78. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
79. In direct contradiction to the reasoning of the Court in Texaco that "reasonably calculated" notice need only be given for an adjudication of rights, the Court, referring to the selfexecuting statute at issue in the earlier Be/ case stated that "due process requires that when a
State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford 'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termination becomes effective." Bell, 402 U.S. at 542.
80. In describing the basic constitutional rationale for the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, Justice Marshall stated that:
[W]here the private interests affected are very important and the governmental interest can be promoted without much difficulty by a well-designed hearing procedure,
[the Due Process Clause] requires the Government to act on an individualized basis,
with general propositions serving only as rebuttable presumptions or other burdenshifting devices.
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 518 (Marshall, J., concurring).
81. In his dissent in Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), Justice Rehnquist warned that: "The Court's disenchantment with 'irrebuttable presumptions,' and its preference for 'individualized determination,' is in the last analysis nothing less than an attack upon
the very notion of lawmaking itself." Id at 660 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
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The Mineral Lapse Act is well suited for application of the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine. A legal determination of abandonment is a necessary
prerequisite for the state to transfer title of the mineral interest to the owner
of the surface estate without giving compensation. Despite the Act's provision for a hearing procedure to judicially determine the surface owner's
claim to the minerals, the issue of abandonment by the mineral owner is
irrebuttably determined by the expiration of the statutory period. After this
period lapses, the mineral owner is foreclosed from challenging the abandonment determination in any judicial forum. 8 3 By employing a statutorily conclusive presumption of abandonment, rather than an in rem adjudication of
status, it is possible that some non-abandoned estates will be extinguished
without due process or compensation. As in Vlandis, there is doubt cast on
the underlying validity of the determination that the irrebuttable presumption attempts to provide.
The Weiberger restriction is met in the Texaco context because the Mineral Lapse Act can deprive a landowner of an interest in property without
84
In adcompensation upon an irrebuttable presumption of abandonment.
dition, the retroactive effect of the Act mandates an intermediate level of
substantive due process scrutiny, which the irrebuttable presumption doctrine provides.
While the Court could use this doctrine to overturn a number of laws
that contain an irrebuttable presumption, usually the issue does not arise
because the irrebuttable presumptions are employed to circumvent difficult
problems of proof.8 5 In contrast, it would be possible for the Mineral Lapse
Act to mandate a simple, efficient in rem adjudication to determine the intent
of a mineral owner to abandon the interest, similar to that used in the Vir86
ginia statute.
A mineral owner who neither has actual knowledge of the Mineral
Lapse Act nor has any intention to abandon, can lose his property by virtue
of presumptions to the contrary.8 7 The Court in Texaco could have found
83. According to one commentator: "The primary objection to conclusive presumptions is
that they usurp the judicial fact-finding function." Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions as an Alternative
to Strict S&rutiny." From Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 GEo. L.J. 1173, 1197 (1974).

84. The Court, and various commentators have struggled to determine when social and
economic legislation, not violative of fundamental rights, results in a taking of property mandating compensation. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978) (examination of the application of New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law to
Grand Central Terminal, owned by Pennsylvania Transportation Co.); Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (balances police power of state against private property interests). Since there was no issue in Texaco of a taking by regulation, or a partial taking, for purposes of this comment it is assumed that the denial of a property right in a severed mineral
interest, absent abandonment, would be a taking requiring compensation.
85. See supra note 72. For example, when a state enacts a law under its police power to
limit the speed of vehicles on a highway, an inherent presumption is that a vehicle traveling in
excess of this speed is dangerous to the public safety. The presumption is irrebuttable, in that
an individual is not allowed to assert that, because of excellent road conditions or superior
driving ability, it was acutally safe to exceed the stated maximum speed. To allow this assertion, under these circumstances, would inextricably complicate the judicial function.
86. See supra note 71.
87. A mining firm may find it economically advantageous to acquire and hold mineral
interests for future production and thereby neither currently work the mineral estate nor intend
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the Mineral Lapse Act unconstitutional based upon the dissent's rationale
that the Act lacked reasonable notice,8 8 or based on the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. The consequence of not examining the underlying legitimacy of the statutory presumptions is that the Mineral Lapse Act allows the
state to take property without just compensation under the guise of abandonment, in violation of constitutional protections.8 9 Failure to utilize any
of these methods of restricting the Court's deferential stance is an indication
of the current Supreme Court tolerance for legislative prerogative in social
and economic legislation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Texaco illustrates the difficulties encountered by a state in efficiently regulating land use by employing retroactive legislation while attempting to
preserve established rights. 9 0 These difficulties, in turn, create complex issues
for the Supreme Court, which must function as a constitutional check on
state action, and yet allow government to creatively address such modern
problems as severed mineral estates.
The Court methodically considered the procedural due process contentions of the appellants, restricting the decision in Mu/lane to state-mandated
adjudicatory proceedings, but failed to sufficiently weigh the burdensome
nature of the law as a violation of substantive due process. The Court did
not adequately address the fundamental reasonableness of a statute that retroactively alters the long-standing legal environment for retaining a vested
property interest, without giving adequate notice. Contrary to earlier cases
and the views expressed by scholars, the Texaco Court assesses this retroactive
law with the more deferential test typically applied to prospective
legislation.
Texaco is, however, implicitly decided on the basis of a substantive due
process reasoning, based on public policy, regarding the limits to state action. The Court viewed the Mineral Lapse Act as justified, given the need
for state action to eliminate dormant mineral interests. It had ample precedent to construe a violation of procedural due process or a taking without
compensation, but chose not to apply these theories in such a way as to defeat the statute. It chose not to invoke the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, refusing to suggest the constitutionally more palatable, but less
to abandon the property. See generally 0. HERFINDAHL & A. KNEESE, ECONOMIc THEORY OF

(1974).
88. The Mineral Lapse Act was passed shortly before midnight by the Indiana Senate on
the last day of the legislative session; thereafter it never received extensive publicity. Polston,
supra note 14, at 90.
89. Here the state is defining abandonment of corporeal and incorporeal mineral interests
contrary to the common law, yet the Supreme Court chose not to examine whether, under this
new definition that creates an irrebuttable presumption the property is sufficiently "abandoned" for the state to take without giving just compensation.
90. The problem, according to P. BASYE, supra note 2, at vi, is that "[b]ecause the original
structure of our system [of land transfers] did not come into being with the ability to visualize its
operation in a later and more complex age, we have seen its efficiency undergoing a progressive
decline during most of the twentieth century to date."
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administratively efficient means of using an individualized hearing procedure to determine abandonment.
The unique nature and problems created by severed mineral interests
limits the precedential value of Texaco for state actions affecting other forms
of property. 9 1 The import of this decision is the indication it provides of an
ideologically divided Court, constrained by its own self-imposed minimal
substantive due process review, trying to strike a proper balance between
legislative prerogative and constitutional safeguards.
Ross Kopi'n

91. See, e.g., Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1901). The Court in Wlson upheld a Pennsylvania statute that provided for the extinguishment of a reserved interest in ground rent if the
owner collected no rent and made no demand for payment for a period of 21 years. Though the
effect of the Pennsylvania statute was to extinguish a fee simple estate of permanent duration,
the Court upheld the legislation. Although heavily relied upon by the Indiana Supreme Court
in its Texaco ruling, and relied upon somewhat by the United States Supreme Court, the facts
are more similar to extinguishment of a debt by the running of a statute of limitations, although
an interest in property is technically lost. It is doubtful that this decision, or that of the Court in
Texaco, can be relied on as precedents for more common types of real property interests.

